SC Communication

Introduction

• The following information was reverse engineered from lv0ldr, lv0, lv1.self, and Iso module sc_iso.self.
• Big thanks to graf_chokolo for a large part of the basis of this page, and to Jestero for Syscon Authentication info!

Overview of Syscon Communication

• Syscon lives at the mmio space of 0x24000080000.
• Communication occurs through mmio read/writes.

List of known offsets in Syscon:

Offset (from start of address space)	Size	Description
0xC000	0xFF0	Syscon packet send area
0xCFF0	0x4	Syscon sent packet counter
0xCFF4	0x4	Syscon sent packet acknowledge counter
0xD000	0xFF0	Syscon packet receive area
0xDFF0	0x4	Syscon received packet counter
0xDFF4	0x4	Syscon received packet acknowledge counter
0xE100	0x4	Tells syscon there is a packet to be received

Quick explanation of the packet counters:

• There are two counters that are incremented by each side (Cell / Syscon).
• 0xCFF0 and 0xDFF0 are incremented by the sending side (Syscon for 0xCFF0, Cell for 0xDFF0)
• 0xCFF4 and 0xDFF4 are incremented by the receiving side (Cell for 0xCFF4, Syscon for 0xDFF4)

Syscon Services

• To be completed... (see Discussion page for examples)

SERV_INTR_NOTIF 0x17
SERV_LS 0x40
SERV STORAGE 0x50
SERV_Patch 0x2D
SERV VERS 0x18
SERV LIVELOCK 0x1B
SERV OSWDT 0x1C
SERV SIRCS 0x15
SERV NOTIF 0x16
SERV NVS 0x14
SERV DEVPM 0x10
SERV SETCFG 0x12
SERV SDA 0x3
SERV SYSPM 0x13

Service ID	Description
0x03	Device Access Service - Used for eeprom read/write.
0x10	PS2 PCI Bus Power On/Off
0x11	Time Zone Presence, Temperature, Thermal Alert Mode,
0x12	Config Info Service (BE Count, Error Log....)
0x13	Power Service - Controls system power and related info. (Power Up/Power Button Mode, Wake Source, RTC too.)
0x14	NVS Service - Used for eeprom read/write.
0x16	LED / Buzzer Service - Controls the lights on the console and the ring buzzer.
0x18	Version Service - Versioning related (SC Type/Major-,Minor Version)
0x1B	Livelock(?) Service - Checks for permission to use other services.
0x20	Syscon Debug Output(?) - Used to send a string to syscon.
0x2D	Syscon Patch Servuce
0x30	A/V Service.
0x50	Storage Service
0x1F	Authenticated Services. (sc_secure_service)
0xFF	Syscon Init (Seen in lv0ldr init sequence to syscon: User_talk:JuanNadie)

Syscon Packet Headers

• Some useful packet headers...
• If the header is shorter than 0x10, you must add your own size.
• If greater than 0x10, it's a full packet ;)

What?	Description	Data	Notes
AUTH1	AUTH1 Header	0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30	On AUTH1 UART SC Packets it's instead 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
AUTH2	AUTH2 Header	0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30	On AUTH2 UART SC Packets it's instead 0x10, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
Debug Output	Sends string to Syscon TTY	0x20, 0x01, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00	Start message with 0x00. Will print as much as packet length.
Triple Beep		0x16, 0x01, 0x16, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x08, 0x20, 0x29, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB6
Shutdown		0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00	Will not gracefully shut down HD.
Soft Restart		0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01	Restarts, but doesn't kill power between boots.
Hard Restart		0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02	Restarts, but kills power between boots.
Panic		0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03	Shuts down, beeps, and kills power LED until power button pressed, or power removed.

Syscon Authentication

- An IV of 0x00 is used for most AES steps.

Step 1 - Generate Individual Seeds

Encrypt sc_iso metadata seeds w/ eid root key / iv.

aes256cbc_enc(eid_root_erk, eid_root_riv, sc_module_seeds, 0x40, sc_module_seeds);

Step 2 - Generate SC_ISO encrypted keys

Encrypt the sc_key_seeds.

indiv_key = sc_module_seeds + 0x20;
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; i += 0x10)
    aes256cbc_enc(indiv_key, zero_iv, key_seeds + i, 0x10, enc_key_seeds + i);

Step 3 - Authenticate with Syscon

Pick a session_id. Must be <= 7.

