Kirk
The PSP KIRK Crypto Engine is a security hardware device that is embedded into the TACHYON main IC chip. It is a bus master and can DMA to/from main DDR RAM memory, operating independantly of the CPU. It is intefaced via memory mapped registers at base of 0xBDE00000 ([SPOCK Crypto Engine] on the other hand is mapped to 0xBDF00000). It is capable of performing AES encryption, decryption, SHA1 Hash, pseudo random number generation, and signature generation and verifications (ECDSA) and CMAC.
Commands
On PSP there are 18 KIRK commands. On PSVita, there are these 18 commands plus some new commands to support bigger keys (192 bits for example). See F00D commands.
KIRK functions are called with the same 5 arguments (outbuf, outbuf_size, inbuf, inbuf_size, service_number (which is the command ID)). Depending on the service number used, the expectations of the inbuf or outbuf vary and are detailed below.
Table
Command ID | Name | Short description | Input size | Output size | Result | Used in |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | KIRK_CMD_DECRYPT_PRIVATE | Super-Duper decryption (no inverse) | buf_size+0x40 | buf_size | memlmd, mesg_led | |
2 | KIRK_CMD_2 | Encrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 3) | ||||
3 | KIRK_CMD_3 | Decrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 2) | ||||
4 | KIRK_CMD_ENCRYPT_IV_0 | Encrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 7) (IV=0) | buf_size+0x14 | buf_size+0x14 | chnnlsv, memab | |
5 | KIRK_CMD_ENCRYPT_IV_FUSE | Encrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 8) (IV=FuseID) | buf_size+0x14 | buf_size+0x14 | chnnlsv, psheet since PSP FW 2.81 for PGD, ?openpsid for IDS Certificates? | |
6 | KIRK_CMD_ENCRYPT_IV_USER | Encrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 9) (IV=UserDefined) | ||||
7 | KIRK_CMD_DECRYPT_IV_0 | Decrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 4) (IV=0) | buf_size+0x14 | buf_size+0x14 | memlmd, mesg_led,chnnlsv, memab | |
8 | KIRK_CMD_DECRYPT_IV_FUSE | Decrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 5) (IV=FuseID) | buf_size+0x14 | buf_size+0x14 | chnnlsv, psheet since PSP FW 2.81 for PGD | |
9 | KIRK_CMD_DECRYPT_IV_USER | Decrypt Operation (inverse of cmd 6) (IV=UserDefined) | ||||
10 (0xA) | KIRK_CMD_PRIV_SIGVRY | Private Signature Verify (checks for private SCE sig) | ||||
11 (0xB) | KIRK_CMD_HASH | SHA1 Hash | buf_size >= 0x14 | ?0x14? | memlmd, mesg_led, memab | |
12 (0xC) | KIRK_CMD_MUL1 | ECDSA Generate Keys | 0 | 0x3C | memab | |
13 (0xD) | KIRK_CMD_MUL2 | ECDSA Multiply Point | 0x3C | 0x3C | ||
14 (0xE) | KIRK_CMD_PRNGEN | Pseudo Random Number Generation | 0 | 0x14 | mesg_led, chnnlsv, memab, semawm | |
15 (0xF) | KIRK_CMD_15 | (absolutely no idea – could be KIRK initialization) | IPL | |||
16 (0x10) | KIRK_CMD_SIGGEN | ECDSA Signature Generation | 0x34 | 0x28 | memab | |
17 (0x11) | KIRK_CMD_SIGVRY | Signature Verification (checks for generated signatures) | 0x64 | 0 | memab | |
18 (0x12) | KIRK_CMD_CERTVRY | Certificate Verification (IDStorage Certificates CMAC) | 0xB8 | 0 | openpsid, memab |
Command 1: decryption and authentication
Overview
There are two versions of this service: AES CMAC Verification, and ECDSA Verification. They use the header section of the input buffer slightly differently as follows.
AES CMAC Version
Key Header Structure (Length 0x60):
- 0x00-0x0F is decryption key (but stored encrypted with AES128, is not PLAINTEXT key)
- 0x10-0x1F is CMAC key (but again, derived ver not plain)
- 0x20-0x2F is header hash (CMAC)
- 0x30-0x3F is data hash (CMAC)
- 0x40-0x5F is 0
Metadata Header Structure (Length 0x30):
- 0x60-0x63 is set to 1 to indicate KIRK1 Verification
- 0x64-0x67 is 0 to indicate AES CMAC Version
- 0x68-0x6B is 0
- 0x6C-0x6F is 0 for retail versions and 0xFFFFFFFF for dev versions
- 0x70-0x73 is length of decrypted data
- 0x74-0x77 is length of padding after Metadata header before real data starts
- 0x78-0x8F is 0
Decryption process
The first 0x20 bytes of the Key Header is decrypted with the KIRK 1 Stored AES Key. This was allegedly discovered by Datel by decapping the chip and reversing engineering the algorithms and keys. This was also recovered through the failure in PS3 cryptography by decrypting the isolated module in the PSP emulator on the PS3.
