Revision as of 12:57, 21 March 2011

This is a copy of the page from 22nd of February 2011, right before ps3wiki.lan.st went down.

HSPRG

The hypervisor stores a pointer to some structure per LPAR in HSPRG0 register.
There are actually 2 HSPRG0 values: one for each thread of Cell CPU !!!
There is a HSPRG0 array at 0x8(-0x69A0(HSPRG0)) + 0x20.

LPAR

LPAR = Logical Partition

lpar1 starts at 0x<unknown>, and its belived to be the memory space where lv1 stores its variables, flags and other data.

lpar2 starts at 0x80000000000 and it's belived to be the memory space where lv2 stores its variables, flags and other data.

The pointer to active LPAR is stored at -0x67E8(HSPRG0).

vtable

0x0033CA40 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x38 - some pointer

offset 0x50 - LPAR id (8 bytes)

offset 0x70 - pointer to VAS id bitmap

offset 0x78 - power of 2 of word size from VAS id bitmap (4 bytes), equal to 6

offset 0x7C - number of 64-bit words in VAS id bitmap(4 bytes)

Interrupt handling

The pointer to the interrupt handler that is called e.g. when an external interrupt occurs is at -0x69F0(HSPRG0).

0x00001930 (3.15 and 2.60)

Interrupt vector tables

There are 2 interrupt vector tables. One for each thread. The pointer to these tables is at -0x6950(HSPRG0).

offset 0x8 - IIC memory base address (8 bytes)

offset 0x10 - thread register offset (8 bytes)

offset 0x18 - start of interrupt vector table (19 entries, each entry 32 bytes)

Interrupt vector table entry

offset 0x0 - pointer to interrupt handler

offset 0x8 - TOC

offset 0x10 - 0

offset 0x18 - parameter to interrupt handler

Interrupt handlers

Spurious interrupt handler

0x002BC174 (3.15)

RSX

0x00219A44 (3.15)

0x002176FC (2.60)

SB bus

0x002B9CC4 (3.15)

I/O address translation

0x002CD7D8 (3.15)

0x002C9214 (2.60)

Performance monitor

0x002F0584 (3.15)

0x002EB1B0 (2.60)

Token manager

0x002BBA9C (3.15)

0x002B754C (2.60)

HV call

The address of HV table is stored at -0x6FC8(HSPRG0).
The address of HV table size is stored at -0x6FD0(HSPRG0).

HV call

Id	Name	Description
62	lv1_undocumented_function_62	SPE (isolation, it updates a SLB entry, writes to SLB_Index, SLB_VSID, SLB_ESID and SLB_Invalidate_Entry registers)
89	lv1_undocumented_function_89	SPE (writes to MFC_TLB_Invalidate_Entry register)
99	lv1_authenticate_program_segment	SPE (isolation, syscall 0x10043, syscall 0x10042, syscall 0x1004A)
102	lv1_undocumented_function_102	Returns current TB ticks
137	lv1_undocumented_function_137	SPE
138	lv1_undocumented_function_138	SPE
167	lv1_undocumented_function_167	SPE (isolation, reads from SPU_Out_Intr_Mbox and MFC_CNTL registers)
168	lv1_undocumented_function_168	SPE (isolation, writes to MFC_CNTL register)
195	lv1_undocumented_function_195	WLAN Gelic device
196	lv1_undocumented_function_196	WLAN Gelic device
200	lv1_undocumented_function_200	SPE (isolation)
201	lv1_undocumented_function_201	SPE (isolation)
209	lv1_undocumented_function_209	SPE (isolation)
250	lv1_undocumented_function_250	Storage device
251	lv1_undocumented_function_251	Storage device
252	lv1_undocumented_function_252	Storage device
253	lv1_undocumented_function_253	Storage device

Initializing HV Call Table

set_lv1_hvcall_table

0x002C02B4 (3.41)

0x002C1F04 (3.15)

0x002C2B4C (3.55)

This function sets pointer to HV Call Table and the size of HV Call Table in HSPRG context of a LPAR.

set_lv1_hvcall_table_entry_invalid

0x002C1F28 (3.15)

0x002C02D8 (3.41)

0x002C2B70 (3.55)

This function initializes an entry in HV Call Table to the Invalid HV Call function.

Memory HV call

All memory HV calls branch to lv1_mm_call
lv1_mm_call has it's own function table
Memory HV call number = HV call number

Memory HV call table

Each entry is a pointer to a function TOC entry.
table size = 256

0x00364208 (3.15)

0x00362308 (3.41)

0x00366088 (3.55)

Memory HV calls

lv1_map_htab - 0x002D595C (3.15)

lv1_unmap_htab - 0x002D56B8 (3.15)

lv1_allocate_memory - 0x002D72F0 (3.15)

lv1_release_memory - 0x002D66A4 (3.15)

lv1_query_logical_partition_address_region_info - 0x002C9B24 (3.15)

lv1_create_repository_node - 0x002DD014 (3.15)

lv1_get_repository_node_value - 0x002DD260 (3.15)

lv1_undocumented_function_231 - 0x0030B560 (3.15)

System call

HV Processes do not use HV calls. They use syscalls only.

System call handler

0x002974D8 (3.15)

0x00292F6C (2.60)

There are 2 system call tables in HV. The first one stores system calls 0 - 36. The second one stores system calls 0x10000 - 0x100FF.

System call table 0 - 36

0x0035FAE8 (3.15)

0x00358ED0 (2.60)

System call numbers

0x1 - getpid(void)

0x2 - getppid(void)

0x3 - fork(void)

0x4 - exit

0x5 - exec(filename)

0x6 - wait(status)

0x7 - open(filename)

0x8 - close(fd)

0x9 - read

0xA - write

0xB - seek

0xC - unlink(filename)

0xD - signal

0xE - kill(pid, signal type)

0xF - brk

0x10 - socket(af, type, protocol) (supports only address family 0x1F, type 0x0 and protocol 0x0)

0x11 - bind

0x12 - listen(fd, backlog)

0x13 - accept

0x14 - connect

0x15 - ?

0x16 - pause(void)

0x17 - sleep(seconds)

0x18 - mmap(addr, size, prot, flags, fd, offset)

0x19 - munmap

0x1A - some fs func for directories, perhaps readdir

0x1B - ?

0x1C - map_pages (used for alloc)

0x1D - unmap_pages (used for free)

0x1E - select

0x1F - getcwd

0x20 - ?

0x21 - alarm

0x22 - ioctl

0x23 - _map_pages

0x24 - _unmap_pages

System call table 0x10000 - 0x100FF

0x0035DE78 (3.15)

0x00357260 (2.60)

System call numbers

0x10000 - allocate_memory_region(LPAR id, size, log2 of page size, ?, ?)

0x10001 - lpar_query_address_region_info

0x10002 - lpar_memory_addr_to_phys_addr(LPAR id, LPAR address, physical addr)

0x10005 - construct_logical_pu

0x10007 - activate_logical_pu(LPAR id, PPE id)

0x10009 - construct_logical_partition(0, LPAR id, outlet)

0x1000E - release_memory_region(LPAR id, memory region address)

0x1001A - construct_event_receive_port

0x10024 - shutdown_logical_partition(LPAR id, shutdown command)

0x10025 - destruct_logical_partition(LPAR id)

0x10026 - get_logical_partition_info

0x1002C - construct_scheduling_table

0x1002D - set_scheduling_slot

0x10032 - accesses system console

0x10036 - accesses system console

0x10040 - construct_spe_type_1(SPE id, shaddow_addr)

0x10041 - destruct_spe(SPE id)

0x10042 - decrypt_lv2_self(spe id, LPAR auth id, SELF file image ptr, LPAR memory address)

0x10043 - load_spe_module(spe id, SCE module ptr, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4)

0x10044 - disable_spe_execution

0x10045 - set_spe_interrupt_mask

0x10046 - read_spe_problem_state_register(spe id, register offset, value)

0x10047 - write_spe_problem_state_register(spe id, register offset, value)

0x1004B - disable_spe_loading

0x10053 - pmi_set_guest_os_mode

0x10081 - accesses system console

0x10084 - construct_virtual_uart(LPAR id, VUART id, VUART data buffer size)

0x10085 - destruct_virtual_uart(LPAR id, VUART id)

0x10088 - RSX_syscall_10088(LPAR id)

0x10089 - RSX_syscall_10089

0x1008A - RSX_syscall_1008A

0x100BE - lv1_ioctl

0x100C0 - create_repository_node(LPAR id)

0x100C1 - get_repository_node_value(LPAR id)

0x100C2 - modify_repository_node_value(LPAR id)

0x100C3 - remove_repository_node_value(LPAR id)

Process

Process table

HV supports only 32 processes simultaneously. The number of processes currently running in HV is stored at address 0x0035EA54 (3.15) and 0x00357E3C (2.60).

The process table is an array of 32 process table entries.

0x0035E850 (3.15)

0x00357C38 (2.60)

Process table entry

offset 0x0 - process status ? (8 bytes)

offset 0x8 - pointer to Process object

create_new_proc

This function creates a new Process object.

0x00298E2C (3.15)

0x002948BC (2.60)

Parameters

r3 - pointer to parent Process object

r4 - ?

copy_user_data

This function copies data to/from user space.

0x00299688 (3.15)

0x00295118 (2.60)

Parameters

r3 - pointer to Process object

r4 - some address in address space of Process

r5 - pointer to buffer in HV space

r6 - size to copy

r7 - ?

r8 - direction of copy (0 - copy from user space, != 0 - copy to user space)

r9 - ?

vtable

Processes have no vtables. That means they have no virtual functions.

Member variables

offset 0x0 - PID (4 bytes)

offset 0x8 - pointer to parent Process object

offset 0x10 - pointer to AddressSpace object

offset 0x30 - pointer to first PThread object of process

offset 0x38 - array of signal handlers (192 * 8 bytes)

offset 0x638 - pointer to pointer to ELF image

offset 0x640 - start of file table (20 * 24 bytes)

offset 0x820 - exit status (4 bytes)

offset 0x898 - pointer to Inode object of current directory

offset 0x8A8 - some pointer

Signals

A process can have upto 192 signal handlers. For example, signal 9 is SIGKILL. A signal handler for SIGKILL cannot be installed and it cannot be ignored.

A process does not have a signal mask. Every thread of a process has it's own signal mask.

Signal constants

0x9 - SIGKILL

0xE - SIGALRM

0x20 - SIGSPUMB

0x21 - SIGSPUMB_SL

0x22 - SIGSPUSTOP

0x23 - SIGSPUSTOP_SL

0x24 - SIGSPUDMA

0x26 - SIGSPUTIMEOUT

0x27 - SIGSPUERR

0x41 - SIGSHUTDOWN

File table

The file table has 20 entries. So, a process can have at most 20 files opened simultaneously. Each entry is 24 bytes large.

offset 0x0 - entry valid or invalid (1 byte), 0 - invalid, 1 - valid

offset 0x8 - pointer to object with File interface

offset 0x10 - current file position (8 bytes)

Process_EA_to_RA

This function translates an effective process address to real address.

0x00297E08 (3.15)

Objects

Here are the addresses of Process objects i could identify in HV dump 3.15:

0x006BB0D0 (PID 0)
0x0012C010 (PID 3) - ss_server3.fself
0x000915D0 (PID 5) - ss_server2.fself
0x000E4D70 (PID 6) - ss_server1.fself
0x0012C8D0 (PID 9) - sysmgr_ss.fself

Here are the addresses of Process objects i could identify in HV dump 2.60:

0x006B7580 (PID 0)
0x00135F90 (PID 3)
0x000862D0 (PID 5)
0x000A9870 (PID 6)
0x00084B80 (PID 9)

PThread

All PThread objects of the same Process object are linked together in a list.

vtable

0x003556D8 (3.15)

0x0034ECC0 (2.60)

offset 0x60 - pointer to TOC entry of system call handler

Member variables

offset 0x10 - pointer to next PThread object of Process

offset 0x18 - Thread object

offset 0x2B8 - ? (4 bytes)

offset 0x2C0 - pointer to TOC of some function

offset 0x2C8 - pointer to TOC of some function

offset 0x348 - some conter (4 bytes)

offset 0x3C0 - pointer to Process object that owns PThread object

offset 0x3F8 - signal pending mask (3 * 8 bytes = 192 signals)

offset 0x440 - ConditionVariable object

Signals

A PThread has it's own signal mask, independant of all other PThreads in the same process.

