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== | == Hardware Exploits == | ||
=== | === PCIe man-in-the-middle attack === | ||
* First done on 1.01 by failoverflow on PS4 launch ! | |||
* Detailed at 33c3: [https://fail0verflow.com/media/33c3-slides/#/5 33c3 slides by Marcan] | |||
* Permits kernel and userland dumping | |||
=== Syscon glitching === | |||
It is possible to glitch the [[Syscon]] debug interface to allow access and dump keys. It was originally done by an anonymous member of fail0verflow. | |||
=== Aeolia and Belize (Southbridge) SCA/DPA === | |||
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) with Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on Aeolia and Belize (PS4 Southbridge revisions) has been shown to be able to recover key material. Since Sony never used private/public key pairs, it is possible to exploit this and gain complete control over the [[Southbridge]]. You can attack the main FreeBSD kernel from here. | |||
Nearly same methods are working on recent PS4 Pro motherboard NVB-003 that has Belize [[Southbridge]] ([[CXD90046GG]]). | |||
Contrarly to Aeolia, Belize has ROM readout protection and clears stack which makes it more secure. | |||
Old notes: | |||
This is a hack to gain unsigned code execution on the [[Southbridge]] for all motherboard/console revisions. You might be able to glitch the EMC bootrom in order to bypass further signature checks and break the chain of trust. This hack might involve slowing down the [[Syscon]] clock. Timing the glitch based on SPI read accesses then either doing a power glitch or clock glitch to skip signature check. If the glitch fails, then we simply reset. This can be done with a very cheap CPLD/FPGA. Most Xbox 360 glitching modchips used a Xilinx Coolrunner because it is cheap and easy to use (board can cost as low as $5). | |||
Related: | |||
* | * [https://fail0verflow.com/blog/2018/ps4-aeolia/ fail0verflow's writeup] | ||
* [[https://twitter.com/fail0verflow/status/1047690778527653889 fail0verflow's tweet]] | |||
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMroXa-zYxk Playstation 4 Rest Mode DEMO REcon Brussels 2018 by Volodymyr Pikhur] | |||
* [https://recon.cx/2018/brussels/resources/slides/RECON-BRX-2018-Mess-with-the-best-die-like-the-rest_(mode).pdf Slides of REcon Brussels 2018 by Volodymyr Pikhur] | |||
* [https://www.psxhax.com/threads/ps4-southbridge-reverse-engineered-code-examination-by-jogolden.6736/ jogolden's writeup] | |||
' | |||
* | |||
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= | |||
* [https:// | |||
* [https:// | |||
==== | == WebKit/Userland Exploits == | ||
=== FW ?.??-9.00 - WebCore::CSSFontFaceSet vulnerabilities === | |||
=== | |||
There are many FontFaceSet vulnerabilities. Explore [https://trac.webkit.org/search?q=mmaxfield%40apple.com+FontFaceSet&noquickjump=1&changeset=on]. | There are many FontFaceSet vulnerabilities. Explore [https://trac.webkit.org/search?q=mmaxfield%40apple.com+FontFaceSet&noquickjump=1&changeset=on]. | ||
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* Maddie Stone, Google Project Zero, for sharing a write-up describing this vulnerability (2021-10-13) | * Maddie Stone, Google Project Zero, for sharing a write-up describing this vulnerability (2021-10-13) | ||
* PS Test discord server community for testing PoCs of many WebKit vulnerabilities on their PS4s (2021-10-13) | * PS Test discord server community for testing PoCs of many WebKit vulnerabilities on their PS4s (2021-10-13) | ||
* sleirsgoevy for making the first exploit PoC for Safari (2021-10-24) and the first exploit PoC for PS4 FW 9.00 | * sleirsgoevy for making the first exploit PoC for Safari (2021-10-24) and the first exploit PoC for PS4 FW 9.00 and PS5 FW 3.00-4.03 (2021-10-27) | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
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* [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit/commit/fbf37d27e313d8d0a150a74cc8fab956eb7f3c59 WebKit fix commit by Myles C. Maxfield merged by Russell Epstein (2021-09-09)] | * [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit/commit/fbf37d27e313d8d0a150a74cc8fab956eb7f3c59 WebKit fix commit by Myles C. Maxfield merged by Russell Epstein (2021-09-09)] | ||
* [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit/blob/74bd0da94fa1d31a115bc4ee0e3927d8b2ea571e/Source/WebCore/css/CSSFontFaceSet.cpp#L223 Part of vulnerable code] | * [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit/blob/74bd0da94fa1d31a115bc4ee0e3927d8b2ea571e/Source/WebCore/css/CSSFontFaceSet.cpp#L223 Part of vulnerable code] | ||
* [ | * [https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2021/CVE-2021-30858.html Write-up and PoC by Maddie Stone (2021-10-13)] | ||
* [https://wololo.net/2021/10/14/use-after-free-webkit-vulnerability-impacts-ps4-possibly-up-to-firmware-9-00-included/ Vulnerability description by Wololo (2021-10-14)] | * [https://wololo.net/2021/10/14/use-after-free-webkit-vulnerability-impacts-ps4-possibly-up-to-firmware-9-00-included/ Vulnerability description by Wololo (2021-10-14)] | ||
