Editing Vulnerabilities

= Usermode =

== BD-J exploits ==

=== FW <= 7.61 - BD-JB2 - Path traversal sandbox escape by TheFloW ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_%3C=10.71_-_BD-JB2_-_Path_traversal_sandbox_escape_by_TheFloW].

==== Patched ====

'''Yes''' on PS5 FW 8.00.

=== FW <= 4.51 - BD-JB - Five vulnerabilities chained by TheFloW ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_%3C=9.00_-_BD-JB_-_Five_vulnerabilities_chained_by_TheFloW].

==== Implementations ====

* [https://github.com/psxdev/bd-jb PS5 BD-JB implementation by Antonio Jose Ramos Marquez (psxdev)]
* [https://github.com/john-tornblom/bdj-sdk/tree/master/samples/ps5-invoke-native PS5 BD-JB implementation by John Törnblom]
* [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/bd-jb/tree/ps5 PS5 BD-JB implementation by sleirsgoevy]
* [https://github.com/TheOfficialFloW/bd-jb PS5 BD-JB implementation by TheFloW]

==== Patched ====

'''Yes''' partially on PS5 FWs > 4.50 (need to test). Probably unpatched on FW 4.51 and patched on FW 5.00.

== WebKit exploits ==

=== Modal Browser HTTPS Bypass ===

* It is possible to bypass HTTPS in the modal browser, if you reply to the HTTPS CONNECT with a standard HTTP 1.1 response, instead of attempting to create a tunnel. The web browser will just display that response. The downside to this is that you have no idea of what the contents of even the HTTP REQUEST would have been, but it is useful for redirecting the web browser to any website you want.

==== Patched ====

'''No''' as of PS5 FW 5.10.

=== FW 6.00-9.60 - Unknown heap and string overflow (no CVE) leading to crash ===

See also [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_?10.00?-11.52_-_Unknown_heap_and_string_overflow_(no_CVE)_leading_to_crash].

==== Patched ====

'''Yes''' on PS4 FW 12.00 and PS5 FW 10.00.

==== Tested ====

Tested and working on PS4 FWs 10.00-11.52 and PS5 FWs 6.00-9.60.

=== FW 6.00-8.60 - JSC DFG Abstract Intepreter clobberWorld Type Confusion (no CVE) leading to arbitrary RW ===

See also [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_10.00-11.02_-_JSC_DFG_Abstract_Intepreter_clobberWorld_Type_Confusion_(no_CVE)_leading_to_arbitrary_RW].

==== Patched ====

'''Yes''' on PS4 FW 11.50 and PS5 FW 9.00.

==== Tested ====

Tested and working on PS4 FWs 10.00-11.02 and PS5 FWs 6.00-8.60.

=== FW <= 5.50 - FrameLoader::loadInSameDocument() UaF (CVE-2022-22620) leading to arbitrary RW ===

See also [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_6.00-9.60_-_FrameLoader::loadInSameDocument()_UaF_(CVE-2022-22620)_leading_to_arbitrary_RW].

==== Patched ====

'''Yes''' on PS4 FW 10.00 and PS5 FW 6.00.

==== Tested ====

Tested and working on PS4 FWs 6.00-9.60 and PS5 FWs 1.00-5.50.

=== FW 3.00-4.51 - WebCore::CSSFontFaceSet vulnerabilities leading to usermode ROP code execution ===

Contrarly to PS4, on PS5 this exploit does not allow arbitrary usermode memory RW because of PS5 memory protections. However thanks to tricks it is possible to get usermode ROP code execution from this exploit.

See also [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_9.00-9.04_-_WebCore::CSSFontFaceSet_vulnerabilities_leading_to_arbitrary_RW].

==== Implementations ====

* [https://github.com/ChendoChap/PS5-Webkit-Execution Implementation for PS5 by ChendoChap]

==== Patched ====

'''No''' as of PS5 FW 4.51 (need to test on PS5 FWs >=5.00).