Methods

wait_for_my_turn(Pthread ptr, ?, sleep interruptible flag) = wakeup status - 0x00296FB0 (3.15)

Thread

get_current_thread

This function returns the pointer to current running thread.

0x0028B994 (3.15)

0x0028744C (2.60)

vtable

0x00355750 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x288 - some pointer

offset 0x290 - some pointer

AddressSpace

vtable

0x003549A0 (3.15)

0x0034DF88 (2.60)

Member variables

offset 0x8 - Mutex object

offset 0x40 - AddressProtectionDomain object

offset 0x50 - some pointer

offset 0xC0 - some counter (4 bytes)

AddressSpace_EA_to_RA

0x002874D0 (3.15)

AddressProtectionDomain

vtable

0x00354980 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x8 - pointer to previous AddressProtectionDomain object

offset 0x10 - pointer to next AddressProtectionDomain object

offset 0x18 - poiinter to pointer to SLB entries

offset 0x20 - pointer to AddressSpace object that owns this object

offset 0x34 - pointer to previous ProtectionPage

offset 0x3C - pointer to next ProtectionPage

offset 0x48 - Mutex object

ProtectionPage

vtable

none

Member variables

offset 0x0 - RA (8 bytes)

offset 0x8 - EA (4 bytes)

offset 0x10 - pointer to previous ProtectionPage (4 bytes)

offset 0x14 - pointer to next ProtectionPage (4 bytes)

Mutex

vtable

0x00354D08 (3.15)

0x0034E2F0 (2.60)

Member variables

offset 0x18 - ? (4 bytes)

offset 0x1C - ? (4 bytes)

ConditionVariable

vtable

0x003549C0 (3.15)

offset 0x20 - wait

Member variables

offset 0x20 - pointer to Mutex object

File interface

vtable

offset 0x8 - ?

offset 0x28 - open

offset 0x30 - close

offset 0x38 - read

offset 0x40 - write

offset 0x50 - mmap

offset 0x58 - ioctl

StorageRegionFile

Flash device file class.

vtable

0x003569F8 (3.15)

VUARTFile

VUART device file class.

vtable

0x00356458 (3.15)

STDLCFile

Console device file class.

vtable

0x003561F8 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x20 - reference counter (8 bytes)

offset 0x28 - free buffer space ? (8 bytes)

SocketFile

vtable

0x00355DB0 (3.15)

offset 0xB0 - bind

RegionManager

vtable

0x00355F80 (3.15)

Inode

DirectoryInode

vtable

0x00355788 (3.15)

offset 0x20 - link

offset 0x28 - unlink

get_root_inode

This function returns the pointer to the Inode object of the root directory.

0x0029C124 (3.15)

0x00297BB4 (2.60)

vtable

0x00334E50 (3.15)

offset 0x30 - lookup

File system

Console device file objects

Here is the list of console device file objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

console

vtable

0x003561F8 (3.15)

Flash device file objects

Here is the list of flash device file objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

/dev/eflash0
/dev/eflash1
/dev/rflash0
/dev/rflash1
/dev/rflash_1x
/dev/rflash_1xp

vtable

0x003569F8 (3.15)

IOIF device file objects

Here is the list of IOIF device file objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

/dev/ioif0

vtable

0x00356688 (3.15)

Member variables

0x360 = MMIO base address

SD detector device file objects

Here is the list of SD detector device file objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

/dev/sd_detector

vtable

0x00356B48 (3.15)

NET device file objects

Here is the list of NET device file objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

/dev/net0

vtable

0x00356DE8 (3.15)

INODES

INODE OBJECT

+0x04: previos inode

+0x08: next inodes

+ 0x38: path

+ 0x358: childer_inode

MFS_ROOT_INODE

(2.60) 0x3580B0

+ 0x60 = ROOT_INODE

SOME ADDRESSES IN 2.60

0x60C010: "/dev" inode

0x6AA580: "/proc" inode

using linked list you can follow all inodes

Repository

Each LPAR has it's own node repository
Repository nodes are stored in a hash table which can have several sub-hash tables.

RepositoryNode

vtable

0x00357F58 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x30 - pointer to next RepositoryNode obj

offset 0x38 - 2nd hash value of name (4 bytes)

offset 0x40 - 1st field name (8 bytes)

offset 0x48 - 2nd field name (8 bytes)

offset 0x50 - 3rd field name (8 bytes)

offset 0x58 - 4th field name (8 bytes)

offset 0x60 - ? (4 bytes)

offset 0x68 - 1st field value (8 bytes)

offset 0x70 - 2nd field value (8 bytes)

Hash Function

The name of a repository node is hashed and 2 hash values (2 32bit values) are produced.
The 1st hash value is used to select a sub-hash table.
The 2nd hash value is used to find a sub-hash table bucket.
Repository nodes in a hash bucket are ordered by the 2nd hash value.

void hash(unsigned long long n1,
          unsigned long long n2,
          unsigned long long n3,
          unsigned long long n4,
          unsigned long *h1,
          unsigned long *h2)
{
    unsigned long long h;
    unsigned long hl;

    h = ((((n1 ^ n4) >> 32) ^ (n2 ^ n3)) ^ (((n2 ^ n3) >> 32) ^ (n1 ^ n4))) & ~0xC0000000ULL;

    *h1 = h & 0xFFFFFFFFULL;

    h = ((h & 0x55555555ULL) << 1) | ((h & 0xAAAAAAAAULL) >> 1);

    h = ((h & 0x33333333ULL) << 2) | ((h & 0xCCCCCCCCULL) >> 2);

    h = ((h & 0xF0F0F0FULL) << 4) | ((h & 0xF0F0F0F0ULL) >> 4);

    hl = (h << 8) | ((h & 0xFF000000ULL) >> 24);

    hl = (hl & ~0xFF000000UL) | ((h & 0xFFULL) << 24);

    hl = (hl & ~0x0000FF00UL) | (((h << 24) | (h >> 8)) & 0x0000FF00ULL);

    hl |= 0x1; 

    *h2 = hl;
}

Repository nodes from HV 3.15

Dump of all repository nodes from HV 3.15

Repository nodes from HV 3.41 dump made from GameOS

Dump of all repository nodes from HV 3.41 dump made from GameOS

Buses

SB bus

type - 4

index - 1

num_devices - 4 (repository node says this but there are more devices !!!)

Storage bus

type - 5

index - 4

num_devices - 4

SB bus subsystem

vtable

0x00352600 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x10 - MMIO memory base address

offset 0x20 - array of 16 pointers to SB devices (0 - Gelic device, 1 - USB device)

Objects

0x00349528 - pointer to pointer to SB bus subsystem object

Memory base address

0x24000000000

All SB bus device MMIO addresses are relative to this memory address.

SB device MMIO/DMA memory region

vtable

0x000x352308 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x18 - pointer to previous bus memory region object

offset 0x20 - pointer to next bus memory region object

offset 0x30 - relative bus memory start address

offset 0x38 - size of bus memory region

SB bus device

vtable

0x00352620 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x18 - array of pointers to MMIO memory region objects owned by device (8 * 8 bytes)

offset 0x60 - pointer to first DMA region object

offset 0x6C - device opened flag (1 byte, 0 - not opened, 1 - already opened)

offset 0x70 - id of LPAR that opened this device

offset 0x90 - pointer to an object that contains the address of interrupt handler for this device and SB bus interrupt index

Gelic device (Network Interface)

device id = 0

interrupt index = 8

MMIO regions

Index	Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0	0x2800	0x24000002800	0x200
1	0x3004000	0x24003004000	0x1000
2	-	-	-
3	-	-	-
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0xA0000000	-	0x8000
0xC0000000	-	0x10000000

SATA Controller 1 device

device id = 1

interrupt index = 49

MMIO regions

Index	Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0	0x2000	0x24000002000	0x200
1	0x3000000	0x24003000000	0x1000
2	0x3800000	0x24003800000	0x1000
3	0x3802000	0x24003802000	0x1000
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0xA0000000	-	0x1000
0xA0001000	-	0x1000
0xA0002000	-	0x1000

SATA Controller 2 device

device id = 2

interrupt index = 13

MMIO regions

Index	Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0	0x2200	0x24000002200	0x200
1	0x3001000	0x24003001000	0x1000
2	0x3801000	0x24003801000	0x1000
3	0x3803000	0x24003803000	0x1000
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0xA0000000	-	0x1000
0xA0001000	-	0x1000
0xA0002000	-	0x1000

USB Controller 1 device

device id = 3

MMIO regions

Index	Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0	0x2400	0x24000002400	0x200
1	0x3010000	0x24003010000	0x10000
2	0x3810000	0x24003810000	0x10000
3	-	-	-
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0xC0000000	-	0x10000000
0xD0000000	-	0x10000000

USB Controller 2 device

device id = 4

MMIO regions

Index	Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0	0x2600	0x24000002600	0x200
1	0x3020000	0x24003020000	0x10000
2	0x3820000	0x24003820000	0x10000
3	-	-	-
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0xC0000000	-	0x10000000
0xD0000000	-	0x10000000

ENCDEC device

device id = 7

interrupt index = 5

MMIO regions

Index	Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0	0x2C00	0x24000002C00	0x200
1	0x3005000	0x24003005000	0x1000
2	0x3006000	0x24003006000	0x1000
3	-	-	-
4	-	-	-
5	-	-	-
6	-	-	-
7	-	-	-

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0x80010000	-	0x10000
0x80004000	-	0x4000
0x80001000	-	0x1000
0x80003000	-	0x1000
0x80008000	-	0x1000
0x80009000	-	0x1000
0x80040000	-	0x10000
0x8000A000	-	0x1000
0x90020000	-	0x20000
0xC0000000	-	0x10000
0xC0040000	-	0x40000

FLASH Controller device (StarShip - SS)

device id = 9

interrupt index = 41

MMIO regions

FLASH controller doesn't have MMIO regions.