* Warning: Maddie Stone's vulnerability is not CVE-2021-30858 but was guessed to be by Maddie Stone. See [https://github.com/googleprojectzero/0days-in-the-wild/commit/65fcdf0473ada4e80dc967662ea8f3f3ce4ea81e#diff-1a428c43cedcf140e5bd6f92e4527f169c3c717780e1586f2fab589e4f467b52 write-up edit commit]. | |||
* Warning: Maddie Stone's vulnerability was wrongly classified as a use-after-free by Maddie Stone according to sleirsgoevy. | |||
==== Bug description ==== | |||
Description in WebKit fix commit by Myles C. Maxfield: | Description in WebKit fix commit by Myles C. Maxfield: | ||
After r256659, asking for a failed CSSFontFace's families() returns nullopt. It | After r256659, asking for a failed CSSFontFace's families() returns nullopt. It's possible to add a failed font to a CSSFontFaceSet (of course). When we do that, we recognize the font is failed and don't update our internal data structures, because there's no need to - we can't do anything useful with a failed font. If you _then_ try to remove the font from the CSSFontFace, we don't call families(), but instead just pull out the raw m_families member, and look in our internal data structures for it, but we don't find it, because it was never added. | ||
Description in Maddie Stone's write-up: | Description in Maddie Stone's write-up: | ||
The vulnerability is a use-after-free due to an unchecked end() iterator. There was an assert statement: ASSERT(iterator != m_facesLookupTable.end());, but ASSERTs | The vulnerability is a use-after-free due to an unchecked end() iterator. There was an assert statement: ASSERT(iterator != m_facesLookupTable.end());, but ASSERTs don't do anything in release builds. Therefore, even if iterator == m_facesLookupTable.end() in the release build, nothing would happen and iterator would still be used. In FontFaceSet a FontFace is not added to the faces lookup table in addToFacesLookupTable if the font has already been deemed to be invalid. However, removeFromFacesLookupTable would still attempt to remove the font, leading to the use-after-free. The patch changes the ASSERT to an if clause. The function will return if iterator == m_facesLookupTable.end(), since the item it wishes to remove is not found in the table. | ||
Description by sleirsgoevy: | Description by sleirsgoevy: | ||
On PS4 | On PS4 FW 9.00 the constructor returns with an exception, but to C++ code that ignores it. That is how an invalid font is created in the first place. On earlier PS4 FWs the exception is propagated to JavaScript. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* [ | * [http://vdsina.sleirsgoevy.dynv6.net:8081/ First exploit PoC for Safari by sleirsgoevy (2021-10-24)] | ||
* [https://gist.github.com/sleirsgoevy/6beca32893909095f4bba1ce29167992 First exploit PoC for PS4 FW 9.00 | * [https://gist.github.com/sleirsgoevy/6beca32893909095f4bba1ce29167992 First exploit PoC for PS4 FW 9.00 and PS5 FW 3.00-4.03 by sleirsgoevy (2021-10-27)] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
''' | '''Not yet''' as of PS4 FW 9.00 and PS5 FW 4.03. | ||
Might have been introduced in PS4 FW 3.50 and before PS5 FW 1.00 according to dates (need to check). However the vulnerability cannot be exploited in some conditions depending on how WebKit was compiled. For example, on PS4 FWs 7.55-8. | Might have been introduced in PS4 FW 3.50 and before PS5 FW 1.00 according to dates (need to check). However the vulnerability cannot be exploited in some conditions depending on how WebKit was compiled. For example, on PS4 FWs 7.55-8.53 and PS5 FWs <= 2.00, the FontFaceSet constructor returns with an exception that is propagated to JavaScript, preventing exploitation this way. | ||
Tested working on PS4 FW 9.00 and PS5 FWs 3.00-4.03. Untested: PS5 FWs 2.10-2.50. | |||
Tested working on PS4 | |||
=== FW | === FW ?.??-7.55 - WebCore::ValidationMessage::buildBubbleTree() UaF leading to arbitrary RW === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
* Quentin Meffre (@0xdagger) and Mehdi Talbi (@abu_y0ussef) who are Security Researcher at Synacktiv for fuzzing WebKit, finding a way to exploit the vulnerability on PS4, presenting it on Black Hat Europe 2020 ([https://www.blackhat.com/eu-20/briefings/schedule/index.html#this-is-for-the-pwners--exploiting-a-webkit--day-in-playstation--21212]) and sharing the code (2020-12-10) | * Quentin Meffre (@0xdagger) and Mehdi Talbi (@abu_y0ussef) who are Security Researcher at Synacktiv for fuzzing WebKit, finding a way to exploit the vulnerability on PS4, presenting it on Black Hat Europe 2020 ([https://www.blackhat.com/eu-20/briefings/schedule/index.html#this-is-for-the-pwners--exploiting-a-webkit--day-in-playstation--21212]) and sharing the code (2020-12-10) | ||
* sleirsgoevy for porting (although with low success rate) to | * sleirsgoevy for porting (although with low success rate) to 7.00-7.02 | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