The first two blocks (0x20 bytes at offset 0) are decrypted with the KIRK 1 AES Key. The first block is the AES Key used for decrypting the main data. The second block is used to decrypt the next two blocks (0x20 bytes at offset 0x20). These represent the Metadata Header CMAC and the Data CMAC. They are checked against the AES CMAC of the header section and the AES CMAC of the data section.
ECDSA Version
Key Header Structure (Length 0x60):
- 0x00-0x0F is decryption key (but stored encrypted with AES128, is not PLAINTEXT key)
- 0x10-0x23 is header ECDSA sig r
- 0x24-0x37 is header ECDSA sig s
- 0x38-0x4b is data ECDSA sig r
- 0x4c-0x5f is data ECDSA sig s
Metadata Header Structure (Length 0x30):
- 0x60-0x63 is set to 1 to indicate KIRK1 Verification
- 0x64-0x67 is set to 1 to indicate ECDSA version
- 0x68-0x6B is 0
- 0x6C-0x6F is 0 for retail versions and 0xFFFFFFFF for dev versions
- 0x70-0x73 is length of decrypted data
- 0x74-0x77 is length of padding after Metadata header before real data starts
- 0x78-0x8F is 0
Decryption process
The ECDSA version is slightly different. Only the first block (0x10 bytes) is decrypted with the Kirk 1 AES Key. It is used to decrypt the main data section just as in the AES CMAC version. Rather than a CMAC, the Metadata header is checked by SHA1 hashing its 0x30 bytes and checking the signature components through a ECDSA Verify call. The Data section is also checked via SHA1 of the entire data through a ECDSA Verify call.
The ECDSA curve parameters used for this ECDSA Verification are as follows.
p=FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
NP=FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0001B5C617F290EAE1DBAD8F
a=-3
b=65D1488C0359E234ADC95BD3908014BD91A525F9
Base Point: Gx=2259ACEE15489CB096A882F0AE1CF9FD8EE5F8FA Gy=604358456D0A1CB2908DE90F27D75C82BEC108C0
Public Point: Px=ED9CE58234E61A53C685D64D51D0236BC3B5D4B9 Py=049DF1A075C0E04FB344858B61B79B69A63D2C39
Command 2 (DRM encrypt)
This command is mostly unknown. The input data passed to KIRK is first checked (presumably CMAC), then decrypted, and re-encrypted with the console unique private key. Having that common key would allow legit creation of DRM BB install packages.
Command 3
Command 4
Command 5
Command 6
Command 7
Command 8
Command 9
Command 10
Command 11
Command 12: ECDSA key pair generation
Elliptic Curve Math formula : <math>y^2 = x^3 +ax +b mod p</math> with NP points on the curve
p = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
N= FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFB5AE3C523E63944F2127
a= -3
b= A68BEDC33418029C1D3CE33B9A321FCCBB9E0F0B
Base Point:
Gx= 128EC4256487FD8FDF64E2437BC0A1F6D5AFDE2C
Gy= 5958557EB1DB001260425524DBC379D5AC5F4ADF
Invocation:
u8 keypair[0x3c] sceUtilsBufferCopyWithRange(keypair,0x3c,0,0,0xC);
This returns the following into the keypair buffer (each value is 0x14 bytes long):
- 0x00 - randomly generated private key
- 0x14 - Public Key point x value
- 0x28 - Public Key point y value
Basically function 0xC generates a random number < N and multiplies it to the base point G to get the new public key.
Command 13: point multiplication
Elliptic Curve Math formula : <math>y^2 = x^3 +ax +b mod p</math> with NP points on the curve
p = FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF00000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
NP= FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEFFFFB5AE3C523E63944F2127
a= -3
b= A68BEDC33418029C1D3CE33B9A321FCCBB9E0F0B
Base Point:
Gx= 128EC4256487FD8FDF64E2437BC0A1F6D5AFDE2C
Gy= 5958557EB1DB001260425524DBC379D5AC5F4ADF
Invocation:
u8 buffer[0x3C] u8 newpoint[0x28] memcpy(buffer, multiplier, 0x14); memcpy(buffer+0x14, pointx, 0x14); memcpy(buffer+0x28, pointy, 0x14); sceUtilsBufferCopyWithRange(newpoint,0x28,buffer,0x3c,0xD);
The result is a new point(x and y are each 0x14 bytes long).
To test this, you can call 0xC service and copy the first 0x14 bytes to a new buffer, then copy the Gx and Gy values after that. Calling 0xD with the new buffer will return the values of x and y that were generated by the 0xC call.
Command 14
Command 15
Command 16
Command 17
Command 18
Library
Calling commands using KIRK registers
Notes
In 2008 SilverSpring wrote:
Currently what is known about the cipher is that it is: a block cipher operating in CBC mode an all zero 128-bit initialization vector 128-bit block and key sizes cmd4/7 uses a static key that is identical in all PSP’s cmd5/8 uses a key based off the fuseID making all operations unique per PSP cmd6/9 uses a user-defined 128-bit key cmd1/2/3 uses the block cipher but also signature algorithms the remaining KIRK cmd’s do not use the block cipher (sig, hash, & prng algo’s)