DMA regions

Relative Bus Start Address	Absolute Bus Start Address	Size
0x80000000	-	0x1000
0x80020000	-	0x20000
0x80002000	-	0x1000
0x90000000	-	0x20000

SB Bus Interrupt Handling

There is a table of interrupt handlers for SB devices
The size of table is 64
The main SB bus interrupt handler is at 0x002B9CC4 (3.15)
The main interrupt handler reads interrupt index and dispatches interrupts

Interrupt Index

The main SB bus interrupt handler reads 2 32-bit values from addresses 0x24000008100 and 0x0x24000008104
The interrupt index is calculated from these values

Interrupt Handler Table

Interrupt	Description	Address in HV
5	ENCDEC device	0x00275C60 (3.15)
6	EH EPCIC internal	0x0023B6B0 (3.15)
8	Gelic device	0x00245330 (3.15)
12	ATA interrupt handler	0x0026B984 (3.15)
13	ATA interrupt handler	0x0026B984 (3.15)
14	Spider SC	0x0020A68C (3.15)
29	SBERR	0x0023AA50 (3.15)
30	SBERR	0x0023AA50 (3.15)
41	EBUS (Flash StartShip)	0x002814EC (3.15)
49	ATA media interrupt handler	0x00268A8C (3.15)
50	Flash ?	0x00280B24 (3.15)
55	EH EPCIC SERR	0x0023B67C (3.15)

Storage bus subsystem

vtable

0x00353AC8 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xEE8 - table of pointers to storage device objects (7 * 8 bytes, max 7 devices)

Storage device class

Member variables

offset 0x8 - device id (8 bytes)

offset 0xD50 - device id (8 bytes)

offset 0xD60 - pointer to ENCDEC SB bus device object

Region Manager

Each storage device has a Region Manager (i call it like that)
Region Manager stores information about each Region of the storage device
All Regions of a Region Manager are linked together
Free Regions of a Region Manager are linked together also
A Region Manager can have at most 8 Regions

Region

Each storage device can have at most 8 regions (0-7)
Each region has ACL table
HV checks region ACLs before allowing access to the region
Each region has a start sector that is an offset from the physical first sector of the storage device and a number of sectors

The start sector passed to lv1 storage hvcalls is relative to the start sector of the region passed to the lv1 storage hvcall

Region ACL

offset 0x0 - LPAR AUTH ID (8 bytes)

offset 0x8 - access rigths (8 bytes)

offset 0x10 - entry valid flag: 0 - invalid, 1 - valid (1 byte)

Region Access Protection

Before a storage region is accessed, HV checks access rights of the caller.
Repository node ss.laid (LPAR authentication id) is evaluated for this purpose.
If LPAR has a repository node ios.ata.region0.access (value doesn't matter) then the access rights check never fails. After System Manager sets ATA keys it removes this repository node from LPAR 1. If we add this repository node again or patch System Manager so it's not removed then we will be able to access all storage regions of all storage devices.
ALL storage accesses from LPAR 1 are allowed
If (flags & 0x100000002) != 0 then access rights check is skipped !!!.

 I tested on HV 3.41 with flags 0x2 and got access to regions which were denied by policy (LV1_DENIED_BY_POLICY result).

Storage Device Partition Table

Each storage device has a Partition Table
Partition Table contains information about each region on the storage device

Methods

lv1_storage_create_region (lv1_undocumented_function_250) - 0x00301328 (3.15)

lv1_storage_delete_region (lv1_undocumented_function_251) - 0x003011E8 (3.15)

lv1_storage_set_region_acl (lv1_undocumented_function_252) - 0x00300F3C (3.15)

lv1_storage_get_region_acl (lv1_undocumented_function_253) - 0x00301090 (3.15)

storage_device_create_region - 0x00253988 (3.15)

storage_device_delete_region - 0x00253BE8 (3.15)

storage_device_region_set_acl - 0x00252C80 (3.15)

storage_device_region_get_acl - 0x00252710 (3.15)

storage_region_mgr_create_region - 0x0025A530 (3.15)

storage_region_mgr_delete_region - 0x0025BA64 (3.15)

storage_region_mgr_set_acl - 0x0025A140 (3.15)

storage_region_mgr_get_acl - 0x0025A298 (3.15)

storage_region_mgr_update_partition_table - 0x00259924 (3.15)

storage_region_acl_entry_reset - 0x0025C1A8 (3.15)

storage_region_acl_entry_check_laid - 0x0025C1FC (3.15)

storage_region_overlap - 0x0025C094 (3.15)

storage_region_check_access - 0x00259EC8 (3.15)

Storage subsystem device

device id = -1

The storage subsystem is a storage device itself.
It's a psuedo device used to notify a LPAR when storage devices become e.g. ready.
Linux implements a loop and reads from this device and process notifications (adds new devices dynamically).

Notification Events

List of supported notification events:

Notify Device Ready (0x1)
Notify Region Probe (0x2)
Notify Region Update (0x4)

RBD device

On Linux, ENCDEC and RBD devices are mapped to the storage device with device id 0.
On GameOS, ENCDEC device has device id 0 and RBD device has device id 2.

device id = 0

block size = 2048

/dev/rbd0

The RBD storage device uses ENCDEC device.

vtable

0x00354288 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x1808 - request table (0x58 * 32 bytes)

Regions

Index	Start sector	Number of sectors
0	0x0	0x7FFFFFFF
1	-	-
2	-	-
3	-	-
4	-	-
5	-	-
6	-	-
7	-	-

Supported Device Commands

Here is the list of commands supported by RBD storage device.

The commands can be used with HV call lv1_storage_send_device_command.
However, before a command is executed HV does bit manipulation with it and checks it against the value of repository node ss.laid or also called LPAR authentication ID. If this test fails then the command is NOT executed.

Command	Description
0x1	LV1_STORAGE_SEND_ATAPI_COMMAND
0x10	ATAPI Read Capacity
0x11	ATAPI Get Configuration
0x13	ATAPI Read TOC
0x1A	ATAPI Get Event

/dev/rbd0

This LPAR 1 device accesses RBD storage device.
A write to this device sends a device command to RBD storage device.

ENCDEC Device

bus id = 4

device id = 0

ENCDEC device has a request table of size 32.

Member variables

offset 0xDC0 - request table (0x58 * 32 bytes)

Methods

encdec_device_initialize - 0x00273524 (3.15)

InitializeENCDEC - 0x00277310 (3.15)

ENCDEC_ConnectBusDriver - 0x00275A98 (3.15)

encdec_interrupt_handler - 0x00275C60 (3.15)

encdec_process_interrupt - 0x0027526C (3.15)

encdec_device_enqueue_decsec_request - 0x00273738 (3.15)

encdec_device_do_request - 0x00273EA8 (3.15)

encdec_device_do_SS_request - 0x00274940 (3.15)

Encdec_KickDMA - 0x00277118 (3.15)

encdec_device_is_in_testmode - 0x002756E0 (3.15)

is_encdec_in_testmode - 0x002732D0 (3.15)

ENCDEC Device Commands

EdecKgen1 command is used e.g. by Storage Manager Service 0x5003 to generate random numbers. Storage Manager performs this command through LPAR 1 device /dev/encdec0.

Command	Description
0x81	EdecKgen1
0x82	EdecKgen2
0x83	EdecKset/EdecKset NG
0x84	EdecKgenFlash
0x85	Encrypts/decrypts sectors (This command cannot be executed through ioctl interface !!!)
0x86	Encdec decsec (This command cannot be executed through ioctl interface !!!)
0x87	EdecSBClear

EdecKgen1 Command (0x81)

First, ENCDEC device key generator is flashed by executing the operation which is also performed during EdecKgenFlash command.
0x30 bytes of data are written to MMIO registers of ENCDEC device.
0x40 bytes of data are read from MMIO registers of ENCDEC device.
The base address of MMIO registers used in this command is 0x24003006000.
I tested this command by directly communicating with ENCDEC device from GameOS by using HV call lv1_storage_send_device_command and it returns random data.

Here is the data i sent to ENCDEC device:

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000000   00 01 00 30 72 A7 88 EC  FC A4 06 71 4C B1 50 C9   ...0r§ˆìü¤.qL±PÉ
00000010   FB E0 06 C2 74 B5 84 C4  E6 BD 1E 55 4E 36 E9 C9   ûà.Âtµ„Äæ½.UN6éÉ
00000020   D6 09 BC B4 79 A6 BC DE  60 A5 B2 41 C7 15 68 68   Ö.¼´y¦¼Þ`¥²AÇ.hh
00000030   82 1D 8F D6 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ‚.Ö............

Here is the data i received back from ENCDEC device:

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000000   00 02 00 00 57 CF 06 AF  53 85 1B B8 49 37 06 28   ....WÏ.¯S….¸I7.(
00000010   51 8D 4E F9 EF 76 E2 C7  17 EF 41 14 FA 6C 96 A8   QNùïvâÇ.ïA.úl–¨
00000020   7E 41 43 96 15 9A 0D 71  A9 B6 A6 B0 F1 96 15 C5   ~AC–.š.q©¶¦°ñ–.Å
00000030   30 25 C3 8E 6F AC FB 7F  E7 2A FB E2 36 E1 85 92   0%ÃŽo¬û?ç*ûâ6á…’
00000040   99 66 DB EC 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ™fÛì............

Here is another data i received back from ENCDEC device by using the same command and data:

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000000   00 02 00 00 57 CF 06 AF  53 85 1B B8 49 37 06 28   ....WÏ.¯S….¸I7.(
00000010   51 8D 4E F9 EF 76 E2 C7  17 EF 41 14 FA 6C 96 A8   QNùïvâÇ.ïA.úl–¨
00000020   7E 41 43 96 17 08 75 F6  66 2F 32 5A 9E 3E E7 FD   ~AC–..uöf/2Zž>çý
00000030   16 3E 18 CA B2 5E 90 84  29 7F 98 BC 73 36 0E 7B   .>.Ê²^„)?˜¼s6.{
00000040   7D EC B6 37 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   }ì¶7............

EdecKgen2 Command (0x82)

The base address of MMIO registers used in this command is 0x24003006000.

EdecKset Command (0x83)

EdecKgenFlash Command (0x84)

The base address of MMIO registers used in this command is 0x24003006000.
The command reads 4 bytes from address 0x240030060A0, sets bit 1 to 1 (old value | 0x2) and writes the new value to the same address.

Encdec decsec Command (0x86)

This command is used to decrypt/encrypt sectors.
FLASH, HDD and RBD storage devices use this command to decrypt/encrypt sectors.
This command cannot be executed through lv1_storage_send_device_command HV call, it's used by HV only internally.

EdecSBClear Command (0x87)

The command expects arg2 to be 4 or else it returns with an error.
This command is used e.g. by Storage Manager service 0x5002 when ATA keys are deleted.

Test Mode

ENCDEC device has Test Mode
Some HV functions test it by reading a 4 byte value from address 0x24003005200. If this value is 0 then ENCDEC device is NOT in Test Mode.

ENCDEC Request

offset 0x34 - start sector (4 bytes)

offset 0x38 - sector count (4 bytes)

offset 0x3C - sector size (4 bytes)

offset 0x40 - key (4 bytes)

offset 0x44 - 0 = decrypt, 1 = encrypt (4 bytes)

Encrypting and Decrypting Sectors

HV passes to ENCDEC device addresses of 2 buffers: ENCDEC User Buffer and ENCDEC Descriptor Buffer.
ENCDEC User Buffer contains the following information: Start Sector, Sector Count, Sector Size and Key

ENCDEC User Buffer

offset 0x0 - start sector (4 bytes)

offset 0x4 - sector count (4 bytes)

offset 0x8 - sector size (4 bytes)

offset 0xC - key (4 bytes)

FLASH device

device id = 1

The FLASH device uses ENCDEC device.

vtable

0x00354450 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x18F0 - request table (0x58 * 16 bytes)

Regions

Index	Start sector	Number of sectors
0	0x0	0x8000
1	0x8	0x77F8
2	0x7900	0x100
3	0x7A00	0x400
4	-	-
5	-	-
6	-	-
7	-	-

Supported Device Commands

Here is the list of commands supported by FLASH StarShip 2 storage device.

The commands can be used with HV call lv1_storage_send_device_command.
However, before a command is executed HV does bit manipulation with it and checks it against the value of repository node ss.laid or also called LPAR authentication ID. If this test fails then the command is NOT executed.

Command	Description
0x31	Dummy (This command does nothing, returns success immediately)
0xA2	-
0xA3	-
0xA4	-
0xA6	SS2 HW Reset
0xAC	-
0xAD	TEST

/dev/eflash1 and /dev/rflash1

These LPAR 1 devices access region 0 of FLASH storage device.
/dev/rflash1 is 16MB large
There is no file system on /dev/rflash1
There is some sort of TOC (Table Of Contents) stored in it. It contains file names, offsets and sizes.
On /dev/rflash1 you will find lv0, lv1ldr, lv2_lernel.self and all the other important SELFs.
The files are encryted of course.