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* [http://i.blackhat.com/eu-20/Thursday/eu-20-Meffre-This-Is-For-The-Pwners-Exploiting-A-Webkit-0day-In-Playstation4.pdf Presentation slides by by Quentin Meffre (@0xdagger) and Mehdi Talbi (@abu_y0ussef) (2020-12-10)] | * [http://i.blackhat.com/eu-20/Thursday/eu-20-Meffre-This-Is-For-The-Pwners-Exploiting-A-Webkit-0day-In-Playstation4.pdf Presentation slides by by Quentin Meffre (@0xdagger) and Mehdi Talbi (@abu_y0ussef) (2020-12-10)] | ||
==== Bug | ==== Bug description ==== | ||
* The method buildBubbleTree makes a call to update the layout during which all user registered JS handlers are executed. If the ValidationMessage is destroyed in a JS callback, this could lead to a Use-After-Free situation when we get back to buildBubbleTree code. | * The method buildBubbleTree makes a call to update the layout during which all user registered JS handlers are executed. If the ValidationMessage is destroyed in a JS callback, this could lead to a Use-After-Free situation when we get back to buildBubbleTree code. | ||
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==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 8.00 FW. | '''Yes''' in 8.00 FW. Tested working on FWs 6.72-7.55. | ||
Tested working on FWs 6. | |||
=== FW 6.00-6.72 - bad_hoist Type Confusion exploit (CVE-2018-4386) leading to arbirary RW === | === FW 6.00-6.72 - bad_hoist Type Confusion exploit (CVE-2018-4386) leading to arbirary RW === | ||
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==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
WebKit: JSC: BytecodeGenerator::hoistSloppyModeFunctionIfNecessary | WebKit: JSC: BytecodeGenerator::hoistSloppyModeFunctionIfNecessary doesn't invalidate the ForInContext object. | ||
It is possible to craft Javascript in such a way that allows for an object to be passed as the property variable directly as a string to the op_get_direct_pname handler without being properly validated. | It is possible to craft Javascript in such a way that allows for an object to be passed as the property variable directly as a string to the op_get_direct_pname handler without being properly validated. | ||
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---- | ---- | ||
=== FW | === FW 6.00-6.20 - JSArray::shiftCountWithArrayStorage() OOB RW (CVE-2018-4441) leading to arbitrary RW === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
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* [https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/commit/51a62eb53815863a1bd2dd946d12f383e8695db0 WebKit fix commit (Oct 15, 2018)] | * [https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/commit/51a62eb53815863a1bd2dd946d12f383e8695db0 WebKit fix commit (Oct 15, 2018)] | ||
* [https://mastodon.social/@buherator/101654714198519755 Announce of incoming write-up by rkmylo and buherator/stratan/@5tratan, Meligra Team (Feb 25, 2019)] | * [https://mastodon.social/@buherator/101654714198519755 Announce of incoming write-up by rkmylo and buherator/stratan/@5tratan, Meligra Team (Feb 25, 2019)] | ||
* [https://rstforums.com/forum/topic/110439-cve-2018-4441-oob-rw-via-jsarrayunshiftcountwitharraystorage-webkit/ Write-up | * [https://rstforums.com/forum/topic/110439-cve-2018-4441-oob-rw-via-jsarrayunshiftcountwitharraystorage-webkit/ Write-up by Nytro, Meligra Team (Feb 27, 2019)] | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
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==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 6.50 FW | '''Yes''' in 6.50 FW | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW 6.00-6.20 - JSC::arrayProtoPrivateFuncConcatMemcpy() Information Leak (CVE-2018-4358) ?leading to ASLR defeat? === | === FW 6.00-?6.20? - JSC::arrayProtoPrivateFuncConcatMemcpy() Information Leak (CVE-2018-4358) ?leading to ASLR defeat? === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
* bkth, niklasb and saelo (from phoenhex Team) for the exploit PoC in Safari (Sep 26, 2018) | * bkth, niklasb and saelo (from phoenhex Team) for the exploit PoC in Safari (Sep 26, 2018) | ||
* Vultra for discovering that the exploit worked | * Vultra for discovering that the exploit worked since FW 6.00 (Dec 10, 2018) | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/commit/b68b373dcbfbc68682ceeca8292c5c0051472071 | * https://github.com/WebKit/webkit/commit/b68b373dcbfbc68682ceeca8292c5c0051472071 | ||
* https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-4358 | * https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-4358 | ||
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==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 6.50 FW | '''Yes''' in 6.50/1 FW | ||
==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
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---- | ---- | ||
=== FW | === FW 5.05 - Document::adoptNode() UaF leading to crash === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
* Lokihardt (from Google Project Zer0) for the exploit PoC (Jan 23, 2017) | * Lokihardt (from Google Project Zer0) for the exploit PoC (Jan 23, 2017) | ||
