Talk:SELF - SPRX
To be merged with SELF File Format and Decryption
NPDRM Header
typedef struct { u32 block_type; // this is 3(NPDRM) u32 block_size; // this is 0x90(sizeof(Self_NPDRM)) u32 unknown1; //So far always 0 u32 unknown2; //So far always 0 u32 magic; // 0x4E504400(NPD) u32 unknown3; // So far always 1 u32 license; // 1 Network License, 2 Local License, 3 Free u32 type; // 1 Executable, 21 Update for Disc Based Game u8 titleid[0x30]; u8 hash_unknown[0x10]; u8 hash1[0x10]; u8 hash2[0x10]; u8 padding[0x10]; } Self_NPDRM
Located after the Self Control Info.
Main header
field | offset | type | notes |
---|---|---|---|
Magic | 0x0 | u32 | Must be "SCE\0" |
SCE header version | 0x4 | u32 | This must be 2 or the Self loader will abort |
flags | 0x8 | u16 |
|
SCE header type | 0xA | u16 | 1 for SELF, 3 for update PKG |
meta_offset | 0xC | u32 | Offset to the checksums. Must be at least 20 bytes before the end of the header |
header size | 0x10 | u64 | This is the length of the header (including the fake elf headers)
|
Encrypted size | 0x18 | u64 | The size of the encrypted part of the self file. |
unknown | 0x20 | u64 | Must be 3 |
App_info_offset | 0x28 | u64 | An offset in the header, usually at 0x70. See App info header. |
elf_offset | 0x30 | u64 | offset to the elf header |
phdr_offset | 0x38 | u64 | offset to phdr |
shdr_offset | 0x40 | u64 | offset to shdr |
encrypted phdr sizes/offsets table offset | 0x48 | u64 | Offset to a table which maps phdr entries to the actual offset/size within the encrypted fself.
Because fselfs can be compressed, they might not match the values listed within the elf. |
sceversion header | 0x50 | u64 | Offset to a header which contains some version information, including an offset to the .sceversion section of the encrypted elf.
The playstation 3 doesn't care about this, and doesn't even check the header |
Digest | 0x58 | u64 | |
Digest Size | 0x60 | u64 |
The real ELF data is located after the SCE header (see header size). It is encrypted, unless the flags are 0x8000. unfself works by cutting the SCE header from the (fake) SELF.
App Info header:
Aligned to 0x10 bytes.
field | offset | type | notes |
---|---|---|---|
authid | 0x00 | u64 | |
unknown | 0x08 | u32 | |
app_type | 0x0c | u32 |
|
app_version | 0x10 | u64 |
Encrypted phdr offset entry
There is one of these entries for each phdr entry in the elf file so that the ps3 knows where to decrypt the data from. (because it might also be compressed.)
field | offset | type | notes |
---|---|---|---|
Encrypted Data Offset | 0x00 | u64 | |
Encrypted Data Size | 0x08 | u64 | |
unknown | 0x10 | u32 | This has been 1 in all the examples I have seen. |
unknown | 0x14 | u32 | Always 0, as far as I know. |
unknown | 0x18 | u32 | Always 0, as far as I know. |
unknown | 0x1c | u32 | This is 2 for loadable segment types, and 0 for other types. |
Meta Checksums
There are 3 checksums at the offset specified by meta_offset.
- The first is the sha1 checksum of the entire self file.
- The 2nd checksum is the inverse of the first checksum.
- The 3rd checksum is the first checksum XORed with 0xAAAAAA..AAAAAB
The PSJailbreak payload ignores the actual checksums, but checks that the 3rd checksum is the 2nd checksum XORed with 0xAAAAAA..AAAAAB
Cryptography
Here is a small summary on how the self cryptography works.
Basically here are the steps being involved by the loaders:
Loaders all have a static key and iv called respectively erk and riv, those are keys for the first decryption step which are used to decrypt the very first 0x40 bytes of the self's metadata using AES256CBC
Then the result is used as a key and iv to decrypt the rest of the metadata using AES128CTR, finally the decrypted metadata contains the keys and iv for each data sections which are still decrypted through AES128CTR. This security model is based on the fact that the first 0x40 bytes of the self's metadata once decrypted by the static AES256CBC key in the loader should never be the same from one binary to the other. The same goes for any other value used as an AES128CTR key or iv.
Loaders are also involved with inflating the binaries using zlib.
The self authenticity is based on other independent steps, HMAC-SHA1 and ECDSA for the actual signature.