Content of /dev/rflash1 (FLASH storage device region 0, size 16 MB)

There is a main TOC which describes different regions on /dev/rflash1
It seems that TOC 0xC0000 and TOC 0x7C0000 contain the same files but from different SDK versions.
TOC 0xC0000 is SDK version 3.41 and TOC 0x7C0000 is SDK version 3.30 (look at the content of files sdk_version).
I guess it's because when i bought my PS 3 Slim it had Firmware 3.30 and i updated it to 3.41 for PSGroove.
TOC on /dev/rflash1 is used by HV Processes to locate files and load them into memory, e.g. SPU modules. E.g. Process 6 loads spu_utoken_processor.self to decrypt and verify user tokens or SPL which runs in Process 5 loads spp_verifier.self from there in order to decrypt and verify profile files. And Update Manager stores e.g. there files.

TOC Entry

A TOC entry is 0x30 bytes large.

offset 0x0 - relative offset from this TOC to entry data

offset 0x8 - entry data size

offset 0x10 - entry name (max 32 characters)

Main TOC

Here is a list of regions/files stored on /dev/rflash1 i found in HV 3.41 and dumped with PSGroove:

Entry Name	TOC Offset	Entry TOC Index	Entry Relative Offset	Entry Absolute Offset	Entry Size
asecure_loader	0x400	0	0x400	0x810	0x2E800
eEID	0x400	1	0x2EC00	0x2F010	0x10000
cISD	0x400	2	0x3EC00	0x3F010	0x800
cCSD	0x400	3	0x3F400	0x3F810	0x800
trvk_prg0	0x400	4	0x3FC00	0x40010	0x20000
trvk_prg1	0x400	5	0x5FC00	0x60010	0x20000
trvk_pkg0	0x400	6	0x7FC00	0x80010	0x20000
trvk_pkg1	0x400	7	0x9FC00	0xA0010	0x20000
ros0	0x400	8	0xBFC00	0xC0010	0x700000
ros1	0x400	9	0x7BFC00	0x7C0010	0x700000
cvtrm	0x400	10	0xEBFC00	0xEC0010	0x40000

asecure_loader Region TOC

Here is a list of files stored on /dev/rflash1 i found in HV 3.41 and dumped with PSGroove:

Entry Name	TOC Offset	Entry TOC Index	Entry Relative Offset	Entry Absolute Offset	Entry Size
metldr	0x800	0	0x40	0x840	0xE920

ros1 Region TOC

Here is a list of files stored on /dev/rflash1 i found in HV 3.41 and dumped with PSGroove:

Entry Name	TOC Offset	Entry TOC Index	Entry Relative Offset	Entry Absolute Offset	Entry Size
creserved_0	0xC0000	0	0x460	0xC0470	0x40000
sdk_version	0xC0000	1	0x40460	0x100470	0x8
lv1ldr	0xC0000	2	0x40480	0x100490	0x1E948
lv2ldr	0xC0000	3	0x5EE00	0x11EE10	0x16FF0
isoldr	0xC0000	4	0x75E00	0x135E10	0x13074
appldr	0xC0000	5	0x88E80	0x148E90	0x1E254
spu_pkg_rvk_verifier.self	0xC0000	6	0xA70D4	0x1670E4	0xFACC
spu_token_processor.self	0xC0000	7	0xB6BA0	0x176BB0	0x5C94
spu_utoken_processor.self	0xC0000	8	0xBC834	0x17C844	0x65D0
sc_iso.self	0xC0000	9	0xC2E04	0x182E14	0x1532C
aim_spu_module.self	0xC0000	10	0xD8130	0x198140	0x4498
spp_verifier.self	0xC0000	11	0xDC5C8	0x19C5D8	0xD7F0
mc_iso_spu_module.self	0xC0000	12	0xE9DB8	0x1A9DC8	0x808C
me_iso_spu_module.self	0xC0000	13	0xF1E44	0x1B1E54	0x88B8
sv_iso_spu_module.self	0xC0000	14	0xFA6FC	0x1BA70C	0xC078
sb_iso_spu_module.self	0xC0000	15	0x106774	0x1C6784	0x5DB0
default.spp	0xC0000	16	0x10C524	0x1CC534	0x22A0
lv1.self	0xC0000	17	0x10E800	0x1CE810	0x127DF0
lv0	0xC0000	18	0x236600	0x2F6610	0x3E678
lv2_kernel.self	0xC0000	19	0x274C78	0x334C88	0x171B88
eurus_fw.bin	0xC0000	20	0x3E6800	0x4A6810	0x70F94
emer_init.self	0xC0000	21	0x457794	0x5177A4	0x7CDB8
hdd_copy.self	0xC0000	22	0x4D454C	0x59455C	0x60D68

ros2 Region TOC

Here is a list of files stored on /dev/rflash1 i found in HV 3.41 and dumped with PSGroove:

Entry Name	TOC Offset	Entry TOC Index	Entry Relative Offset	Entry Absolute Offset	Entry Size
creserved_0	0x7C0000	0	0x460	0x7C0470	0x40000
sdk_version	0x7C0000	1	0x40460	0x800470	0x8
lv1ldr	0x7C0000	2	0x40480	0x800490	0x1E64C
lv2ldr	0x7C0000	3	0x5EB00	0x81EB10	0x16E30
isoldr	0x7C0000	4	0x75980	0x835990	0x12EC4
appldr	0x7C0000	5	0x88880	0x848890	0x1DB64
spu_pkg_rvk_verifier.self	0x7C0000	6	0xA63E4	0x8663F4	0xFACC
spu_token_processor.self	0x7C0000	7	0xB5EB0	0x875EC0	0x5C94
spu_utoken_processor.self	0x7C0000	8	0xBBB44	0x87BB54	0x65D0
sc_iso.self	0x7C0000	9	0xC2114	0x882124	0x1532C
aim_spu_module.self	0x7C0000	10	0xD7440	0x897450	0x4498
spp_verifier.self	0x7C0000	11	0xDB8D8	0x89B8E8	0xD7F0
mc_iso_spu_module.self	0x7C0000	12	0xE90C8	0x8A90D8	0x808C
me_iso_spu_module.self	0x7C0000	13	0xF1154	0x8B1164	0x88B8
sv_iso_spu_module.self	0x7C0000	14	0xF9A0C	0x8B9A1C	0xC078
sb_iso_spu_module.self	0x7C0000	15	0x105A84	0x8C5A94	0x5DB0
default.spp	0x7C0000	16	0x10B834	0x8CB844	0x22A0
lv1.self	0x7C0000	17	0x10DB00	0x8CDB10	0x129040
lv0	0x7C0000	18	0x236B80	0x9F6B90	0x3E570
lv2_kernel.self	0x7C0000	19	0x2750F0	0xA35100	0x1712D0
eurus_fw.bin	0x7C0000	20	0x3E63C0	0xBA63D0	0x70F94
emer_init.self	0x7C0000	21	0x457354	0xC17364	0x7FBB8
hdd_copy.self	0x7C0000	22	0x4D6F0C	0xC96F1C	0x61518

Methods

initialize_starship - 0x0028298C (3.15)

SSOperation - 0x0027BFB0 (3.15)

SSTransfer - 0x0027BE68 (3.15)

FLASH_Memory_SS2_on_complete - 0x00278E48 (3.15)

_FLASH_read_data - 0x0022D89C (3.15)

_FLASH_write_data - 0x0022D8C8 (3.15)

FLASH_SS2_HW_Reset - 0x0027BD1C (3.15)

HDD device

device id = 2

block size = 512

The HDD device uses ENCDEC device.

vtable

0x00353F48 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x1590 - LBA48 capability flag (4 bytes)

offset 0x17E8 - request table (0x58 * 16 bytes)

offset 0x1DB8 - request timer active flag (1 byte)

Regions

Index	Start sector	Number of sectors
0	0x0	0x950F8B0
1	0x8	0x80000
2	0x80018	0x7C8F898
3	0x7D0F8B8	0x3FFFF8
4	0x810F8B8	0x13FFFF8
5	-	-
6	-	-
7	-	-

Supported Device Commands

Here is the list of commands supported by HDD storage device.

The commands can be used with HV call lv1_storage_send_device_command.
However, before a command is executed HV does bit manipulation with it and checks it against the value of repository node ss.laid or also called LPAR authentication ID. If this test fails then the command is NOT executed.

Command	Description
0x2	LV1_STORAGE_SEND_ATA_COMMAND
0x10	-
0x1B	ATA Set UltraDMA Mode
0x1C	ATA Set Features PIO Flow Control Transfer Mode
0x21	-
0x22	ATA Identify Device
0x23	LV1_STORAGE_ATA_HDDOUT (ATA Flush Cache Ext)
0x26	ATA Read Alternative Status
0x27	ATA Read Error
0x28	-
0x31	ATA Flush Cache/ATA Flush Cache Ext
0x32	ATA Stanby Immediate
0x33	-

Virtual FLASH device (VFLASH)

device id = 3 (on Linux)/ 4 (on GameOS)

block size = 512

It's a psuedo device.
This storage device redirects all requests to the region 1 of HDD storage device !!!

vtable

0x00353D88 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xD60 - pointer to a storage device that all requests are redirected to

offset 0xD68 - region ID of the storage device that all requests are redirected to

Regions

Index	Start sector	Number of sectors
0	0x0	0x80000
1	0x8	0x75F8
2	0x7800	0x63E00
3	0x6B600	0x8000
4	0x73600	0x400
5	0x73A00	0x2000
6	0x77C00	0x200
7	-	-

/dev/rflash1_1x and /dev/rflash_1xp

These LPAR 1 devices access region 5 of UNKNOWN storage device.
In region 5 of UNKNOWN storage device is e.g. LINUX image stored.

GameOS's dev_flash

dev_flash has FAT16 file system.
Accesses to GameOS's dev_flash are routed to UNKNOWN storage device region 2
To decrypt sectors read from this region use as flags 0x4 !!! Without using flags 0x4 the sectors will be encrypted.
The sectors are decrypted not by GameOS but by ENCDEC device.

Here is a snippet from raw dev_flash dump made with HV call lv1_storage_read (flags 0x4) from GameOS:

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000000   E9 00 00 20 20 20 20 20  20 20 20 00 02 10 10 00   é..        .....
00000010   02 00 02 00 00 F8 70 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   .....øp.........
00000020   00 3E 06 00 00 00 29 00  00 00 00 4E 4F 20 4E 41   .>....)....NO NA
00000030   4D 45 20 20 20 20 46 41  54 31 36 20 20 20 00 00   ME    FAT16   ..
00000040   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000050   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000060   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000070   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000080   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000090   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000100   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000110   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000120   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000130   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000140   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000150   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000160   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000170   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000180   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000190   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 55 AA   ..............Uª

Methods

initialize_virtual_flash - 0x00282954 (3.15)

Enqueueing and Scheduling of Storage Requests

HV uses a simple FIFO scheduling algorithm for Storage Requests and a request timeout.
Each storage device has a table of size 16 to store incomming and pending Storage Requests
ENCDEC storage device has a table of size 32 to store incomming and pending Storage Requests
When a new Storage Request is submitted e.g. by HV call lv1_storage_read or lv1_storage_write, the table is scanned for a free slot, if there are no pending Storage Requests then the Storage Request is executed immediately
When a Storage Request is completed, the finished Storage Reuqest is passed to function storage_device_async_request_complete and the table of Storage Requests is scanned again for the next pending Storage Request which will be executed
There are 2 types of Storage Requests: Read/Write (1) and Device Command (2).
Read and Write Storage Requests use the same HV function of a Storage Device to enqueue the request. Before Write Storage Request is inserted into the Request Table of a Storage Device, the flags parameter passed e.g. in lv1_storage_read or lv1_storage_write is ored with 0x8. That is how HV differentiates between Read and Write Storage Requests.

Storage Device Request Table

Each request slot is of size 0x58

Request Slot

offset 0x0 - state: 1 - free, 2 - ? (4 bytes)

offset 0x4 - type: 1 - Read/Write, 2 - Command, 0x86 - ENCDEC command (4 bytes)

offset 0x10 - request tag (8 bytes)

offset 0x20 - start sector (8 bytes)

offset 0x28 - sector count (4 bytes)

ENCDEC Storage Device

Request Table begins at offset 0xDC0 of ENCDEC storage device.

