Editing Vulnerabilities
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
The edit can be undone. Please check the comparison below to verify that this is what you want to do, and then publish the changes below to finish undoing the edit.
Latest revision | Your text | ||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
== Hardware Exploits == | == Hardware Exploits == | ||
Line 74: | Line 5: | ||
* First done on 1.01 by failoverflow on PS4 launch ! | * First done on 1.01 by failoverflow on PS4 launch ! | ||
* Detailed at 33c3: [https://fail0verflow.com/media/33c3-slides/#/5 33c3 slides by Marcan] | * Detailed at 33c3: [https://fail0verflow.com/media/33c3-slides/#/5 33c3 slides by Marcan] | ||
* Permits kernel and | * Permits kernel and userland dumping | ||
=== syscon glitching === | |||
It is possible to glitch the syscon debug interface to allow access and dump keys. Originally done by an anonymous member of fail0verflow. | |||
== | === Aeolia/Belize SCA/DPA === | ||
Aeolia side channel analysis with differential power analysis has been shown to be able to recover key material on all PS4 models. Since Sony never used private/public key pairs, it is possible to exploit this and gain complete control over the southbridge. You can attack the main FreeBSD kernel from here. | |||
== WebKit/Userland Exploits == | |||
== | |||
=== [[Internet_Browser#Webkit_exploit|FW 4.50-5.50 - haveABadTime Type Confusion]] === | |||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1208 Project Zer0 Bug Description] | [https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1208 Project Zer0 Bug Description] | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
When JSGlobalObject::haveABadTime() is called with arrays of a different JSGlobalObject type, type confusion can occur, leading to memory corruption. | When JSGlobalObject::haveABadTime() is called with arrays of a different JSGlobalObject type, type confusion can occur, leading to memory corruption. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
[http://crack.bargains/550/ PS4 5.50 (WebKit Only)] | |||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in | '''Yes''' in 5.53 FW | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW 4.50-5. | === [[Internet_Browser#Webkit_exploit|FW 4.50-5.01 - setAttributeNodeNS Use-After-Free (UAF)]] === | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/WebKit/setAttributeNodeNS%20UAF%20Write-up.md Specter's setAttributeNodeNS Exploit Writeup] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
By forcing setAttributeInternal() to call setAttributeNodeNS() twice, an attribute node reference will be added twice to the list. When one is free()'d, the second attribute still contains a duplicate stale reference, leading to a use-after-free (UAF) scenario. | By forcing setAttributeInternal() to call setAttributeNodeNS() twice, an attribute node reference will be added twice to the list. When one is free()'d, the second attribute still contains a duplicate stale reference, leading to a use-after-free (UAF) scenario. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS4-5.05-Kernel-Exploit PS4 5.05 WebKit + Kernel Exploit] | [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS4-5.05-Kernel-Exploit PS4 5.05 WebKit + Kernel Exploit] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 5.03 FW. | '''Yes''' in 5.03 FW. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW | === [[Internet_Browser#Webkit_exploit|FW <= 4.07 - Stack Uninitialized Read]] === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
* | * Uses parts of Pegasus webkit exploit | ||
* | * Created by Qwerty (Luca Todesco) | ||
* Analysed by Specer | |||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/PS4/4.0x%20WebKit%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's 4.0x WebKit Exploit Writeup] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Line 740: | Line 52: | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS4-4.0x-Code-Execution-PoC Specter's commented and usable version] | *[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS4-4.0x-Code-Execution-PoC Specter's commented and usable version] | ||
* [https://gist.github.com/X41/36acd2a6939e4cebbecba45d35bf0d75 mirrorred expl.js from | *[https://gist.github.com/X41/36acd2a6939e4cebbecba45d35bf0d75 mirrorred expl.js from qwerty] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 4.50 FW | '''Yes''' in 4.50 FW | ||
==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