* CelesteBlue for testing on PS4 and | * CelesteBlue for testing on PS4 and PSVita | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* [https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1099 exploit report by Lokihardt (Jan 23, 2017)] | * [https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1099 exploit report by Lokihardt (Jan 23, 2017)] | ||
* [https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2468 | * [https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2468 mitre report] | ||
* [https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41868 exploitDB report] | * [https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41868 exploitDB report] | ||
* [https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=541206 related bug (Oct 8, 2015)] | |||
* [https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=541206 | * Test on PSVita FW 3.60 by CelesteBlue (May 9, 2020) | ||
* Test on PS4 FW 5.05 by CelesteBlue (Aug 20, 2020) | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* [https://github.com/Metnew/uxss-db/tree/master/webkit/CVE-2017-2468 PoC that just crashes on PS4 FW | * [https://github.com/Metnew/uxss-db/tree/master/webkit/CVE-2017-2468 PoC that just crashes on PS4 FW 5.05] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
''' | '''Maybe''' in ?6.00? FW. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW | === FW ?-5.05-? - WebCore::HTMLFrameElementBase::marginHeight() Heap UaF (CVE-2016-1859) leading to crash === | ||
PoC crashes the webbrowser. | |||
* [http://arayz.github.io/933ky/A-general-attack-model-of-UAF-on-browser/ Writeup by Arayz (Wang Ao) (March 31, 2017)] | * [http://arayz.github.io/933ky/A-general-attack-model-of-UAF-on-browser/ Writeup by Arayz (Wang Ao) (March 31, 2017)] | ||
=== FW 4.50-5.01 - Element::setAttributeNodeNS() UaF leading to arbitrary RW === | === FW 4.50-5.01 - Element::setAttributeNodeNS() UaF leading to arbitrary RW === | ||
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==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
Works on 3.15-4.07. Not working on <= 3.11 | Works on 3.15-4.07. Not working on <=3.11. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
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==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* [https://blog.xyz.is/2016/webkit-360.html PSVita 3.60 | * [https://blog.xyz.is/2016/webkit-360.html PSVita 3.60 HENKaku WebKit exploit writeup] | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
When attempting to update a vector via sortCompactedVector() - data is written based on a pointer, though the pointer | When attempting to update a vector via sortCompactedVector() - data is written based on a pointer, though the pointer isn't re-updated nor nulled. When this memory in free()'d, the reference is maintained and thus memory corruption can occur. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
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=== FW <= 3.50 - WebCore::TimerBase::heapPopMin() Heap UaF leading to crash === | === FW <= 3.50 - WebCore::TimerBase::heapPopMin() Heap UaF leading to crash === | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit-http/commit/98845d940e30529098eea7e496af02e14301c704 WebKit fix commit | * [https://github.com/WebKit/WebKit-http/commit/98845d940e30529098eea7e496af02e14301c704 WebKit fix commit] | ||
* [https://xz.aliyun.com/t/292 Summary of Critical and Exploitable iOS Vulnerabilities in 2016 by Min (Spark) Zheng, Cererdlong, Eakerqiu @ Team OverSky] | * [https://xz.aliyun.com/t/292 Summary of Critical and Exploitable iOS Vulnerabilities in 2016 by Min (Spark) Zheng, Cererdlong, Eakerqiu @ Team OverSky] | ||
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==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* [http://psxhax.com/threads/ps4-3-50-webkit-exploit-from-playstation-4-dev-qwertyoruiop.450/ Article about qwertyoruiop's tests ( | * [http://psxhax.com/threads/ps4-3-50-webkit-exploit-from-playstation-4-dev-qwertyoruiop.450/ Article about qwertyoruiop's tests (20-05-2016)] | ||
* [http://psxhax.com/threads/ps4-heap-use-after-free-at-webcore-3-50-poc-by-hunter128.452/ Article about initial PoC for PS4 ( | * [http://psxhax.com/threads/ps4-heap-use-after-free-at-webcore-3-50-poc-by-hunter128.452/ Article about initial PoC for PS4 (21-05-2016)] | ||
* [http://wololo.net/talk/viewtopic.php?t=45888 Initial PoC for PS4 ( | * [http://wololo.net/talk/viewtopic.php?t=45888 Initial PoC for PS4 (21-05-2016)] | ||
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20161030085033/http://cryptoanarchic.me/wat.txt iOS 9.3.2 WebKit RCE via heapPopMin (2016 | * [https://web.archive.org/web/20161030085033/http://cryptoanarchic.me/wat.txt iOS 9.3.2 WebKit RCE via heapPopMin (07-2016)] | ||
* [https://twitter.com/qwertyoruiopz/status/756268361282125824 qwertyoruiop's tweet ( | * [https://twitter.com/qwertyoruiopz/status/756268361282125824 qwertyoruiop's tweet (22-07-2016)] | ||
* [https://github.com/Jailbreaks/jbme/tree/master mirror of iOS 9.3.2 WebKit RCE via heapPopMin] | * [https://github.com/Jailbreaks/jbme/tree/master mirror of iOS 9.3.2 WebKit RCE via heapPopMin] | ||
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==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