RBD Storage Device

Request Table begins at offset 0x1808 of RBD storage device.

FLASH Storage Device

Request Table begins at offset 0x18F0 of FLASH storage device.

HDD Storage Device

Request Table begins at offset 0x17E8 of HDD storage device.

Methods

storage_device_HDD_enqueue_request - 0x0026E21C (3.15)

storage_device_HDD_do_device_command - 0x0026CED0 (3.15)

storage_device_HDD_do_request - 0x0026DED8 (3.15)

storage_device_HDD_request_complete - 0x0026E57C (3.15)

storage_device_FLASH_enqueue_request - 0x0027A518 (3.15)

storage_device_FLASH_do_request - 0x00278D1C (3.15)

storage_device_FLASH_do_device_command - 0x00279250 (3.15)

FLASH_Memory_SS2_on_complete - 0x00278E48 (3.15)

storage_device_async_request_complete - 0x00255184 (3.15)

storage_device_TransLparAddrToPhysAddr - 0x002533B4 (3.15)

storage_device_add_async_request_locked - 0x002527B8 (3.15)

storage_device_RBD_enqueue_request - 0x002723F0 (3.15)

storage_device_RBD_do_request - 0x0025EF70 (3.15)

storage_device_RBD_do_next_request - 0x00270994 (3.15)

storage_device_RBD_request_complete - 0x00271FD4 (3.15)

storage_device_rbd_do_request - 0x0025EE94 (3.41)

storage_device_rbd_do_device_command - 0x0027061C (3.41)

Encryption and Decryption of Storage Devices

HDD

ENCDEC peripheral device is used for HDD encryption/decryption
Write request is first passed to ENCDEC device for encryption. When ENCDEC device is done, it calls a callback and passes the encrypted data to the callback. The callback writes the encrypted data with ATA WriteDMAExt command to HDD.
When a storage device request is processed by HV, Storage Subsystem checks if cryptography is enabled for the storage device.
HV checks 1 byte of data owned by the storage device and when the value of this flag is not 0 then it uses encryption/decryption.
By setting this flag to 0 at runtime, encryption/decryption of storage devices can be disabled at runtime.
We could patch lv1.self so that encryption/decryption of storage devices is disabled permanently.
HDD sectors can be both decrypted and encrypted with HV calls

UFS2

Superblock starts at sector 0x80.
At the end of the superblock structure you will find UFS2 signature 0x19540119.

Here is the decrypted superblock of UFS2 filesystem:

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00010000   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 28 00 00 00 30   ...........(...0
00010010   00 00 00 38 00 00 0B B8  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ...8...¸........
00010020   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 78 10 00 00 01 5C   ..........x....\
00010030   00 00 40 00 00 00 08 00  00 00 00 08 00 00 00 08   ..@.............
00010040   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  FF FF C0 00 FF FF F8 00   ........ÿÿÀ.ÿÿø.
00010050   00 00 00 0E 00 00 00 0B  00 00 00 08 00 00 08 00   ................
00010060   00 00 00 03 00 00 00 02  00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010070   00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00  00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00   ...........@....
00010080   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010090   00 00 00 00 F5 35 BD 07  00 00 00 00 00 00 18 00   ....õ5½.........
000100A0   00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ..@.............
000100B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 5C 00 00 01 6F 70   ..........\...op
000100C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000100D0   00 00 00 80 2F 63 65 6C  6C 5F 6D 77 5F 63 66 73   ...€/cell_mw_cfs
000100E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000100F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010100   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010110   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010120   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010130   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010140   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010150   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010160   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010170   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010180   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010190   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000101A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000101B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000101C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000101D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000101E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000101F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010200   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010210   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010220   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010230   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010240   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010250   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010260   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010270   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010280   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010290   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000102A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000102B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000102C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000102D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7C  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   .......|........
000102E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000102F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010300   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010310   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010320   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010330   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  80 00 00 00 00 55 FD 70   ........€....Uýp
00010340   80 00 00 00 00 55 E0 00  80 00 00 00 00 55 F8 00   €....Uà.€....Uø.
00010350   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00   ..............@.
00010360   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010370   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010380   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010390   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000103A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000103B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000103C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000103D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000103E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00   ................
000103F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3C  00 00 00 00 00 3B D3 23   .......<.....;Ó#
00010400   00 00 00 00 00 7D 0F 82  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 9F   .....}.‚.......Ÿ
00010410   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010420   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010430   00 00 00 00 49 B0 5E 3B  00 00 00 00 01 F2 3E 26   ....I°^;.....ò>&
00010440   00 00 00 00 01 E2 86 3B  00 00 00 00 00 00 0B B8   .....â†;.......¸
00010450   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010460   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010470   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010480   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010490   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000104A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00   ..............@.
000104B0   00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ...@............
000104C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000104D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000104E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000104F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010500   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010510   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00010520   00 00 00 03 00 00 00 08  00 00 00 78 00 00 00 00   ...........x....
00010530   00 00 80 10 02 02 FF FF  00 00 00 00 00 00 3F FF   ..€...ÿÿ......?ÿ
00010540   00 00 00 00 00 00 07 FF  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   .......ÿ........
00010550   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 19 54 01 19   .............T..

FLASH

RBD

SATA/ATA/ATAPI

ATA Interrupt Handler

0x0026B984 (3.15)

ATA_SetDMA

0x00268ADC (3.15)

ATA_make_PRD_table

0x00267DB4 (3.15)

This function initializes a PRD (Physical Region Descriptor) table.

ClearPATACInterrupt

0x00267CAC (3.15)

EnablePATACInterrupt

0x00267D44 (3.15)

DisablePATACInterrupt

0x00267AF0 (3.15)

ATA_read_AltStatus_reg

0x00267C40 (3.15)

This function reads the ATA Alternate Status Register and returns it's value.

ATA_write_DATA_reg

0x00268A10 (3.15)

This function writes a 16-bit value to the ATA Data Register.

ATA_read_DATA_reg

0x0026887C (3.15)

ATA_write_DATA

0x0026635C (3.15)

This function writes several 16-bit values to the ATA Data register.

ATA_write_CMD_reg

0x002688A0 (3.15)

ATA_read_Error_reg

0x00267BD4 (3.15)

ATA_write_Features_reg

0x002689F0 (3.15)

ATA_write_DevCtrl_reg

0x00267BB4 (3.15)

ATA_write_TaskFile_regs

0x00266BC8 (3.15) 0x002665A0 (3.15)

ATA_send_ATAPI_cmd

0x002655F4 (3.15)

ATA_send_cmd

0x0026580C (3.15)

ATA_send_ReadSectors_cmd

This function uses LBA28.

0x0025D2B4 (3.15)

ATA_send_WriteSectors_cmd

This function uses LBA28.

0x0025CEF4 (3.15)

ATA_send_ReadDMA_cmd

This function uses LBA28.

0x0025D380 (3.15)

ATA_send_WriteDMA_cmd

This function uses LBA28.

0x0025CFB8 (3.15)

ATA_send_ReadDMAExt_cmd

This function uses LBA48.

0x0025D74C (3.15)

ATA_send_WriteDMAExt_cmd

This function uses LBA48.

0x0025D664 (3.15)

ATA_send_IdentifyDevice_cmd

0x0025D4D8 (3.15)

ATA_send_IdentifyPacketDevice_cmd

0x0025D448 (3.15)

ATA_send_FlushCache_cmd

0x0025D5E8 (3.15)

ATA_send_FlushCacheExt_cmd

0x0025D568 (3.15)

ATA_send_StandbyImmediate_cmd

0x0025D07C (3.15)

ATA_send_SetFeatures_cmd

0x0025D208 (3.15)

ATA_send_SMARTEnable_cmd

0x0025D0F8 (3.15)

ATA_send_SMARTSaveAttributeValue_cmd

0x0025D180 (3.15)

ATA_SetUDMAMode

0x00260EE8 (3.15)

Parameters

r5 - UltraDMA mode (0-5)

Booting a Bootloader from VFLASH

Coming soon !!!

High precision timers

These timers are used e.g. in SATA/ATA/ATAPI driver.

timer_add

0x002C3F2C (3.15)

timer_del

0x002C41AC (3.15)

timer_run_expired

This function is called from HDEC interrupt handler.

0x002C4020 (3.15)

timer_set_HDEC

0x002BCF80 (3.15)

SPE

There are 3 SPE classes.

The HV call lv1_construct_logical_spe can create LogicalSPE, SPEType1 and SPEType2 objects.

The syscall 0x10040 creates only SPEType1 objects.

The SPEType1 and SPEType2 objects cannot be created when isolation mode is disabled. The right most bit of repository node sys.lv1.iso_enbl is checked and when it's not 1 then the SPEType1 and SPEType2 objects cannot be created. In LPAR 1, this check succeedes always. Only in LPARs different from 1, the repository node sys.lv1.iso_enbl is checked.

LogicalSPE

SPE type = 0

Objects of this class are used e.g. on Linux.

vtable

0x00358360 (3.15)

offset 0x20 - pointer to TOC entry of interrupt handler for SPE

Member variables

offset 0x38 - pointer to LPAR obj that owns this SPE obj

offset 0x78 - table of pointers to Outlet objects (3 * 8 bytes, one for each Class 0-2)

offset 0xB0 - pointer to VAS object

offset 0xC8 - pointer to Logical PPE object

offset 0xE0 - SPE id

offset 0x1A0 - pointer to MMIO Memory Region object

offset 0x1A8 - pointer to Shadow Registers Memory Region object

Objects

Here is the list of logical SPE objects i found in HV 3.15:

0x003A82E0 - SPE id 0
0x003A8660 - SPE id 1
0x003ABA00 - SPE id 2
0x003B4010 - SPE id 3
0x003B4D60 - SPE id 4
0x003B5970 - SPE id 5

SPEType1

SPE type = 1

vtable

0x00359750

Member Variables

offset 0x198 - pointer to MMIO Memory Region object

offset 0x1A0 - pointer to Shadow Registers Memory Region object

SPEType2

SPE type = 2

vtable

0x00359790

SPE Register Shadow Area

HV createas a SPE Register Shadow Area for each contstructed SPE.
The area is 1 4Kb page of physical memory.
When SPE state changes then HV updates data in this area.
The value of shadow_addr that is returned by lv1_construct_logical_spe is a LPAR start address of this area and it cannot be accessed until it's mapped in the HTAB.
The SPE Register Shadow Area may be mapped only with read-only page protection or else HV call lv1_insert_htab_entry fails. I tested it with PSGroove and could map the whole memory range and read it after i constructed SPE of type 1 with lv1_construct_logical_spe.
The shadow_addr is also returned by syscall_10040 (that creates SPE of type 1) but it returns already mapped Process address so HV Processes do not have to map it in HTAB.
When an isoated SPU is done, HV Processes checks the value at offset 0x30 to determine if the SPU execution was successfull or not.
GameOS checks also the value at offset 0x30 in the SPE Shadow Area.
When GameOS creates SPE of type 1 then it maps only SPE Register Shadow Area into it's address space.

SPE Register Shadow Area Offsets

0x30 - SPU_Status register value (4 bytes)

0xF10 - ?

0xF18 - ?

Stop Code

The high-order 16 bit of SPU_Status register value is a Stop Code.

Here is the list of Stop Codes i extracted from HV Processes which read the value at offset 0x30 when SPU is done:

Value	Description
0xA	Success
0xC	Access Violation (LPAR auth id error)
0xE	?
0xF	Revoked
0x12	Invalid Parameter
0x13	?
0x17	Invalid Parameter
0x25	?

SPU_send_MFC_cmd

0x002B09B0 (3.15)

This function programs a MFC.