Step 3a - Secure Packet Header

struct secure_payload_header {
    u8 session_id;
    u8 seq_service_id;  //service_ID (Unsecure uses 0xFF, AUTH1 = 0x02, AUTH2 = 0x03, READ_DATA = 0x04, WRITE_DATA = 0x05)
    u8 packet_type;     //0xFF for BE->SC, 0x00 for SC->BE (if success)
    u8 magic[0x2];      //0xAD1A
    u8 prng_random[0xB] //Random shit for padding
};

Step 3b - AUTH 1 to SC

uint8_t random_shit[0x10];
auth_key_1_0x01 = enc_key_seeds + (session_id * (0x10*2));
auth_key_2_0x01 = enc_key_seeds + (session_id * (0x10*2) + 0x10);

//generating random payload for auth1
rnd_gen(random_shit, 0x10);

//create auth1 random data
aes128cbc_enc(auth_key_1_0x01, zero_iv, random_shit, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10);

//length = 0x20
//Create secure header/footer
// create header: 5 bytes + random stuff (0xb)
payload_header->session_id = session_id;
payload_header->seq_service_id = seq_service_id++; // starts at 0
payload_header->packet_type = 0xFF;
payload_header->magic[0] = 0xAD;
payload_header->magic[1] = 0x1A;
rnd_gen((u8*) &payload_header->prng_random, 0x0B);
    
//encrypt payload
aes128cbc_enc(be2sc_key, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf, length, secure_payload_buf);

// create footer: omac1 of the whole packet
aesOmac1Mode(secure_payload_buf + length, secure_payload_buf, length, be2sc_key, sizeof(be2sc_key)*8);

//Set regular header
memcpy(sc_packet, auth1_pkt_header, 0x10);

//Send packet. 0x40 Bytes

Step 3c - Validate AUTH1

First, check the header/footer.

• Calculate AES OMAC over the packet length and compare to OMAC from syscon. Use sc2be key.
• Decrypt internal packet with sc2be key. Use AES128CBC
• Compare returned session_id and seq_service_id.
• Check secure_payload_buf[0x2] == 0.

Then check the AUTH1 response

// decrypt secure_payload
for (i = 0x0; i < 0x20; i += 0x10)
    aes128cbc(auth_key_2_0x01, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf + 0x10 + i, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10 + i);
    
// check if challange returned from syscon is correct
res = memcmp(secure_payload_buf + 0x10, random_shit, 0x10);
if (res != 0)
    return -1;
    
// save the new challange needed for AUTH2
memcpy(auth_challenge, secure_payload_buf + 0x20, 0x10);

Step 3d - AUTH2 to SC

//AUTH2 Challenge Payload
aes128cbc_enc(auth_key_1_0x01, zero_iv, auth_challenge, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10);

//length = 0x20
//Create secure header/footer
// create header: 5 bytes + random stuff (0xb)
payload_header->session_id = session_id;
payload_header->seq_service_id = seq_service_id++; // starts at 0
payload_header->packet_type = 0xFF;
payload_header->magic[0] = 0xAD;
payload_header->magic[1] = 0x1A;
rnd_gen((u8*) &payload_header->prng_random, 0x0B);
    
//encrypt payload
aes128cbc_enc(be2sc_key, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf, length, secure_payload_buf);

// create footer: omac1 of the whole packet
aesOmac1Mode(secure_payload_buf + length, secure_payload_buf, length, be2sc_key, sizeof(be2sc_key)*8);

//Set regular header
memcpy(sc_packet, auth2_pkt_header, 0x10);

//Put packet - 0x40 packet length

Step 3e - Validate AUTH2

Again, check the header/footer.

• Calculate AES OMAC over the packet length and compare to OMAC from syscon. Use sc2be key.
• Decrypt internal packet with sc2be key. Use AES128-CBC
• Compare returned session_id and seq_service_id.
• Check secure_payload_buf[0x2] == 0.

// encrypt random_shit using auth_challenge (returned from AUTH1 reply) as key and 0 IV
aes128cbc_enc(auth_challenge, zero_iv, random_shit, 0x10, session_key);

// encrypt result in place with session_key_create[0x10 * sess_id] and IV 0 (result will be the session_key)
aes128cbc_enc(session_key_create + (session_id * 0x10), zero_iv, session_key, 0x10, session_key);

// use the session_key to decrypt auth2_payload in place (0x10)
aes128cbc(session_key, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf + 0x10, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10);
    
// compare the result with a 0x10 zero string
res = memcmp(secure_payload_buf + 0x10, zero_iv, 0x10);

//res == 0x0 is good.

Step 4 - Profit?

You are now authenticated with syscon, and can use privileged commands. Just use the session_key calculated from the AUTH2 reply to encrypt/decrypt responses.

Some Samples from DYN-001 Syscon SPI SC Comms

• https://mega.nz/#!2w00VAjK!u10PD2b0G-MqwUZTBD4Nv_by36QNn8P-jVIUxq0pLDM

00 70 0B 93 FF DC CF 43 97 68 49 06 71 32 27 C1 
E8 9F D1 73 DA 4D FA A2 7C 6F 24 F7 BD 95 37 EC 
F9 17 5B BB DB 32 E8 82 55 3F 51 23 F1 71 E6 88