Editing Vulnerabilities
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Tested and working on PS4 FWs 10.00-11.52 and PS5 FWs 6.00-9.60. | Tested and working on PS4 FWs 10.00-11.52 and PS5 FWs 6.00-9.60. | ||
=== FW 6.00-8.60 - JSC DFG Abstract Intepreter clobberWorld Type Confusion (no CVE) leading to arbitrary RW === | === FW 6.00-8.60 - JSC DFG Abstract Intepreter clobberWorld Type Confusion (no CVE) leading to arbitrary RW === | ||
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==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
Tested and working on PS4 FWs 9.00-9.04 and PS5 FWs 3.00-4.51. Untested: PS5 FWs 2.10-2. | Tested and working on PS4 FWs 9.00-9.04 and PS5 FWs 3.00-4.51. Untested: PS5 FWs 2.10-2.50 and >=5.00. | ||
== Game savedata exploits == | == Game savedata exploits == | ||
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=== Patched === | === Patched === | ||
'''Yes''' in PS5 FW 5.00. Invulnerable in PS5 FW 2. | '''Yes''' in PS5 FW 5.00. Invulnerable in PS5 FW 2.50 and below. | ||
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=== Exploit Implementation === | === Exploit Implementation === | ||
Edit: it may now be possible to build a valid PS5 exFAThax payload thanks to PS5 kernel .text segment dumps for System Software versions <= 2. | Edit: it may now be possible to build a valid PS5 exFAThax payload thanks to PS5 kernel .text segment dumps for System Software versions <= 2.50 thanks to Hypervisor exploits. | ||
Not yet because even though there is ChendoChap's method to execute usermode code in WebKit, there is no PS5 kernel .text segment dump to build a kernel ROP chain. Exploiting this kernel vulnerability blind is almost impossible because once the USB device is inserted it corrupts the kernel heap memory and if the offsets in the kernel ROP chain are bad it creates a kernel panic. | Not yet because even though there is ChendoChap's method to execute usermode code in WebKit, there is no PS5 kernel .text segment dump to build a kernel ROP chain. Exploiting this kernel vulnerability blind is almost impossible because once the USB device is inserted it corrupts the kernel heap memory and if the offsets in the kernel ROP chain are bad it creates a kernel panic. | ||
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* Patched since PS5 FW 5.00. | * Patched since PS5 FW 5.00. | ||
== <=?2. | == <=?2.50? - APIC pointers in kernel data segment == | ||
=== Credits === | === Credits === | ||
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* Maybe on PS5 FW 3.00. | * Maybe on PS5 FW 3.00. | ||
== <=2. | == <=2.50 - System Level debug flag in kernel data segment and not wiped after rest mode (Byepervisor bug #2) == | ||
=== Credits === | === Credits === | ||
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=== Bug description === | === Bug description === | ||
On PS5 System Software version 2. | On PS5 System Software version 2.50 and lower, the System Quality Assurance (QA) flags are shared between the Hypervisor and the guest kernel. When the hypervisor initializes, the init code for constructing nested page tables will check QA flags for the System Level (SL) debugging flag. If this flag is set, the nested Page Table Entries (PTEs) will not have the xotext bit set for kernel .text pages, and further the kernel .text pages will also have the write bit set. | ||
These flags are not reinitialized by the Secure Loader upon resume from PS5 sleep mode, though the hypervisor is. By setting the SL flag, then putting the system to sleep and resuming, we can edit the guest kernel's page tables to make kernel .text pages readable and writable, allowing kernel dump and patches. | These flags are not reinitialized by the Secure Loader upon resume from PS5 sleep mode, though the hypervisor is. By setting the SL flag, then putting the system to sleep and resuming, we can edit the guest kernel's page tables to make kernel .text pages readable and writable, allowing kernel dump and patches. | ||
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'''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00. | '''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00. | ||
== <=2. | == <=2.50 - Hypervisor virtual tables in kernel data segment (Byepervisor bug #1) == | ||
=== Credits === | === Credits === | ||
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=== Bug description === | === Bug description === | ||
On PS5 System Software version 2. | On PS5 System Software version 2.50 and lower, the Hypervisor's [[Hypervisor#Hypercalls]] virtual tables are shared with the guest kernel. It is possible to hijack some entries (for example VMMCALL_HV_SET_CPUID_PS4) in the hypercalls virtual table to jump to a ROP chain. On FWs <= 2.50, this virtual table is stored in the kernel .data segment. By using two ROP chains, one for setting up hypervisor registers and one for executing code in hypervisor. Indeed, the registers used by the Hypervisor are preserved accross Virtual Machine exit boundary. The ROP chain disables Nested Paging (NPT) and Guest Mode Execute Trap (GMET), which allows us to disable eXecute Only Memory (XOM) aka xotext in the kernel Page Table Entries (PTEs) to dump it, as well as enabling write in the PTEs to hook/patch the kernel as well. | ||