SPU_write_MFC_cmd_status_reg

0x002AEE70 (3.15)

SPU_write_Sig_Notify1_reg

0x002AEF4C (3.15)

SPU_write_Sig_Notify2_reg

0x002AEF30 (3.15)

SPU_write_Sig_Notify1_and_Notify2

0x002B0A78 (3.15)

SPU_enable_iso_load_request

0x002AEDE0 (3.15)

SPU_iso_load_request

0x002AEED0 (3.15)

SPU_enable_runcntl

0x002AEB24 (3.15)

SPU_stop_request

0x002AEEF0 (3.15)

SPU_run_request

0x002AEF10 (3.15)

SPU_read_status_reg

0x002AE978 (3.15)

SPU_read_Mbox_Stat_reg

0x002AE998 (3.15)

lv1_undocumented_function_62

Updates SLB entry.

Parameters

%r3 - SPE id

%r4 - ? (valid values: 0 - 3)

%r5 - SLB entry index (valid values: 0 - 7)

%r6 - ESID

%r7 - VSID

spe_type1_interrupt_handler

0x0030E238 (3.15)

spe_type2_interrupt_handler

0x003103F8 (3.15)

spe_type3_interrupt_handler

0x002F36F4 (3.15)

Isolation

Loaders Table

All the binary files needed for isolation and decryption are already stored in HV memory !!!
They are probably loaded during HV initialization from FLASH.
The table has 9 entries.
Each entry is 16 bytes large.

0x00010100 (3.15)

Loaders Table Entry

offset 0x0 - pointer to data in memory

offset 0x8 - size of data

Here are the contents of the Loaders Table from HV 3.15:

Index	Name	Address of Data in HV Dump	Size of Data
0	-	0x0C150000	0x1E5CC
1	metldr	0x00011000	0xE8D0
2	lv2ldr	0x00020000	0x16DA0
3	isoldr	0x00055000	0x12E44
4	appldr	0x00037000	0x1DAE4
5	EID0	0x00068000	0x860
6	-	0x00069010	0x8
7	-	0x00069020	0x50
8	-	0x00069070	0x8

Methods

get_iso_loaders_tab - 0x002B0B70 (3.15)

iso_loaders_tab_get_entry - 0x002B0CB8 (3.15)

metldr

Loading metldr

Physical/Virtual memory address of an isolation module that should be loaded by metldr is written into SPU register SPU_In_Mbox. The SPU register SPU_In_Mbox is 32bit, so 64bit memory address is written in 2 steps.
MFC relocation is turned off by clearing R-bit in SPU register MFC_SR1. By doing this, HV enables real address mode for MFC of SPU.
On GameOS, it also works with relocation on. You just have to initialize SLB of SPU and insert valid SLB entries.
Physical/Virtual memory address of metldr is written to SPU registers Sig_Notify1 and Sig_Notify2
Isolation load request is enabled by writing SPU register SPU_PrivCntl
Isolation load request is made by writing value 0x3 into SPU register SPU_RunCntl

Methods

SPE_load_request_metldr - 0x002B00A4 (3.15)

lv2ldr

lv2ldr is used to decrypt lv2_kernel.self
syscalls 0x10042 and 0x1004A use lv2ldr
syscall 0x10042 is used by HV Process 3 during LV2 LPAR construction
syscall 0x1004A uses different parameters as syscall 0x10042

Methods

SPE_load_request_lv2ldr_1 - 0x002AE82C (3.15)

SPE_load_request_lv2ldr_2 - 0x002AE8D8 (3.15)

Loading lv2ldr

64 bit memory address of lv2ldr is written into 32 bit SPU register SPU_In_Mbox
metldr is loaded

isoldr

isoldr is used for executing isolated SPUs
syscall 0x10043 and HV call lv1_undocumented_function_209 use isoldr to execute isolated SPUs
EID0 data is transferred to Local Storage Address 0x3E400 by MFC
Revoke List For Program is transferred to Local Storage Address 0x3F000 by MFC

Revoke List For Programs

0x00361980 (3.15)

Methods

SPE_load_request_isoldr - 0x002B0394

Loading isoldr

64 bit memory address of isoldr is written into 32 bit SPU register SPU_In_Mbox
metldr is loaded

appldr

appldr is used for decryption of SELFs
HV call lv1_authenticate_program_segment loads appldr

Methods

SPE_load_request_appldr - 0x002AE900

Loading appldr

64 bit memory address of isoldr is written into 32 bit SPU register SPU_In_Mbox
metldr is loaded

Decrypting SELFs with appldr and lv1_authenticate_program_segment

lv1_authenticate_program_segment loads and prepares appldr for SELF decryption.
When appldr is ready to decrypt data, it sends a message via mailbox.
The address and the size of the encrypted data is passed to appldr via a shared memory.

Socket

The socket supports only one address family 0x1F, one socket type 0 and one protocol 0.

Socket address

Socket address is called port ID. Valid port IDs are 0-63. Port ID 0 is reserved.

Socket state

2 - LISTEN

Socket table

The socket table contains 64 entries, one for each port ID. Each entry is 16 bytes large.

The socket table is at 0x0035F6E8 (3.15).

Here is the list of opened sockets i found in HV 3.15:

0x00091FE0 (port ID 0x23, accepts connections)
0x00127850 (port ID 0x24, accepts connections)
0x0012F810 (port ID 0x25, accepts connections)

Socket table entry

offset 0x0 - pointer to Socket obj

offset 0x8 - socket accepts connections or not (0 - does not accept, 1 - accepts, 1 byte)

vtable

0x00355DB0 (3.15)

offset 0xB0 - bind

offset 0xB8 - listen

offset 0xC8 - connect

Member variables

offset 0x360 - socket state (4 bytes)

offset 0x368 - port ID (8 bytes)

offset 0x370 - max backlog queue size (8 bytes)

Virtual Address Space

VAS

vtable

0x00357958 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x18 - pointer to LPAR that owns this VAS object

offset 0x48 - VAS id (8 bytes)

offset 0x70 - number of page sizes (4 bytes)

offset 0x74 - log2 of HTAB size

offset 0x78 - pointer to HTAB object

Objects

Here is the list of the VAS objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

0x001C8050 (VAS id 2, LPAR 1)
0x003B4910 (VAS id 3, LPAR 2)
0x003BDB50 (VAS id 48, LPAR 2)

HTAB

0x38(-0x69A8(HSPRG0)) - pointer to the currently active HTAB in LPAR

vtable

0x003575B0 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x48 - pointer to first PTE

offset 0x60 - LPID (4 bytes)

offset 0x64 - log2 of HTAB size (4 bytes)

Objects

Here is the list of the HTAB objects i found in HV dump 3.15:

0x001C8270 (VAS id 2, LPAR 1)

 * 0x00180000 - HTAB PTEs (HTAB size 256 kB)

0x003A8050 (VAS id 3, LPAR 2)

 * 0x00500000 - HTAB PTEs (HTAB size 1 MB)

0x003BC510 (VAS id 48, LPAR 2)

 * 0x00800000 - HTAB PTEs (HTAB size 1 MB)

LPAR_change_HTAB

This function changes currently active HTAB. It writes to SDR1 register where HTAB address and size is stored.

0x002BE5D4 (3.15)

Process SLB

Each HV process has 16 SLB entries.

Each SLB entry is 16 bytes large and is in format expected by opcode slbmte.

Most of the entries are zero (invalid).

Each process has 4 valid SLB entries: code, data, heap and stack.

Process 3

SLB entries

0x0012D1F0 (3.15)

Name	ESID	VSID
code	0x8	0x38
data	0xC	0x3C
heap	0xA	0x3A
stack	0xF	0x3F

Process 5

SLB entries

0x00093120 (3.15)

Name	ESID	VSID
code	0x8	0x48
data	0xC	0x4C
heap	0xA	0x4A
stack	0xF	0x4F

Process 6

SLB entries

0x000E6960 (3.15)

Name	ESID	VSID
code	0x8	0x58
data	0xC	0x5C
heap	0xA	0x5A
stack	0xF	0x5F

Process 9

SLB entries

0x00763E20 (3.15)

Name	ESID	VSID
code	0x8	0x8
data	0xC	0xC
heap	0xA	0xA
stack	0xF	0xF

VUART

VUART is a bi-directional communication link. A VUART object has a peer VUART object.

Data written to a VUART object is stored NOT in the data buffer of the VUART object but in the data buffer of the peer VUART object.

VUART table

Every LPAR has a VUART table. A VUART table has 256 entries. Each entry is a pointer to a VUART object that implements VUART interface.

0x00677218 (3.15) - address of VUART table of LPAR 1

Here is the list of all VUART objects in LPAR 1 i found in HV 3.15:

0x006ABD90 - VUART 0
0x006ABEB0 - VUART 1
0x006A3CB0 - VUART 2
0x006A3DD0 - VUART 3
0x000A3410 - VUART 5
0x000A3250 - VUART 6

VUART [0-3] are used by /dev/sc[0-3] respectively.

VUART [0-3] are linked to VUART objects of different type i could not yet identify. These unknown VUART objects use eieio opcode a lot. So i think, they communicate with hardware peripheral.

A write/read to/from /dev/sc[0-3] is a write/read to/from VUART.

0x00762AA8 (3.15) - address of VUART table of LPAR 2

Here is the list of all VUART objects in LPAR 2 i found in HV 3.15:

0x00126660 - VUART 0
0x000A3010 - VUART 2

VUART 0 and VUART 2 of LPAR 2 are created by Process 9 during LPAR construction.

VUART class

Member variables

offset 0x48 - pointer to peer VUART object

offset 0x58 - write pointer into data ring buffer

offset 0x60 - read pointer into data ring buffer

offset 0x68 - pointer to data ring buffer

offset 0x70 - size of data ring buffer (8 bytes)

offset 0x78 - size of data stored in data ring buffer currently (8 bytes)

offset 0x88 - tx trigger (8 bytes)

offset 0x90 - rx trigger (8 bytes)

offset 0x98 - interrupt mask (8 bytes)

offset 0xA8 - port number (4 bytes)

Methods

pmpi_read_virtual_uart(port, buf, size, nread) - 0x002EB30C (3.15)

pmpi_write_virtual_uart(port, buf, size, nwritten) - 0x002EB0EC (3.15)

VUART_read(pointer to VUART object, buf, size, nread) - 0x002E8654 (3.15)

VUART_write(pointer to VUART object, buf, size, nwritten) - 0x002E8428 (3.15)

Guest OS VUART 0 (AV Manager)

All data sent to VUART 0 in LPAR 2 is written into the data buffer of VUART 5 of LPAR 1.

VUART 5 of LPAR 1 is accessed by Process 9 in LPAR 1 through the file /proc/partitions/2/vuart/0.

Process 9 of LPAR 1 uses RSX syscalls to access RSX driver and memory mapped device access (/dev/ioif0).

Guest OS VUART 2 (System Manager)

All data sent to VUART 2 in LPAR 2 is written into the data buffer of VUART 6 of LPAR 1.

VUART 6 of LPAR 1 is accessed by Process 9 in LPAR 1 through the file /proc/partitions/2/vuart/2.

System manager supports 62 (0-61) service ids.
Process 9 has a SID table. SID table has 62 entries.
Each entry is a pointer to a function responsible for processing SID packets.

A/V Manager

A/V Manager is running in Process 9 of HV.
It communicates with Guest OS through /proc/partitions/0/vuart/0 file.
GameOS accesses A/V Manager through syscalls 367 - 370.
PS2 Soft EMU accesses A/V Manager also.

System Manager (SM)

System Manager (SM) is running in Process 9 of HV.
It communicates with Guest OS through /proc/partitions/2/vuart/2 file.
GameOS accesses SM through syscalls 372 - 415

System Manager class

Member variables

offset 0x10 - LPAR state (8 bytes)

offset 0x68 - LPAR auth id

offset 0x70 - LPAR name

offset 0x90 - LPAR image path

offset 0x1C0 - LPAR ability (8 bytes)

Types of System Manager

There are 6 different SM types
When Process 9 starts it reads profile file, by default DEFAULT.SPP, by sending requests to SPL (Secure Profile Loader) and constructs System Managers listed in this profile file.
So, the profile file controls which System Manager types are available later.