==== Tested ====

Tested and working on PS4 FWs 9.00-9.04 and PS5 FWs 3.00-4.51. Untested: PS5 FWs 2.10-2.50 and >=5.00.

== Game savedata exploits ==

=== PS1 games savedata exploits ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#PS1_games_savedata_exploits PS4 Dev Wiki].

=== PS2 game savedata exploits ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#PS2_games_savedata_exploits PS4 Dev Wiki].

=== PSP games savedata exploits ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#PSP_games_savedata_exploits PS4 Dev Wiki].

=== PS4/PS5 PS2emu sandbox escape (mast1c0re) ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#PS4.2FPS5_PS2emu_sandbox_escape_.28mast1c0re.29 PS4 Dev Wiki].

=== PS4/PS5 game savedata LUA exploit ===

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#PS4/PS5_game_savedata_LUA_exploit PS4 Dev Wiki].

== PS4 emulator exploits ==

Nothing yet.

== Usermode securities ==

See also [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#Usermode_securities PS4 usermode securities].

=== >=8.00 - Syscalls and libkernel blocked from main usermode applications ===

Since PS5 System Software version 8.00, in order to make the PS5 less vulnerable to kernel escalation from usermode after TheFloW's disclose of BD-JB2, Sony blocked syscall and libkernel access from the main contenders such as BD JAVA, WebKit, PS2emu and probably more else all usermode applications.

= Kernel =

== CR0.WP and XOM bypass ==

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#CR0.WP_protection PS4 dev wiki].

=== Credits ===

* sleirsgoevy for proposing it in PS4 kernel exploit since System Software version 6.51.
* Specter for adapting it to PS5 and explaining it.

=== Patched ===

'''Maybe''' in PS5 FW 5.00.
----

== Physical memory readable by kernel (Meme Dumper) ==

=== Credits ===

Discovered by cheburek3000. Released on 2023-02-07 by cheburek3000.

=== Bug Description ===

Steps:

1. Find kernel_pmap_store offset in kernel data segment. You can guess its location by specific signature (see guess_kernel_pmap_store_offset code). Luckily kernel_pmap_store has physical and virtual addresses for PML4.

2. Through physical and virtual addresses for PML4, you can find physical memory mapped directly to the kernel memory (DMAP). See PADDR_TO_DMAP macro and vmparam.h from FreeBSD for reference.

3. Use page tables to convert any kernel virtual address to physical address (see vaddr_to_paddr code).

4. Access data by physical address through DMAP.

=== Exploit Implementation ===

* [https://github.com/cheburek3000/meme_dumper]

=== Patched ===

'''No''' in PS5 FW 4.51.
----

== FW <= 7.61 - umtx UaF (yielding arbitrary kernel R/W) (CVE-2024-43102) ==

=== Credits ===

* chris@accessvector.net for discovering the vulnerability, keeping it secret (2020-12) then sharing a writeup (2024-09-06)
* Rebecca Cran for discovering the bug in umtx (2023-05-07)
* Synacktiv for finding and disclosing publicly the vulnerability (2024-09-04)
* Olivier Certner for fixing the bug (2024-09-04), kib for reviewing the bug fix (2024-09-04), Ed Maste for approving the bug fix commit (2024-09-04)
* Shuffle from Fail0verflow for the FreeBSD 11 and PS5 PoC in C++ (2024-09-14)
* Flatz for writing a PS5 exploit chain with TheFloW's BD-JB2 (2024-09-14)
* Specter for chaining the kernel exploit with PsFree WebKit exploit (2024-09-21)