This method requires a fair number of gadgets and offsets, which is the main reason this exploit is deprecated over the Byepervisor bug #2. This method also currently only breaks the hypervisor on the core the ROP chain runs on. The hypervisor is still active on other cores and would need to be disabled. | This method requires a fair number of gadgets and offsets, which is the main reason this exploit is deprecated over the Byepervisor bug #2. This method also currently only breaks the hypervisor on the core the ROP chain runs on. The hypervisor is still active on other cores and would need to be disabled. | ||
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'''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00. | '''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00. | ||
== <=2. | == <=2.50 - Hypervisor integrated as part of the kernel binary == | ||
=== Credits === | === Credits === | ||
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=== Bug description === | === Bug description === | ||
On PS5 System Software version 2. | On PS5 System Software version 2.50 and lower, the Hypervisor is integrated as part of the kernel binary. This makes Hypervisor exploitation easier as it can be triggered by usermode directly without the need of a kernel exploit. Later versions have the Hypervisor as a separately loaded component. | ||
* See [[Hypervisor#In-Kernel_Hypervisor_.28.3C.3D_2. | * See [[Hypervisor#In-Kernel_Hypervisor_.28.3C.3D_2.50.29]] and [https://wololo.net/2023/07/02/ps5-specterdev-shares-details-on-in-kernel-hypervisor-earlier-versions-of-the-ps5-hypervisor-found-in-firmwares/ wololo article (2023-07-02)]. | ||
=== Patched === | === Patched === | ||
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'''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00. | '''Yes''' since PS5 FW 3.00. | ||
= Secure Loader (software) - | = Secure Loader (software) - ARM Platform Secure Processor (hardware) = | ||
* The PS5 | * The PS5 APU is a custom AMD ZEN 2 Ryzen chip that includes the [[ARM Platform Secure Processor]] and the ARM SMU. | ||
* The | * The ARM Platform Secure Processor runs the [[Secure Loader]] that is in charge of loading and executing [[Secure Modules]], like on PS4. The Secure Loader exports some SM management services to kernel through a mailbox. | ||
* With a | * With a Hypervisor exploit, it is possible to exploit a vulnerability to dump the ARM Platform Secure Processor memory. This dump contains the PS5 [[Secure Loader]]. This leads to PS5 symmetric root keys dump, that can then be used for decryption of most Secure Modules. This allows to decrypt on PC most parts of the PS5 System Software files (see also PS Vita 0xAA key fail impact) including: | ||
* | * secure modules | ||
* | * PUP | ||
* kernel boot loader / | * kernel boot loader / BIOS | ||
* non-secure | * non-secure kernel | ||
* usermode system | * usermode system modules | ||
== <=2. | == <=2.50 - Software vulnerability leading to Secure Loader dump from Hypervisor == | ||
=== Credits === | === Credits === | ||
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=== Bug description === | === Bug description === | ||
A software vulnerability triggered from the PS5 Hypervisor leads to [[AMD Platform | A software vulnerability triggered from the PS5 Hypervisor leads to [[AMD Platform Secure Processor]] memory dump. | ||
It must be noted that Shawn Hoffman (fail0verflow, Microsoft Offensive Security Research) reported in 2020, 2021 and 2022 many vulnerabilities affecting AMD | It must be noted that Shawn Hoffman (fail0verflow, Microsoft Offensive Security Research) reported in 2020, 2021 and 2022 many vulnerabilities affecting AMD Secure Processor (ASP), AMD System Management Unit (SMU), AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV), and other AMD platform components. | ||
From [https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1021.html AMD Server Vulnerabilities – November 2021]: | From [https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1021.html AMD Server Vulnerabilities – November 2021]: | ||
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=== Patched === | === Patched === | ||
Maybe since 3.00. Vulnerable on PS5 FWs <= 2. | Maybe since 3.00. Vulnerable on PS5 FWs <= 2.50. | ||
== Untested - VZEROUPPER Instruction on AMD Zen 2 can Leak Register File State - ZenBleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-20593) == | == Untested - VZEROUPPER Instruction on AMD Zen 2 can Leak Register File State - ZenBleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-20593) == |