Name	LPAR name
SCE_CELLOS_PME	-
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR	PS3_LPAR
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2	PS2_LPAR
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2_SW	PS2_SW_LPAR
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2_GX	PS2_GX_LPAR
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_LINUX	LINUX_LPAR

Ability Bitmask

Index	Name	Ability Bitmask (Hex)	Ability Bitmask (Binary)
0	SCE_CELLOS_PME	0x1	0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001
1	SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR	0x3BF7EF	0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0011 1011 1111 0111 1110 1111
2	SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2_SW	0x1226D	0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 0010 0010 0110 1101
3	SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_LINUX	0x40012	0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 0000 0001 0010

Bit Position (from right)	SID	Description
1	5 (SET_NEXT_OP)	Shutdown or Reboot LPAR
2	5 (SET_NEXT_OP)	Boot PS3 LPAR
3	5 (SET_NEXT_OP)	Boot PS2_SW LPAR
4	5 (SET_NEXT_OP)	Boot LINUX LPAR
5	12 (CONTROL_LED)	Control LED
6	21 (RING_BUZZER)	Ring Buzzer
7	19 (SET_CONFIG)	Set Config
10	26 (REQUEST_ERROR_LOG)	Request Error Log
10	28 (REQUEST_BE_COUNT)	Request BE Count
10	32 (REQUEST_SYSTEM_EVENT_LOG)	Request System Event Log
12	30 (REQUEST_SC_VERSION)	Request SC Version
14	39 (SET_SHOP_DEMO_MODE)	Set Shop Demo Mode

Service ID (SID)

SM supports 62 (0-61) SIDs.

The value of SM member variable ability controls which SIDs may be used by LPAR.

SID	Name	Description
0	-	-
1	REQUEST	-
2	RESPONSE	-
3	COMMAND	-
4	EXTERN_EVENT	-
5	SET_NEXT_OP	-
6	-	-
7	-	-
8	SET_ATTR	-
9	GET_INTER_LPAR_PARAM	-
10	SET_INTER_LPAR_PARAM	-
11	-	-
12	CONTROL_LED	-
13	TEMPERATURE	-
14	-	-
15	-	-
16	-	-
17	-	-
18	-	-
19	SET_CONFIG	-
20	-	-
21	RING_BUZZER	-
22	-	-
23	-	-
24	-	-
25	FAN_POLICY	-
26	REQUEST_ERROR_LOG	-
27	-	-
28	REQUEST_BE_COUNT	-
29	-	-
30	REQUEST_SC_VERSION	-
31	-	-
32	REQUEST_SYSTEM_EVENT_LOG	-
33	-	-
34	RTC_ALARM	-
35	-	-
36	RTC_ALARM	-
37	-	-
38	RTC_ALARM	-
39	SET_SHOP_DEMO_MODE	-
40	BOOT_PARAMETER	-
41	-	-
42	BOOT_PARAMETER	-
43	-	-
44	FACTORY_PROCESS_COMP	-
45	-	-
46	FACTORY_PROCESS_COMP	-
47	-	-
48	FACTORY_PROCESS_COMP	-
49	-	-
50	FAN_POLICY	-
51	-	-
52	-	-
53	-	-
54	-	-
55	-	-
56	-	-
57	-	-
58	-	-
59	-	-
60	-	-
61	-	-

12 - CONTROL_LED

I have tested this service with PSGroove and GameOS is allowed to use it.
GameOS syscall 386 uses this service.

Packet Body

struct sysmgr_ctrl_led
{
    u8 field0;
    u8 field1;
    u8 field2;
    u8 res1;
    u8 field4;
    u8 field5;
    u8 res2[10];
};

Parameters

I have tested the following parameters with this service:

field0	field1	field2	field4	field5	Description
0x1	0x0	0xFF	0xFF	0xFF	Turns off the power button LED
0x1	0x1	0xFF	0xFF	0xFF	Turns on the power button LED

21 - RING_BUZZER

I have tested this service with PSGroove and GameOS is allowed to use it

Packet Body

struct sysmgr_ring_buzzer
{
    u8 res1;
    u8 field1;
    u8 field2;
    u8 res2;
    u32 field4;
};

Parameters

I have tested the following parameters with this service:

field1	field2	field4	Description
0x29	0x4	0x6	Makes a short single beep
0x29	0xA	0x1B6	Makes a double beep
0x29	0x7	0x36	-
0x29	0xA	0xFFF	Makes a continuous beep

Active System Managers in HV dump 3.15

There are 4 active SMs in HV dump.

Index	Name	LPAR auth id	LPAR image pathname	Ability Bitmask (Hex)
0	SCE_CELLOS_PME	0x1070000001000001	/flh/os/this_is_dummy	0x1
1	SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR	0x1070000002000001	/flh/os/lv2_kernel.self	0x3BF7EF
2	SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2_SW	0x1020000003000001	/local_sys0/ps2emu/ps2_softemu.self	0x1226D
3	SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_LINUX	0x1080000004000001	/flh/lx/linux	0x40012

GameOS file image lv2_kernel.self is stored on /dev/rflash1
Linux file image is stored on /dev/rflash_1x or /dev/rflash_1xp

Booting Linux LPAR through System Manager

To boot Linux LPAR from GameOS when Linux support was not removed (Ability Mask of PS3 System Manager needs patching !!!):

Send SID packet SET_NEXT_OP with operation OP_LPAR_REBOOT and the index of Linux system manager to System Manager (VUART 2)
Send SID packet REQUEST with type SHUTDOWN to System Manager (VUART 2)
Execute lv1_panic HV call in GameOS

It should also work when Linux support was removed but Linux system manager was not removed from Process 9 and also assumed that a Linux kernel image is stored at the right place in /dev/rflash_1x.

It's just a theory, nothing else, that i gathered during HV reversing. It needs a practical proof. Unfortunately, i don't have access to Hypervisor.

Booting modified and reencrypted lv2_kernel.self

The System Manager of GameOS sends the path to lv2_kernel.self to SLL (Secure LPAR Loader) and SLL loads it from FLASH device file /dev/rflash1
I stored a new lv2_kernel.self on FLASH directly by writing FLASH from GameOS. It't risky but if you know what you are doing then it's safe. I warned you guys. You could brick your PS3.
Then i added a new TOC entry to FLASH device which points to the new lv2_kernel.self
I patched the path to lv2_kernel.self in the System Manager of GameOS so it points to my new GameOS kernel (You need HV rights to do it)
Then i rebooted GameOS without rebooting HV, so the patched file path should not change
This method has the advantage that when the new lv2_kernel.self won't work you can just reboot HV and it will load the original lv2_kernel.self again
lv2_kernel.self can be also loaded from GameOS dev_flash. For that, you have to change the path to lv2_kernel.self in default.spp from /flh/os/lv2_kernel.self to /local_sys0/lv2_kernel.self and store lv2_kernel.self on dev_flash.

AV Manager

All data sent to VUART 0 in LPAR 2 is written into the data buffer of VUART 5 of LPAR 1.

VUART 5 of LPAR 1 is accessed by Process 9 in LPAR 1 through the file /proc/partitions/2/vuart/0.

During initialization, AV Manager opens /dev/ioif0 device and maps different address ranges of the device into address space of Process 9
/dev/ioif0 is NOT opened and mapped if the value of repository node lv1.rsx.enable is less than 1
/dev/ioif0 is mapped with READ/WRITE protection
File descriptor of /dev/ioif0 in Process 9 is 4
AV Manager supports a lot more commands than used on Linux
Every command is implemented by a class

Mapped Address Ranges From /dev/ioif0

The base address of /dev/ioif0 is 0x28000000000. The device supports only mmap system call, it cannot be read or written. It also doesn't support ioctl.

Index	Absolute Address Range	Size	Mapped Address in Process 9 Address Space
0	0x28000000000 - 0x28000002000	0x2000	0xA0019000
1	0x28001800000 - 0x28001801000	0x1000	0xA0004000
2	0x28000600000 - 0x28000604000	0x4000	0xA001A000
3	0x28000680000 - 0x28000684000	0x4000	0xA0006000
4	0x28000080000 - 0x28000088000	0x8000	0xA000A000
5	0x28000088000 - 0x28000089000	0x1000	0xA000E000
6	0x2800000C000 - 0x2800000D000	0x1000	0xA0016000
7	0x2800008A000 - 0x2800008B000	0x1000	0xA0017000
8	0x2800008C000 - 0x2800008D000	0x1000	0xA0018000

Process socket services

Function ID and Packet ID

Processes 3, 5 and 6 provide services (functions) to other Processes through sockets (something like RPC).
A service is identified by a function ID.
Each process has a hash table which maps a function ID to socket port ID.
Services (functions) can be further differentiated by a packet ID.
To request a service, a Process sends a packet with specified function and packet ID to the Process that provides the service.
A process that provides a service (function) has a table of objects which handle different packet IDs.
Services are synchronous, a client sends a request and waits for a response.
If a Process requests a service that is located in the same Process then the service is called directly and sockets are not used !!! (e.g. SLL requests from DM creating VUART port during GameOS loading, SLL and DM are in the same Process, so SLL calls DM directly)

Port ID - Process ID mapping

Port ID	Process ID
0x23	6
0x24	5
0x25	3

Function ID - Port ID mapping

Function ID	Port ID	Supported Packet IDs	Function Description
0x2000	0x23	0x2001 - 0x2017	Virtual TRM Manager
0x3000	0x24	0x3001 - 0x3003	Secure RTC
0x5000	0x23	0x5001 - 0x500A	Storage Manager
0x6000	0x23	0x6001 - 0x6011	Update Manager
0x9000	0x24	0x9001 - 0x9016	SC Manager
0x10000	0x23	-	-
0x11000	0x25	0x11001 - 0x11002	SPM (Security Policy Manager)
0x14000	0x25	0x14004 - 0x14005	SLL (Secure LPAR Loader)
0x15000	0x24	0x15001, 0x15003, 0x15009	SPL (Secure Profile Loader)
0x17000	0x24	0x17001 - 0x17017	Indi Info Manager
0x18000	0x25	0x18001, 0x18002, 0x18004	Dispatcher Manager
0x19000	0x24	0x19002 - 0x19005	AIM
0x24000	0x23	0x24001 - 0x24002	USB Dongle Authenticator
0x25000	0x23	0x25001 - 0x25002	User Token Manager

SS Packet

SS means Secure Service ?
Processes send SS Packets to request a service or to reply to a service request.

Member variables

offset 0x8 - packet ID (8 bytes)

offset 0x10 - function ID (8 bytes)

offset 0x18 - return value (4 bytes)

offset 0x20 - subject ID (2 * 8 bytes)

Header

All services use a common header.
The header of a SS Packet is 0x28 bytes large.

struct ss_header
{
    uint64_t packet_id;
    uint64_t function_id;
    uint32_t retval;
    uint8_t res[4];
    uint64_t laid;             /* LPAR authority id */
    uint64_t paid;             /* Program authority id */
}

SS Service Return Values

Error Code	Description
0x00000000	Success
0x00000005	Access Violation
0x00000006	No Entry ?
0x00000009	Invalid Parameter
0x0000000F	?

Body

The body of a SS Packet follows after the header.
The size of the body depends on a used service.

0x2000 - Virtual TRM Manager

Packet ID	Description
0x2001	Init
0x2002	Status
0x2003	Store
0x2004	Store
0x2005	Retrieve
0x2006	Free
0x200A	Encrypt
0x200B	Decrypt
0x200C	Encrypt With Portability
0x200D	Decrypt With Portability
0x200E	Decrypt Master
0x2012	Backup Flash
0x2013	Restore Flash
0x2014	Backup SRK SRH
0x2015	Restore SRK SRH
0x2016	Flash Address Size
0x2017	Force Restart

0x200E - Decrypt Master

This service is e.g. used in Process 6 by USB Dongle Authenticator to decrypt USB Dongle Master Key
GameOS uses this service e.g. in syscall SYS_SS_AD_SIGN
syscall 862 uses Virtual TRM Manager services.