=== Analysis ===

* [https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=271300 Crash report by Rebecca Cran (2023-05-07)]
* [https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-24:14.umtx.asc FreeBSD Security Advisory for CVE-2024-43102 (2024-09-04)]
* [https://cgit.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=62f40433ab47ad4a9694a22a0313d57661502ca1 Fix commit (2024-09-04)]
* [https://securityonline.info/freebsd-issues-urgent-security-advisory-for-cve-2024-43102-cvss-10/ Vulnerability press release (2024-09-09)]
* [https://accessvector.net/2024/freebsd-umtx-privesc Writeup by chris@accessvector.net (2024-09-06)]
* [https://github.com/PS5Dev/PS5-UMTX-Jailbreak Exploitation strategy explanation by Specter (2024-09-21)]

=== Bug Description ===

The _umtx_op(2) system call provides support for the implementation of synchronization primitives between threads, and is used by the 1:1 Threading Library (libthr, -lthr) to implement IEEE Std 1003.1-2001 (POSIX.1-2001) pthread locks, like mutexes, condition variables and so on. In particular, its UMTX_OP_SHM operation provides support for anonymous shared memory associated to a particular physical address, which is used to implement process-shared mutexes (PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED).

Concurrent removals of such a mapping by using the UMTX_SHM_DESTROY sub-request of UMTX_OP_SHM can lead to decreasing the reference count of the object representing the mapping too many times, causing it to be freed too early.

umtx_shm_unref_reg_locked() would unconditionally drop the "registry" reference, tied to USHMF_LINKED.

This is not a problem for caller umtx_shm_object_terminated(), which operates under the 'umtx_shm_lock' lock end-to-end, but it is for indirect caller umtx_shm(), which drops the lock between umtx_shm_find_reg() and the call to umtx_shm_unref_reg(true) that deregisters the umtx shared region (from 'umtx_shm_registry'; umtx_shm_find_reg() only finds registered shared mutexes).

Thus, two concurrent user-space callers of _umtx_op() with UMTX_OP_SHM and flags UMTX_SHM_DESTROY, both progressing past umtx_shm_find_reg() but before umtx_shm_unref_reg(true), would then decrease twice the reference count for the single reference standing for the shared mutex's registration.

A malicious code exercizing the UMTX_SHM_DESTROY sub-request in parallel can panic the kernel or enable further Use-After-Free attacks, potentially including code execution or Capsicum sandbox escape.

=== Exploit Implementation ===

* [https://github.com/fail0verflow/ps5-umtxdbg/ C++ implementation for FreeBSD 11 virtual machine near of PS5 by Fail0verflow (2024-09-14)]
* [https://gist.github.com/flatz/89dfe9ed662076742f770f92e95e12a7 JAVA implementation for PS5 chained with BD-JB2 by Flatz (2024-09-14)]
* [https://gist.github.com/flatz/5e12f75cdb210516d31df03069f7ed0a LUA implementation for PS5 chained with LUA exploit by Flatz (2024-09-14)]
* [https://github.com/PS5Dev/PS5-UMTX-Jailbreak WebKit implementation for PS5 1.00-5.50 chained with PS Free by Specter (2024-09-21)]

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' in PS5 FW 8.00.
----

== FW <= 8.20 - Remote vulnerabilities in spp (yielding kernel panic) (CVE-2006-4304 and no-CVE) ==

See the [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_%3C=_11.00_-_Remote_vulnerabilities_in_spp_(yielding_kernel_ASLR_defeat)_(CVE-2006-4304_and_no-CVE) PS4 wiki].

Note that kernel ASLR defeat is currently not working on PS5 and there are protections remaining before being able to get ROP chain execution in kernel.

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' in PS5 FW 8.40.
----

== FW <= ?3.21? - PPPoE driver remote buffer overflow (CVE-2022-29867) ==

See the [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_%3C=_9.00_-_PPPoE_driver_remote_buffer_overflow_(CVE-2022-29867) PS4 wiki].

Note that PS5 is maybe not affected even though PS4 is.