Works on 3. | Works on 3.50-4.07. Maybe working on 3.15 after porting gadgets offsets. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW | === [[Internet_Browser#Webkit_exploit|FW <= 3.70 - JSArray.sort() Use-After-Free (UAF)]] === | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://blog.xyz.is/2016/webkit-360.html PSVita HENKaku 3.60 webkit exploit writeup] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
When attempting to update a vector via sortCompactedVector() - data is written based on a pointer, though the pointer isn't re-updated nor nulled. When this memory in free()'d, the reference is maintained and thus memory corruption can occur. | |||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
[http://henkaku.xyz PSVita HENkaku by Molecule] | |||
[https://github.com/Fire30/PS4-3.55-Code-Execution-PoC PS4 Playground 3.15-3.70 by Fire30] | |||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
''' | '''Yes''' in 4.00 FW | ||
==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
3.15, 3.50, 3.51, 3.55, 3.70 | |||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW <= 2.03 - | === [[Internet_Browser#Webkit_exploit|FW <= 2.03 - CSSSelector Heap Overflow (CVE-2014-1303)]] === | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-14/materials/eu-14-Chen-WebKit-Everywhere-Secure-Or-Not.PDF BlackHat EU 2014 'WebKit Everywhere - Secure Or Not?' slides] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
By forcing addRule() to be called on a CSS Selector via window.getMatchedCSSRules(), a 1-bit OOB write can be achieved and leveraged to corrupt heap memory. | By forcing addRule() to be called on a CSS Selector via window.getMatchedCSSRules(), a 1-bit OOB write can be achieved and leveraged to corrupt heap memory. | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* | * Currently only has an ROP PoC for firmware [[2.030.000|2.03]] by Fire30: [https://github.com/Fire30/PS4-2014-1303-POC PS4 2.03] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 2.50 FW | '''Yes''' in 2.50 FW | ||
==== Tested ==== | ==== Tested ==== | ||
* | * 2.03 | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== | === [[Internet_Browser#Webkit_exploit|FW <= 1.76 - JSArray.sort() Heap Overflow (CVE-2012-3748)]] === | ||
==== Credits ==== | ==== Credits ==== | ||
Line 903: | Line 98: | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/28081/ Exploit PoC by Vitaliy Toropov] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Line 912: | Line 105: | ||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
* [http://wololo.net/talk/viewtopic.php?p=368577 first POC for 1.76 PS4 by nas and Proxima] | * [http://wololo.net/talk/viewtopic.php?p=368577 first POC for 1.76 PS4 by nas and Proxima] | ||
* [http://wololo.net/ | * [http://wololo.net/v/260.htm PSVita 2.60] | ||
* [https://cturt.github.io/PS4-playground/ PS4 playground 1.76 by CTurt] | * [https://cturt.github.io/PS4-playground/ PS4 playground 1.76 by CTurt] | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 2.00 FW | '''Yes''' in 2.00 FW | ||
== | == Userland securities == | ||
=== | === Userland ASLR === | ||
* Very old firmwares (<= 1.05) | * Very old firmwares (<= 1.05) don't have ASLR enabled, but it was introduced sometime before firmware 1.70. "Address Space Layout Randomization" (ASLR) is a security technique which causes the base addresses of modules to be different every time you start the PS4. | ||
* To defeat | * To defeat userland ASLR on FWs >=1.70, we can use the module imports table to find other modules address once we know SceWebkit2 address. | ||
=== Module imports table cleaned before execution === | === Module imports table cleaned before execution === | ||
* Between 1.76 and 4.05, Sony did that to prevent | * Between 1.76 and 4.05, Sony did that to prevent webkit exploiters from defeating userland ASLR easily. | ||
* Now we have to dump entire | * Now we have to dump entire userland sandboxed memory, and by studying it we can defeat ASLR: | ||
1. Chose a function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) imported from | 1. Chose a function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) imported from LibKernel by SceWebkit2 | ||
2. Read pointer contained at the address where the call is done | 2. Read pointer contained at the address where the call is done | ||
3. Substract to this pointer the offset of the function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) in LibKernel module | 3. Substract to this pointer the offset of the function (ex: __stack_chk_fail) in LibKernel module | ||
4. This result is LibKernel base address. This method works for any imported module. | 4. This result is LibKernel base address. This method works for any imported module. | ||
=== DEP / NX === | === DEP / NX === | ||