Works on 3.15, 3.50 FW. Maybe working on 3.51 FW. | Works on 3.15, 3.50 FW. Maybe working on 3.51 FW. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
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Exploiting this vulnerability on PS4 is not good because: | Exploiting this vulnerability on PS4 is not good because: | ||
* This vulnerability does not provide arbitrary RW without code execution, hence ROP chain (at least to stack pivot to JiT code) must be made with a memory dump or decrypted modules for this FW gotten using another vulnerability. | * This vulnerability does not provide arbitrary RW without code execution, hence ROP chain (at least to stack pivot to JiT code) must be made with a memory dump or decrypted modules for this FW gotten using another vulnerability. | ||
* There is | * There is userland ASLR since about FW 1.70 so ROP chain gadgets must be relocated at runtime. This means another vulnerability allowing userland arbitrary read is needed. | ||
* As usually an arbitrary read vulnerability also gives arbitrary write, and as arbitrary RW leads to | * As usually an arbitrary read vulnerability also gives arbitrary write, and as arbitrary RW leads to userland code execution (by hijacking JS pointers in virtual table), this UaF is not needed at all. | ||
* Even if we get ROP chain to work on PS4 with this UaF vulnerability, there is no evidence that a return to JavaScript from ROP chain is doable, making this exploit less convenient than arbitrary RW exploits method of getting code execution then returning to | * Even if we get ROP chain to work on PS4 with this UaF vulnerability, there is no evidence that a return to JavaScript from ROP chain is doable, making this exploit less convenient than arbitrary RW exploits method of getting code execution then returning to userland by restoring vtable. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
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* Vitaliy Toropov for the exploit on Mac OS X Safari (September 4, 2013) | * Vitaliy Toropov for the exploit on Mac OS X Safari (September 4, 2013) | ||
* nas and Proxima for the first PS4 POC on 1.76 PS4 ( | * nas and Proxima for the first PS4 POC on 1.76 PS4 (Oct. 23, 2014) | ||
* sony for patching the exploit in FW 2.00 ( | * sony for patching the exploit in FW 2.00 (Oct 27, 2014) | ||
* CTurt for the rewriting (PS4 1.76 PlayGround) and implementation with his 1.76 kexploit (December 6, 2015) [https://twitter.com/CTurtE/status/673581693207502849] | * CTurt for the rewriting (PS4 1.76 PlayGround) and implementation with his 1.76 kexploit (December 6, 2015) [https://twitter.com/CTurtE/status/673581693207502849] | ||
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==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
* Working on | * Working on 1.00-1.76 FW, AppleWebKit/531.3-536.26 | ||
* Might work on | * Might work on FW 0.930.020. | ||
== | == Userland securities == | ||
=== Userland ASLR === | |||
* Very old firmwares (<= 1.05) don't have ASLR enabled, but it was introduced sometime before firmware 1.70. "Address Space Layout Randomization" (ASLR) is a security technique which causes the base addresses of modules to be different every time you start the PS4. | |||
* To defeat userland ASLR on FWs >=1.70, we can use the module imports table to find other modules address once we know SceWebkit2 address. | |||
* Very old firmwares (<= 1.05) | |||
* To defeat | |||
=== Module imports table cleaned before execution === | === Module imports table cleaned before execution === | ||
* Between 1.76 and 4.05, Sony did that to prevent | * Between 1.76 and 4.05, Sony did that to prevent webkit exploiters from defeating userland ASLR easily. | ||
* Now we have to dump entire | * Now we have to dump entire userland sandboxed memory, and by studying it we can defeat ASLR: | ||
1. Chose a function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) imported from | 1. Chose a function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) imported from LibKernel by SceWebkit2 | ||
2. Read pointer contained at the address where the call is done | 2. Read pointer contained at the address where the call is done | ||
3. Substract to this pointer the offset of the function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) in LibKernel module | 3. Substract to this pointer the offset of the function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) in LibKernel module | ||
4. This result is LibKernel base address. This method works for any imported module. | 4. This result is LibKernel base address. This method works for any imported module. | ||
=== DEP / NX === | === DEP / NX === | ||
* "Data Execution Prevention" / "No eXecute" is enabled on all firmwares. It prevents allocating memory as both RW and RX at same time (RWX) so preventing us from writing shellcode to userland memory then executing it. | |||
* "Data Execution Prevention" / "No eXecute" is enabled on all firmwares. It prevents allocating memory as both RW and RX at same time (RWX) so preventing us from writing shellcode to | |||