=== Patched ===

'''Probably''' in PS5 FW 4.00.
----

== FW 3.00-4.51 - IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS UaF (yielding arbitrary kernel R/W) (CVE-2020-7457) ==

See the [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_.3C.3D_7.02_-_IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS_UaF_.28yielding_arbitrary_kernel_R.2FW.29_.28CVE-2020-7457.29 PS4 wiki].

=== Credits ===

* Discovered for PS4 and ported to PS5 by TheFloW.

=== Exploit Implementation ===

* See also implementation for FreeBSD 9 or 12 or PS4.
* [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS5-4.03-Kernel-Exploit Kernel exploit implementation for PS5 3.00-4.51 by Specter (2022-10-02)]

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' in PS5 FW 5.00. Invulnerable in PS5 FW 2.50 and below.
----

== FW <= 4.03 - exFAT driver heap-based buffer overflow ==

See the [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#FW_.3C.3D_9.00_-_exFAT_driver_heap-based_buffer_overflow PS4 wiki].

=== Credits ===

Discovered by TheFloW. Disclosed by ChendoChap.

=== Exploit Implementation ===

Not yet because even though there is ChendoChap's method to execute usermode code in WebKit, there is no PS5 kernel dump to build a kernel ROP chain. Exploiting this kernel vulnerability blind is almost impossible because once the USB device is inserted it corrupts the kernel heap memory and if the offsets in the kernel ROP chain are bad it creates a kernel panic.

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' in PS5 FW 4.50.
----

== SMAP bypass (CVE-2021-29628) ==

See also [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#Kernel_SMAP PS4 SMAP bypass].

=== Credits ===

* Discovered and disclosed publicly by m00nbsd. Disclosed to SIE on 2020-12-01.

=== Analysis ===

* [https://hackerone.com/reports/1048322 HackerOne report for CVE-2021-29628 by m00nbsd (2020-12-01)]
* [https://reviews.freebsd.org/D30276 FreeBSD fix commit by kib (2021-05-15)]
* [https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/commit/fb580451456aa769daa2f4b2f077e39692f80c62 FreeBSD fix commit by markjdb (2021-05-16)]
* [https://www.freebsd.org/security/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-21:11.smap.asc FreeBSD advisory for CVE-2021-29628 (2021-05-26)]

=== Bug Description ===

In FreeBSD 13.0-STABLE before n245764-876ffe28796c, 12.2-STABLE before r369857, 13.0-RELEASE before p1, and 12.2-RELEASE before p7, a system call triggering a fault could cause SMAP protections to be disabled for the duration of the system call. This weakness could be combined with other kernel bugs to craft an exploit. It does not work on PS4 because PS4 kernel is based on FreeBSD 9 which did not contain the vulnerability and because PS4 SMAP does not come from FreeBSD but is custom from Sony. It used to work on PS5 before it was disclosed and patched.

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' in PS5 FW 2.30 or later according to dates.
----

== Kernel securities ==

=== dlsym syscall removed ===

Since PS5 System Software version 5.00, dlsym syscall is disabled (?removed?). dlsym could be used to resolve functions and variables addresses by their name. This was convenient for multi-firmware support.

Workaround: in the same way as in PSP and PS Vita HBL, and vitasploit, a workaround is to resolve functions by per-version offsets manually.

=== MAP_SELF flag removed ===

Since PS5 System Software version 5.00, MAP_SELF flag is nonexistent. MAP_SELF flag could be used for decrypting PS5 usermode SELFs such as eboot.bin and SUPRXs for games and applications, and system SELFs from /system and /system_ex, etc.

Workaround: using the PSP functions directly like Specter does.

= Secure Kernel =

== Untested: Partial SAMU KeyRings bruteforce by missing HMAC length check in secure kernel ==

See [https://www.psdevwiki.com/ps4/Vulnerabilities#Partial_SAMU_KeyRings_bruteforce_by_missing_HMAC_length_check_in_secure_kernel].

Potentially vulnerable on PS5 FWs <= 4.03.