* "Data Execution Prevention" / "No eXecute" is enabled on all firmwares. It prevents allocating memory as both RW and RX at same time (RWX) so preventing us from writing shellcode to userland memory then executing it. | |||
* "Data Execution Prevention" / "No eXecute" is enabled on all firmwares. It prevents allocating memory as both RW and RX at same time (RWX) so preventing us from writing shellcode to | |||
* 2 ways to bypass this security: JiT vulnerability (FW <= 1.76) or ROP (all FWs). | * 2 ways to bypass this security: JiT vulnerability (FW <= 1.76) or ROP (all FWs). | ||
=== JiT removed from webbrowser === | === JiT removed from webbrowser === | ||
* On FW <= 1.76, you could map RWX memory from ROP by abusing the JiT functionality and the sys_jitshm_create and sys_jitshm_alias system calls. This however was fixed after 1.76, as WebKit has been split into two processes. One handles javascript compilation and the other handles other web page elements like image rendering and DOM. The second process will request JiT memory upon hitting JavaScript via IPC (Inter-Process Communication). Since we no longer have access to the process responsible for JiT, we can no longer (at least currently), map RWX memory for proper code execution unless the kernel is patched. | * On FW <= 1.76, you could map RWX memory from ROP by abusing the JiT functionality and the sys_jitshm_create and sys_jitshm_alias system calls. This however was fixed after 1.76, as WebKit has been split into two processes. One handles javascript compilation and the other handles other web page elements like image rendering and DOM. The second process will request JiT memory upon hitting JavaScript via IPC (Inter-Process Communication). Since we no longer have access to the process responsible for JiT, we can no longer (at least currently), map RWX memory for proper code execution unless the kernel is patched. | ||
* Workaround is to use ROP. | * Workaround is to use ROP. | ||
=== Syscalls removed === | === Syscalls removed === | ||
==== Syscall 0 disabled ==== | |||
=== Syscall 0 disabled | |||
* Between | * Between 1.76 and 4.05, Sony has removed system call 0, so we can no longer call any system call we like by specifying the call number in the rax register. | ||
* We will have to use wrappers from the libkernel.sprx module provided to us to access system calls. | |||
* We | |||
=== bpf_write function stripped out of the kernel === | === bpf_write function stripped out of the kernel === | ||
Line 973: | Line 147: | ||
=== bpf_open function blocked for unprivileged processes === | === bpf_open function blocked for unprivileged processes === | ||
* On 5.50, opening BPF has been blocked for unprivileged processes such as WebKit and other apps/games. It's still present in the sandbox, however attempting to open it will fail and yield EPERM. This aims blocking bpf exploits like the 4.55 and 5.05 kexploit. | |||
* On 5.50, opening BPF has been blocked for unprivileged processes such as WebKit and other apps/games. It's still present in the sandbox, however attempting to open it will fail and yield EPERM. This aims blocking | |||
== Kernel Exploits == | == Kernel Exploits == | ||
=== FW <= 5.05 - BPF Race Condition (Yielding Double Free()) === | |||
=== FW <= | |||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/FreeBSD/PS4%205.05%20BPF%20Double%20Free%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's Writeup of the 5.05 BPF Race Condition] | [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/FreeBSD/PS4%205.05%20BPF%20Double%20Free%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's Writeup of the 5.05 BPF Race Condition] | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Again due to improper locking, two threads can enter the BPF "SETWF" ioctl command handler. While the bug is similar to that of 4.55, the method of attack is slightly different. Since write() was removed for BPF in 4.70, instead of triggering a use-after-free with write() - "SETWF" is ran in parallel via threading. Eventually, both calls will copy the same pointer to the stack, leading to both threads free()'ing the same pointer, poisoning the freelist. This can later be leveraged via heap spraying to corrupt heap memory to obtain arbitrary code execution in supervisor mode (ring0). | |||
==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ==== Exploit Implementation ==== | ||