* 2 ways to bypass this security: JiT vulnerability (FW <= 1.76) or ROP (all FWs). | * 2 ways to bypass this security: JiT vulnerability (FW <= 1.76) or ROP (all FWs). | ||
=== JiT removed from webbrowser === | === JiT removed from webbrowser === | ||
* On FW <= 1.76, you could map RWX memory from ROP by abusing the JiT functionality and the sys_jitshm_create and sys_jitshm_alias system calls. This however was fixed after 1.76, as WebKit has been split into two processes. One handles javascript compilation and the other handles other web page elements like image rendering and DOM. The second process will request JiT memory upon hitting JavaScript via IPC (Inter-Process Communication). Since we no longer have access to the process responsible for JiT, we can no longer (at least currently), map RWX memory for proper code execution unless the kernel is patched. | * On FW <= 1.76, you could map RWX memory from ROP by abusing the JiT functionality and the sys_jitshm_create and sys_jitshm_alias system calls. This however was fixed after 1.76, as WebKit has been split into two processes. One handles javascript compilation and the other handles other web page elements like image rendering and DOM. The second process will request JiT memory upon hitting JavaScript via IPC (Inter-Process Communication). Since we no longer have access to the process responsible for JiT, we can no longer (at least currently), map RWX memory for proper code execution unless the kernel is patched. | ||
* Workaround is to use ROP. | * Workaround is to use ROP. | ||
=== Syscalls removed === | === Syscalls removed === | ||
=== Syscall 0 disabled i.e Error Kernel: The application directly issues a syscall instruction (24) === | |||
* Between 2.00 and 2.57, SCE has removed system call 0, so we can no longer call any syscall we want by specifying the call number in the rax register. | |||
* Doing so now crashes the app and gives error CE-34878-0, SCE_KERNEL_ABORT_REASON_SYSTEM_ILLEGAL_FUNCTION_CALL, with the message "Kernel: The application directly issues a syscall instruction (24)". | |||
Between 2.00 and 2.57, SCE has | * We now have to use wrappers provided to us from the libkernel / libkernel_web / libkernel_sys modules to access system calls. | ||
* | |||
=== bpf_write function stripped out of the kernel === | === bpf_write function stripped out of the kernel === | ||
Line 975: | Line 470: | ||
=== bpf_open function blocked for unprivileged processes === | === bpf_open function blocked for unprivileged processes === | ||
* On 5.50, opening BPF has been blocked for unprivileged processes such as WebKit and other apps/games. It's still present in the sandbox, however attempting to open it will fail and yield EPERM. This aims blocking BPF kernel exploits especially qwertyoruiop's BPF double free UAF. | * On 5.50, opening BPF has been blocked for unprivileged processes such as WebKit and other apps/games. It's still present in the sandbox, however attempting to open it will fail and yield EPERM. This aims blocking BPF kernel exploits especially qwertyoruiop's BPF double free UAF. | ||
=== bpf_ioctl function blocked or removed === | === bpf_ioctl function blocked or removed === | ||
* Moreover, on FW 5.50+, opening BPF is still possible in less sandboxed apps like test/devkits fselfs. But this is useless because ioctl doesn't work. | |||
* | |||
=== Device access blocked/removed from webbrowser === | === Device access blocked/removed from webbrowser === | ||
* Around 6.50-6.70, device access got blocked or removed. Now you can no longer access devices from | * Around 6.50-6.70, device access got blocked or removed. Now you can no longer access devices from webbrowser | ||
==== | == Kernel Exploits == | ||
=== FW <= 7.55 - IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK Double Free (CVE-2020-9892) === | === FW <= 7.55 - IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK Double Free (CVE-2020-9892) === | ||
Line 1,211: | Line 522: | ||
* [https://asciinema.org/a/396409 Demonstration video of sleirsgoevy's second exploit PoC for FreeBSD 9 (2021-03-03)] | * [https://asciinema.org/a/396409 Demonstration video of sleirsgoevy's second exploit PoC for FreeBSD 9 (2021-03-03)] | ||
* [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/ps4jb2/blob/75x/src/jb.c sleirsgoevy's implementation for PS4 7.5x (2021-03-12)] | * [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/ps4jb2/blob/75x/src/jb.c sleirsgoevy's implementation for PS4 7.5x (2021-03-12)] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
Line 1,217: | Line 527: | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW <= 7.02 - IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS UaF (yielding arbitrary kernel R/W | === FW <= 7.02 - IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS UaF (yielding arbitrary kernel R/W) === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