= Hypervisor =

Without a Hypervisor bypass/compromise, you are essentially limited to "data-only" attacks in kernel and usermode. Since patching the kernel is the most straightforward and direct way to achieve true homebrew on the PlayStation 5, bypassing or compromising the PS5 Hypervisor is necessary. Getting code execution in the PS5 Hypervisor allows one to dump and modify kernel .text segment, and to disable some protections. Moreover, chained with a higher level vulnerability, Hypervisor code can dump AMD PSP memory.

== <=4.51 - Hypervisor bypass vulnerability ==

=== Credits ===

* Discovered by anonymous (probably shuffle from fail0verflow or TheFloW). Announced by Flatz (2024-10-05).

=== Bug description ===

* Not disclosed yet.

=== Patched ===

* Patched since PS5 FW 5.00.

== <=?2.50? - APIC pointers in kernel data segment ==

=== Credits ===

* Discovered by flatz. Disclosed publicly by flatz (2024-10-09).

=== Bug description ===

The apic_ops structure is located in the PS5 kernel .data segment which has RW permissions. Using a kernel vulnerability, you can overwrite a function pointer inside the apic_ops structure, like xapic_mode. This allows to launch a ROP chain but one has to bypass the CFI protection. After doing a PS5 suspend/resume cycle, the ROP code will be executed before Hypervisor restarts. The ROP chain can apply patches in kernel .text section.

* [https://twitter.com/flat_z/status/1843966331093438891 flatz explanation on twitter (2024-10-09)]

=== Patched ===

* Maybe on PS5 FW 3.00.

== <=2.50 - System Level debug flag in kernel data segment and not wiped after rest mode (Byepervisor bug #2) ==

=== Credits ===

* Discovered by Specter and ChendoChap (2023-07-01, [https://twitter.com/SpecterDev/status/1840303332763512837 Specter's announcement]).
* Disclosed publicly by Specter at Hardwear.io 2024 conference (2024-10-24).

=== Bug description ===

On PS5 System Software version 2.50 and lower, the System Quality Assurance (QA) flags are shared between the Hypervisor and the guest kernel. When the hypervisor initializes, the init code for constructing nested page tables will check QA flags for the System Level (SL) debugging flag. If this flag is set, the nested Page Table Entries (PTEs) will not have the xotext bit set for kernel .text pages, and further the kernel .text pages will also have the write bit set.

These flags are not reinitialized by the Secure Loader upon resume from PS5 sleep mode, though the hypervisor is. By setting the SL flag, then putting the system to sleep and resuming, we can edit the guest kernel's page tables to make kernel .text pages readable and writable, allowing kernel dump and patches.

=== Analysis ===

* [https://github.com/PS5Dev/Byepervisor/blob/main/Byepervisor_%20Breaking%20PS5%20Hypervisor%20Security.pdf Writeup of Byepervisor by Specter (2024-10-26)]

=== Implementation ===

* [https://github.com/PS5Dev/Byepervisor Implementation of Byepervisor bug #2 by Specter (2024-10-24)]
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lkd0qgr-4zk Demonstration video of Byepervisor bug #2 by Specter (2024-10-22)]

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00.

== <=2.50 - Hypervisor virtual tables in kernel data segment (Byepervisor bug #1) ==

=== Credits ===

* Discovered by Specter and ChendoChap (2023-07-01, [https://twitter.com/SpecterDev/status/1840303332763512837 Specter's announcement]) and Flatz (before 2023-07-27).
* Disclosed publicly by Specter at Hardwear.io 2024 conference (2024-10-24).