[http://crack.bargains/505k/ PS4 5.05 WebKit + Kernel Exploit]<br/> | |||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/PS4-5.05-Kernel-Exploit PS4 5.05 WebKit + Kernel Exploit Source] | |||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 5. | '''Yes''' in 5.50FW | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW <= 4.55 - BPF Race Condition (Yielding UaF) === | === FW <= 4.55 - BPF Race Condition (Yielding UaF) === | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/FreeBSD/PS4%204.55%20BPF%20Race%20Condition%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's Writeup of the 4.55 BPF Race Condition] | [https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/FreeBSD/PS4%204.55%20BPF%20Race%20Condition%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's Writeup of the 4.55 BPF Race Condition] | ||
Line 1,240: | Line 176: | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 4. | '''Yes''' in 4.70FW | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW <= 4.05 - NamedObj Type Confusion (namedobj - Adieu) === | |||
=== FW <= | |||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[https://fail0verflow.com/blog/2017/ps4-namedobj-exploit/ fail0verflow's Writeup on the 1.01-4.05 Kernel Exploit]<br/> | |||
[https://github.com/Cryptogenic/Exploit-Writeups/blob/master/PS4/%22NamedObj%22%204.05%20Kernel%20Exploit%20Writeup.md Specter's Writeup on his 4.05 implementation] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Line 1,296: | Line 191: | ||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 4.06 FW | '''Yes''' in 4.06 FW | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW <= 1.76 - dlclose | === FW <= 1.76 - Dynamic Library Prepare Close (dlclose) === | ||
* Discovered by CTurt. Privately implemented thanks to qwertyoruiopz. CTurt published a writeup then the exploit was publicly implemented by kR105 and on another side by Zer0xFF and Bigboss (psxdev). | |||
* Discovered by CTurt. | |||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
[http://cturt.github.io/dlclose-overflow.html Analysis of sys_dynlib_prepare_dlclose PS4 kernel heap overflow (by CTurt with the help of | [http://cturt.github.io/dlclose-overflow.html Analysis of sys_dynlib_prepare_dlclose PS4 kernel heap overflow (by CTurt with the help of qwertyoruiopz)] | ||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Line 1,322: | Line 210: | ||
---- | ---- | ||
=== FW <= 1.76 - BadIRET | === FW <= 1.76 - BadIRET === | ||
==== Analysis ==== | ==== Analysis ==== | ||
* | * Ported from FreeBSD 9 to PS4 by CTurt. | ||
[http://cturt.github.io/ps4-3.html Hacking the PS4, part 3 - Kernel exploitation (by '''CTurt''')]<br/> | |||
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-9322 NVD Bug Description] | |||
==== Bug Description ==== | ==== Bug Description ==== | ||
Faults associated with the stack segment (SS) register are not handled properly, allowing unprivileged users to trigger an IRET instruction that accesses a GS Base from | Faults associated with the stack segment (SS) register are not handled properly, allowing unprivileged users to trigger an IRET instruction that accesses a GS Base from userland memory, providing an attacker with a method of privilege escalation. | ||
==== | ==== Source ==== | ||
[http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2015/q3/66 CVE-2014-9322] | |||
<br/>[http://www.filedropper.com/ps4-bad-iret-5fs Public binary] | |||
==== Patched ==== | ==== Patched ==== | ||
'''Yes''' in 2.00 FW | '''Yes''' in 2.00 FW | ||
=== | ==== Implementation ==== | ||
[https://mega.nz/#!Fo1xFDrb!EuOl5s6g_IPTtI6dAknSKYJZ8YLzZWvx1MPUPmkr3Sg (mirror)] | |||
== Kernel securities == | == Kernel securities == | ||
=== Kernel ASLR === | === Kernel ASLR === | ||
* At some point after the 1.76 FW, ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) was enabled in the kernel. | |||
* This means that to properly exploit the kernel to escalate privileges, an information disclosure vulnerability will most likely be needed to defeat ASLR and locate the kernel in memory. | |||
=== Kernel SMAP === | === Kernel SMAP === | ||
* In 5.0x FW and above, "Supervisor Mode Access Prevention" (SMAP), a new custom mitigation was added to the kernel to prevent exploiters from pivoting the stack pointer into userland memory (attempting to do so will crash the system). | |||
* A new exploitation strategy is needed for running kROP (kernel ROP) chains, such as qwertyoruiopz method used in the 5.05 BPF kernel exploit:<br /> | |||
We need to get our ROP chain into kernel memory. To do this, qwertyoruiopz decided to go with the method he used on the iPhone 7 - essentially using JOP to push a bunch of stack frames onto the kernel stack, and memcpy()'ing the chain into RSP. | |||
{{Reverse Engineering}} | {{Reverse Engineering}} | ||
<noinclude> | <noinclude>[[Category:Main]]</noinclude> | ||
[[Category:Main]] | |||
</noinclude> |