* 2018-08-18 up to 2020-07-06 Fire30 for finding and keeping the vulnerability as a private 0day for it not to be patched by SIE. [https://twitter.com/Fire30_/status/1280228173888831490] | * 2018-08-18 up to 2020-07-06 Fire30 for finding and keeping the vulnerability as a private 0day for it not to be patched by SIE. [https://twitter.com/Fire30_/status/1280228173888831490] | ||
* 2020-07-06 TheFloW for publishing publicly a PoC leading to code execution on FreeBSD. [https://twitter.com/theflow0/status/1280224554393178122] | * 2020-07-06 TheFloW for publishing publicly a PoC leading to code execution on FreeBSD. [https://twitter.com/theflow0/status/1280224554393178122] | ||
* sleirsgoevy and ChendoChap for porting the PoC to PS4 and chaining it with the 6.72 and 7.02 | * sleirsgoevy and ChendoChap for porting the PoC to PS4 and chaining it with the 6.72 and 7.02 webkit exploits. | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* [https://hackerone.com/reports/826026 TheFloW's | * [https://hackerone.com/reports/826026 TheFloW's report of the exploit with a FreeBSD 9-12 PoC] | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Due to missing locks in option IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS of setsockopt, it is possible to race and free the struct ip6_pktopts buffer, while it is being handled by ip6_setpktopt. This structure contains pointers (ip6po_pktinfo) that can be hijacked to obtain arbitrary kernel R/W primitives. As a consequence, it is easy to have kernel code execution. This vulnerability is reachable from WebKit sandbox and is available in the latest FW, that is 7.02. | Due to missing locks in option IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS of setsockopt, it is possible to race and free the struct ip6_pktopts buffer, while it is being handled by ip6_setpktopt. This structure contains pointers (ip6po_pktinfo) that can be hijacked to obtain arbitrary kernel R/W primitives. As a consequence, it is easy to have kernel code execution. This vulnerability is reachable from WebKit sandbox and is available in the latest FW, that is 7.02. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* [ | * [https://hackerone-us-west-2-production-attachments.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/Y13EyQCGKEqxH8PpJgFKh5uY?response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%3D%22exploit.c%22%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27exploit.c&response-content-type=text%2Fx-c%2B%2Bsrc&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAQGK6FURQ4G43T3HL%2F20200719%2Fus-west-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Date=20200719T222620Z&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEGUaCXVzLXdlc3QtMiJHMEUCIQD%2F0c09Z1wbdZi9kMJukdNUryexRJUKWxTiqcoAnsxE1gIgQqef8QiWKjHnPYTPLZO5P1KcXixsUrL2Z8AnnT404jEqtAMIHRABGgwwMTM2MTkyNzQ4NDkiDGkLHbTp2BRWlnoy5iqRA0gx69uKt57lUwOOB48RT1j6IEwp5FGjfVUviEc78dJ99qZaUUB%2FI%2BfRDN5J7OKceSsOZwZ1VebLhz2za2R2c5gjX9EtCWf%2Brl6EIvxMXSyC%2FYxnbAVAXvB8jf5sRWr%2FgqpUQbNr1V5JFbe6IYw%2FvlmiYqMzhSqBpupfI6E6cwa3luTr0GBWKR4lppzFXR7%2B6e9bUAC%2BQiQcPk%2FzNqKAGE%2FFKkDreC1Vvlct%2FvhqQ0HbaNesEQG%2F0qbv2%2B6UB9iU4n4uk369G%2BmwtnfEh0%2BEeptwYVwFApNIfwRdOXx%2FrPnL69fkuxjA8BKQpILIf2XYxrbtlE8Nth8z75cXxlFLgdfmhyidy2Q0wkjS45tx39ROJZQBC9g%2Fstx7u0jFZ1M3MJuBVJc%2FO5aWCPOBoZrQKpbAJqHSqF5x5ON3x%2BNkFbfMj%2B20qSfmBn7eT2FYBPR3bahKnI5lZeDzYAQgSIvUpAGW%2Fi2UL1ZmEqEKoV%2Fh67YYzCMzM3uUqPRuSGIeQsmUEQeY%2BjR7PPoR71928%2B%2FHFBbTMN%2FW0vgFOusB5oRuVzVviKnOLIHgixiK0h5rYZe5TfP3JtYhhy3XpV0RB3BliMzTvuhn5TevB9ZZlRYKnP7x08C888AIsUKSm3UuQpHmnZ1M5yeypI5MwjmLO51lBnQwigz0tHGDu2jlOLyvW9bXzFw1rNLSfM5x6dWmvMdYyTkStTFnwcN0V14U5EOVzdfo9WYogPfzq%2FEeOopTjDAusDtIBEtn4ILZxnlPxi8oLY8rI03lsF4GmRx6zQKJ%2Bzs44lQi5DRSMOueKTvWmPRaR83hUAIxlXdDCdM8wPYQe0eMl3V3macYTRK1FghrvW4BCo6ZqQ%3D%3D&X-Amz-Signature=2862cc641fee752f041d00f7d021826e09354ef202bb2da78a966e5b90830662 TheFloW's PoC for FreeBSD 9 and 12] | ||
* [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/ps4jb PS4 6.72-7.02 WebKit + Kernel Exploit implementation by sleirsgoevy] | * [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/ps4jb PS4 6.72-7.02 WebKit + Kernel Exploit implementation by sleirsgoevy] | ||
* [https://github.com/ChendoChap/ps4-ipv6-uaf PS4 5.05-7.02 WebKit + Kernel Exploit implementation by ChendoChap] | * [https://github.com/ChendoChap/ps4-ipv6-uaf PS4 5.05-7.02 WebKit + Kernel Exploit implementation by ChendoChap] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in | '''Yes''' in 7.50 FW | ||
---- | ---- | ||
Line 1,319: | Line 622: | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* [https://fail0verflow.com/blog/2017/ps4-namedobj-exploit/ fail0verflow's writeup on the | * [https://fail0verflow.com/blog/2017/ps4-namedobj-exploit/ fail0verflow's writeup on the 1.01-4.05 namedobj kernel exploit] (2017-10-19) | ||
* [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/PS4/NamedObj%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Overview.md Specter's first writeup] (2017-10-20) | * [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/PS4/NamedObj%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Overview.md Specter's first writeup] (2017-10-20) | ||