=== Bug description ===

On PS5 System Software version 2.50 and lower, the Hypervisor's [[Hypervisor#Hypercalls]] virtual tables are shared with the guest kernel. It is possible to hijack some entries (for example VMMCALL_HV_SET_CPUID_PS4) in the hypercalls virtual table to jump to a ROP chain. On FWs <= 2.50, this virtual table is stored in the kernel .data segment. By using two ROP chains, one for setting up hypervisor registers and one for executing code in hypervisor. Indeed, the registers used by the Hypervisor are preserved accross Virtual Machine exit boundary. The ROP chain disables Nested Paging (NPT) and Guest Mode Execute Trap (GMET), which allows us to disable eXecute Only Memory (XOM) aka xotext in the kernel Page Table Entries (PTEs) to dump it, as well as enabling write in the PTEs to hook/patch the kernel as well.

This method requires a fair number of gadgets and offsets, which is the main reason this exploit is deprecated over the Byepervisor bug #2. This method also currently only breaks the hypervisor on the core the ROP chain runs on. The hypervisor is still active on other cores and would need to be disabled.

=== Analysis ===

* [https://github.com/PS5Dev/Byepervisor/blob/main/Byepervisor_%20Breaking%20PS5%20Hypervisor%20Security.pdf Writeup of Byepervisor by Specter (2024-10-26)]

=== Implementation ===

* [https://github.com/PS5Dev/Byepervisor/tree/main/_old_jump_table_exploit Implementation of Byepervisor bug #1 by Specter (2024-10-24)]

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00.

== <=2.50 - Hypervisor integrated as part of the kernel binary ==

=== Credits ===

* Discovered by shuffle from fail0verflow (in 2020), Specter and ChendoChap (2023-07-01) and Flatz (before 2023-07-27).

=== Bug description ===

On PS5 System Software version 2.50 and lower, the Hypervisor is integrated as part of the kernel binary. This makes Hypervisor exploitation easier as it can be triggered by usermode directly without the need of a kernel exploit. Later versions have the Hypervisor as a separately loaded component.

* See [[Hypervisor#In-Kernel_Hypervisor_.28.3C.3D_2.50.29]] and [https://wololo.net/2023/07/02/ps5-specterdev-shares-details-on-in-kernel-hypervisor-earlier-versions-of-the-ps5-hypervisor-found-in-firmwares/ wololo article (2023-07-02)].

=== Patched ===

'''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00.

= Secure Loader - ARM Platform Secure Processor =

== <=2.50 - Software vulnerability leading to Secure Loader dump from Hypervisor ==

=== Credits ===

* Discovered by Shawn Hoffman (shuffle of fail0verflow) before 2021-09-08 and announced on 2021-11-08 ([https://twitter.com/fail0verflow/status/1457526453105569793 Fail0verflow's announcement on Twitter (2021-11-08)])
* Discovered independently and announced on 2023-07-27 by flatz ([https://twitter.com/flat_z/status/1684554194366107650 flatz's announcement on Twitter (2023-07-27)]).

=== Bug description ===

A software vulnerability triggered from the PS5 Hypervisor leads to [[AMD Platform Secure Processor]] memory dump. This dump contains the PS5 [[Secure Loader]].

This leads to PS5 symmetric root keys dump, that can then be used for decryption of most Secure Modules, according to Fail0verflow. This allows to decrypt on PC most parts of the PS5 System Software files including:
* PUP
And by derivation, mostly like on PS Vita:
* secure modules
* kernel boot loader / BIOS
* non-secure kernel
* usermode system modules

It must be noted that Shawn Hoffman (fail0verflow, Microsoft Offensive Security Research) reported in 2020 and 2021 the following vulnerabilities affecting AMD Secure Processor (ASP), AMD System Management Unit (SMU), AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), and other AMD platform components: CVE-2021-26315, CVE-2021-26335, CVE-2021-26336, CVE-2021-26337, CVE-2021-26338, CVE-2021-26351, CVE-2021-26352. [https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1021.html]. The most probable vulnerabilities that could have been used are:
* CVE-2021-26315 6.9 (Medium): A CPU internal ROM improperly implements decryption of signed off-chip firmware. An attacker with physical access or high privileges could potentially exploit this vulnerability leading to the execution of arbitrary code on the PSP, compromising the authenticity of the attestation state. -> Note that flatz stated that he used only software, including Hypervisor code execution, but not hardware for his exploit, so it is the "attacker with high privileges" part that might be concerned.
* CVE-2021-26335 7.5 (High): Improper input and range checking in the AMD Secure Processor (ASP) boot loader image header may allow an attacker to use attacker-controlled values prior to signature validation potentially resulting in arbitrary code execution. -> This reminds of the [https://wiki.henkaku.xyz/vita/Vulnerabilities#First_Loader_SLSK_buffer_overflow CMeP vulnerability] about [https://wiki.henkaku.xyz/vita/SLSK SLSK] header parsing found by Team Molecule for PS Vita.
* Other Shawn Hoffman's CVEs are related to the AMD System Management Unit (SMU) but mainly to trigger Denial of Service and it is not clear how AMD SMU could be used to dump AMD PSP's memory.

* ''It is also speculated that this exploit is a variant of the 2023 ZenBleed [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20593 CVE-2023-20593] exploit, as the PS5 APU is a custom AMD ZEN 2 Ryzen chip.''

* See also [https://www.psxhax.com/threads/flat_z-confirms-ps5-hypervisor-exploitation-from-ps4-save-game.16063/ flatz's comments].

=== Patched ===

* Vulnerable on PS5 FWs <= 2.50 and potentially patched since 3.00.

= Southbridge =

== EMC, EFC and EAP vulnerabilities leading to code execution ==

=== Credits ===

* Disclosed by Shawn Hoffman (of SYMBRKRS LLC, @shuffle2 of fail0verflow) at the Security Analyst Summit Conference 2024 (2024-10-23).

=== Bug description ===

These exploits allow code execution on EMC, EFC and EAP. The exploits are interesting as they cover a hard-to-spot bug in a firmware state machine, and abusing hardware misconfiguration to bypass memory protection measures.

It is required to solder to [[Service Connectors]] to make use of these vulnerabilities.

=== Analysis ===

* [https://symbrkrs.com/presentations/Beyond_Oberon-SAS2024.pdf Slides of the presentation at SAS24 Conference by shuffle (2024-10-23)]

=== Implementation ===

* [https://github.com/symbrkrs/ps5-uart Software to be used with a Raspberry Pi Pico to unlock PS5 EMC UART and EMC/EFS/EAP code execution by shuffle (2024-10-23)]

In shuffle's implementation, only the Raspberry Pi Pico is supported with the UF2 firmware.

Additionally, only the following PS5 EMC versions are supported for now (see [https://github.com/symbrkrs/ps5-uart/blob/main/uart/emc_shellcode.S shuffle's ps5-uart source code]):
* E1E 0001 0000 0004 13d0
* E1E 0001 0002 0003 1580
* E1E 0001 0004 0002 1752

= Unclassified =

== TheFloW's neither usermode nor kernel exploit ==

* On 2024-08-29, TheFloW received 10.000$ from Sony for disclosing privately on Sony's HackerOne bug bounty program a vulnerability.

* According to Flatz, this vulnerability affects neither usermode nor kernel, so it might be either about hardware or more likely about Hypervisor.

* This vulnerability probably got patched in PS5 FW 10.00 or in PS5 FW 9.60, or if it is not patchable by software, is patched in new hardware revisions of the PS5.

= Hardware =

== Untested: ZenBleed (''[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20593 CVE-2023-20593]) leak register contents directly from the CPU.'' ==
This is a well documented CPU vulnerability in AMD Processors with the Zen 2 microarchitecture. There is no proof of concept specifically for the PS5, however we do know the PS5 uses a custom Zen 2 chip. This is a hardware bug that uses software to exploit the system. AMD has since patched this with [https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7008.html software], but we are unsure of the status for the latest PS5 firmware (assumed to be patched). For more information see [[PS-Chi]].