* [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/PS4/%22NamedObj%22%204.05%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's writeup on his | * [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/PS4/%22NamedObj%22%204.05%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's writeup on his 4.05 implementation] (2017-12-28) | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Line 1,329: | Line 630: | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS4-4.05-Kernel-Exploit PS4 4.05 WebKit + Kernel Exploit] | |||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
Line 1,335: | Line 636: | ||
==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
Works on FWs 4.00-4.05. On <= 3.70 FW we | Works on FWs 4.00-4.05. On <=3.70 FW we haven't found a way to leak the target object, but it might be doable as F0F did it on 1.01. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
Line 1,434: | Line 681: | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Faults associated with the stack segment (SS) register are not handled properly, allowing unprivileged users to trigger an IRET instruction that accesses a GS Base from | Faults associated with the stack segment (SS) register are not handled properly, allowing unprivileged users to trigger an IRET instruction that accesses a GS Base from userland memory, providing an attacker with a method of privilege escalation. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
Line 1,444: | Line 691: | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 2.00 FW | '''Yes''' in 2.00 FW | ||
=== FW ??? - setlogin Information Leak (CVE-2014-8476) === | === FW ??? - setlogin Information Leak (CVE-2014-8476) === | ||
Line 1,472: | Line 718: | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
? | |||
== Kernel securities == | == Kernel securities == | ||
Line 1,492: | Line 728: | ||
=== Kernel SMAP === | === Kernel SMAP === | ||
In 5.0x FW and above, "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" (SMAP), a new custom mitigation was added to the PS4 kernel to prevent exploiters from pivoting the kernel stack pointer into userland memory: attempting to do so would crash the system. A new exploitation strategy is needed to run kernel ROP chains because an exploiters now needs to get his kernel ROP chain inside kernel memory. | |||
To do this, qwertyoruiop decided in his 5.05 PS4 kernel exploit to go with the method he used on the Apple iPhone 7 - essentially using JOP to push a bunch of stack frames onto the kernel stack, and memcpy()'ing the kernel ROP chain into RSP. | |||
Another way to bypass this mitigation has been showed by sleirsgoevy in his 6.72 PS4 kernel exploit implementation. It consists in wrapping the main kernel ROP with cli/sti pair, which would prevent it from being preempted. This way the thread's CPU core will not run other kernel code during kROP execution, and other cores have no way of detecting the stack pivot, so the mitigation is defeated. | |||
* [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/ps4jb/blob/master/src/oldkex.c#L451 cli/sti SMAP bypass in 6.72 PS4 kernel exploit] | * [https://github.com/sleirsgoevy/ps4jb/blob/master/src/oldkex.c#L451 cli/sti SMAP bypass in 6.72 PS4 kernel exploit] | ||
Another SMAP bypass has been found by m00nbsd while working on FreeBSD 12. It is named CVE-2021-29628 and affects FreeBSD 12.2 and later (til it was patched). It does not work on PS4 because PS4 kernel is based on FreeBSD 9, not on FreeBSD 12 in which the vulnerability was added. It used to work on PS5 before it was disclosed and patched. | |||
* [https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-29628 CVE-2021-29628 (FreeBSD SMAP bypass) by m00nbsd] | |||
* [https://hackerone.com/reports/1048322 CVE-2021-29628 (PS5 SMAP bypass) by m00nbsd] | |||
=== CR0.WP protection === | === CR0.WP protection === | ||
At least since | At least since firmware 6.51 Sony instrumented all instructions that write to the CR0 register with checks for attempts to clear CR0.WP (Write Protect), which is necessary for patching the kernel. This is what it looks like in 6.51 kernel: | ||
a1b79: 0f 22 c0 mov cr0,rax | a1b79: 0f 22 c0 mov cr0,rax | ||
Line 1,525: | Line 754: | ||
Bypasses (in chronological order): | Bypasses (in chronological order): | ||
* Use an "unintended" mov to cr0 in the middle of another instruction (e.g. instruction "call $+0x220f1c" (e8 17 0f 22 00) contains an unintended "mov cr0, rax" (0f 22 00)) | |||
* Use kernel write to give your process JIT permissions, allocate JIT memory, and put entirely custom code there (avoids the problem altogether, as it is specific to ROP) | |||
* Since the IDT is writable on FreeBSD and PS4, it is possible to overwrite an exception handler without clearing CR0.WP first. One can overwrite the handler of #UD with a gadget of their choice (a stack pivot, or a "add rsp, ... ; ret", or whatever else), and the UD2 instruction in the mitigation code will happily jump to it instead of the real handler, with CR0.WP cleared. | |||
* | |||
{{Reverse Engineering}} | {{Reverse Engineering}} | ||
<noinclude> | <noinclude>[[Category:Main]]</noinclude> | ||
[[Category:Main]] | |||
</noinclude> |