0x3000 - Secure RTC

Packet ID	Description
0x3001	Set RTC
0x3002	Get Time
0x3003	Set Time

Secure RTC reads LAIDs and PAIDs that are allowed to access Secure RTC service from DEFAULT.SPP segment SCE_CELLOS_SS_SECURE_RTC.

0x3001 - Set RTC

This service uses SC Manager Set RTC (0x9008) service.

0x3002 - Get Time

This service uses SC Manager Get Time (0x9009) service.

0x3003 - Set Time

This service uses SC Manager Set Time (0x900A) service.

0x5000 - Storage Manager

Packet ID	Description
0x5001	Set Encdec Key
0x5002	Set/Delete ATA (Encdec) Key
0x5003	Get Random Number
0x5004	Authenticate BD Drive
0x5005	Authenticate PS2 Disc
0x5006	Get Secure Firmware Version
0x5007	HW disc auth emu
0x5008	HW mc
0x5009	HW me auth header
0x500A	HW me dec block

Storage Manager service is used e.g. by syscall 864 and syscall SYS_SS_MEDIA_ID
GameOS's VSH uses syscall 864
Storage Manager executes SPU module sb_iso_spu_module.self
Storage Manager communicates with devices /dev/encdec0 and /dev/rbd0 from LPAR 1
2nd value from repository node bus1.id is used by Storage Manager
Storage Manager communicates with sb_iso_spu_module.self through a shared DMA memory buffer and SPU MBox
EID4 data is passed to sb_iso_spu_module.self module.

SB Isolation DMA Buffer Header

struct sb_iso_header
{
    u32 seqno;
    u32 mbmsg;
    u32 cmd;
    u32 cmd_size;
    u8 cmd_data[0];
}

0x5002 - Set/Delete ATA (Encdec) Key

Sets/Deletes ATA (Encdec) Key
The service has only one parameter of size 8 bytes: 0x100 - Set ATA Key and 0x110 - Delete ATA Key.
This service is used e.g. by System Manager in HV Process 9 during LPAR booting.
SPM doesn't allow GameOS to use this service.
3 possible key lengths: 0x40, 0x80 and 0xC0
This service communicates with /dev/encdec0 device.
The service uses ENCDEC device commands EdecKgen1 (0x81), EdecKgen2 (0x82), EdecKset (0x83) and EdecKgenFlash (0x84).
This service communicates also with /dev/rbd0 device.
I guess that the ATA key is stored encrypted in EID4 data.
This service is used by LPAR Manager in HV Process 9 during LPAR 2 loading.
I tested this service on Linux with ps3dm-utils and after deleting ATA key the sectors on VFLASH or HDD were NOT decrypted by HV
After setting ATA key again, the sectors were encrypted/decrypted by HV again

Service Parameter Table

Service Parameter	Description
0x100, 0x101	Set ATA Key
0x110, 0x111	Delete ATA Key

0x5003 - Get Random Number

I have got access to Get Random Number service through DM and tested it with PSGroove
The service returns 192-bit random numbers
It has no input parameters except those in SS packet header
Storage Manager communicates with device /dev/encdec0.
This service is used e.g. by USB Dongle Authenticator to generate the body of a challenge or by GameOS to generate hardware random numbers.

0x5004 - Authenticate BD Drive

Used by LPAR Manager in HV Process 9 during LPAR 2 loading and unloading.
Used by SLL Load GOS service (0x14004) in HV Process 3 during PS2EMU loading and by SLL Unload GOS service (0x14005) during PS2EMU unloading.
The service expects one additional parameter.
The service is used during loading of LPAR 2 to authenticate BD drive and during unloading LPAR 2 to reset BD drive.
The service uses isolated SPU module sv_iso_spu_module.self for BD drive authentication.
The service communicates with LPAR 1 device /dev/rbd0 through ATAPI interface.

Service Parameter Table

Service Parameter	Description
0x02	Used by SLL service 0x14004 during PS2EMU loading
0x1E	Used by SLL service 0x14005 during PS2EMU unloading
0x29	Reset BD Drive
0x46	Authenticate BD Drive

0x5007 - Control BD Drive

Used by GameOS to authenticate discs and for BD emulation.

Service Parameter Table

Service Parameter	Description
0x41	-
0x46	-
0x51	-
0x52	-
0x53	-
0xA3	BD emu
0xA5	BD emu
0xA7	BD emu
0xAA	BD emu

0x6000 - Update Manager

Packet ID	Description
0x6001	Update Package Tophalf
0x6002	Inspect Package Tophalf
0x6003	Get Package Info
0x6004	Get Fix Instruction
0x6005	Extract Package Tophalf
0x6006	Get Extract Package
0x6009	Get Token Seed
0x600A	Set Token
0x600B	Read EPROM
0x600C	Write EPROM
0x6010	Check Integrity
0x6011	Get Applicable Version

Update Manager service is accessed by GameOS syscall 863

0x6001 - Update Package Tophalf

The result of the request can be checked by reading the value of repository node ss.update.request.<Request ID> periodically

0x6002 - Inspect Package Tophalf

I have got access to this service through DM and tested it with PSGroove
This service can tell you if a package can be installed or not, the service just checks a package but does not install it
Packages can be updated without GameOS !!! I'm using only HV calls and communicate directly with Dispatcher Manager and Update Manager
I just sent a whole SCE package to GameOS through network, created a LPAR memory region and stored the file there
It expects a SCE package that can be easily extracted from PUP file
The data of SCE package can be passed either in SS packet itself or through LPAR memory of requester
When the data of SCE package is too large for SS packet (SS packets are sent through DM, GameOS and DM communicate through VUART that has only 0x800 bytes buffer) then the data of SCE package has to be passed through GameOS LPAR memory. The requester sends a vector of LPAR memory addresses where the data of SCE package is stored and Update Manager maps it into the address space of Process 6
E.g. Revoke List packages can be sent in SS packets because they are small (about 0x200 bytes). All other packages are too big to sent them in SS packets
The service is actually split into 2 halfs: Top-Half and Bottom-Half
The Top-Half is executed synchronously with service request and it sends a reply to the requester
In the reply sent by Top-Half a Request ID (8 bytes) is returned to the requester
Request ID is calculated by using SHA-1
After the Top-Half is done, a reply is sent to the requester but the service just checked some input parameter upto now and the passed SCE package was not really checked yet
The Bottom-Half is called asynchronously to the request, it does the real job, it checks the passed SCE package.
The result of the request can be checked by reading the value of repository node ss.inspect.request.<Request ID> periodically
I successfully tested this service with RL_FOR_PROGRAM.img from 3.50 PUP file and the service returned Success, so theoretically i could install this package on my PS3. But of course i want to downgrade and NOT to upgrade.

Inspect Package Tophalf Return Values

Error Code	Description
0x00000000	Success
0x00000013	Same Version/Older Version
0x00000014	-

0x6003 - Get Package Info

I have got access to this service through DM and tested it with PSGroove
The service expects one additional parameter: package type (valid values are 1-9)
The service returns the version (8 bytes) of a package type installed

Here are the versions of packages installed on my PS3:

Package Type	Returned Version	Description	Package Name in PUP File
1	0x0003004100000000	Core OS Package	CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg
2	0x0003004100000000	Revoke List Package for Program	RL_FOR_PROGRAM.img
3	0x0002003000000000	Revoke List Package for Package	RL_FOR_PACKAGE.img
4	0xDEADBEAFFACEBABE	-	-
5	0xDEADBEAFFACEBABE	-	-
6	0x0003004000000000	BD Firmware Package	BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg, BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_*.pkg
7	Invalid Parameter	Bluetooth Firmware, dev_flash tarballs	BLUETOOTH_FIRMWARE.pkg, dev_flash, dev_flash3
8	Invalid Parameter	-	-
9	Invalid Parameter	SC Firmware Package	SYS_CON_FIRMWARE_*.pkg

Decrypting and Extracting Packages with spu_pkg_rvk_verifier.self

I have managed to decrypt and extract Revoke List Packages 3.41 and 3.50 by using SPE HV calls and spu_pkg_rvk_verifier.self
Important: Parameters to SPU module shuold be aligned, i used cache line alignment, don't know exactly alignment requerements. Or else some very strange things could happen. E.g SYSCON firmware was only partially decrypted when i used no cache line alignment.
I have also managed to decrypt and extract Core OS Packages 1.10, 1.18 Debug, 2.40, 2.80, 3.15, 3.41 and 3.50 by using SPE HV calls and spu_pkg_rvk_verifier.self but it's compressed with zlib.Update Manager in Process 6 from 3.15 uses zlib 1.2.3 inflate to decompress it after it was decrypted and then it stores the data to flash memory.
I decompressed the decrypted Core OS Packages with zlib.
I am able now to decrypt and decompress all Core OS Packages
The decrypted and decompressed package CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg looks exactly like it's stored on flash.
I also decrypted BD Firmwares BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg and BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg successfully. The firmware is not compressed.
I also decrypted Bluetooth Firmware BLUETOOTH_FIRMWARE.pkg successfully. The firmware is encrypted and compressed.
I also managed to decrypt System Controller Firmware SYS_CON_FIRMWARE_01050101.pkg from 3.41.
Core OS Package 3.50 contains a new isolated SPU module that is not contained in older versions. The SPU module is manu_info_spu_module.self.
Here links to PS3 Firmwares: [1] and [2]

RL_FOR_PROGRAM.img 3.41

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000200   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 41 00 00 00 00   ...........A....
00000210   00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000220   00 00 00 03 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 41 00 00 00 00   ...........A....
00000230   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   ........ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
00000240   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 41 00 00 00 00   ...........A....
00000250   10 70 00 05 FF 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..ÿ...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
00000260   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 41 00 00 00 00   ...........A....
00000270   10 70 00 05 FE 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..þ...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
00000280   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 41 00 00 00 00   ...........A....
00000290   10 70 00 05 FD 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..ý...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
000002A0   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 41 00 00 00 00   ...........A....
000002B0   10 70 00 05 FC 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..ü...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
000002C0   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 03  00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000002D0   10 70 00 04 00 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p......ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ

RL_FOR_PROGRAM.img 3.50

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000200   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 50 00 00 00 00   ...........P....
00000210   00 00 00 06 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000220   00 00 00 03 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 50 00 00 00 00   ...........P....
00000230   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   ........ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
00000240   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 50 00 00 00 00   ...........P....
00000250   10 70 00 05 FF 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..ÿ...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
00000260   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 50 00 00 00 00   ...........P....
00000270   10 70 00 05 FE 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..þ...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
00000280   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 50 00 00 00 00   ...........P....
00000290   10 70 00 05 FD 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..ý...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
000002A0   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 01  00 03 00 50 00 00 00 00   ...........P....
000002B0   10 70 00 05 FC 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p..ü...ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ
000002C0   00 00 00 04 00 00 00 03  00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000002D0   10 70 00 04 00 00 00 01  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF   .p......ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ

RL_FOR_PACKAGE.img 3.41

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000200   00 00 00 03 00 00 00 02  00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000210   00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000220   00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02   ................
00000230   00 00 00 08 00 05 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................

RL_FOR_PACKAGE.img 3.50

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000200   00 00 00 03 00 00 00 02  00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000210   00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000220   00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02   ................
00000230   00 00 00 08 00 05 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................

CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg 3.15

Here is a piece of data from decrypted and decompressed package.

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000000   00 00 00 01 00 00 00 17  00 00 00 00 00 6F FF E0   .............oÿà
00000010   00 00 00 00 00 00 04 60  00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00   .......`........
00000020   63 72 65 73 65 72 76 65  64 5F 30 00 00 00 00 00   creserved_0.....
00000030   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000040   00 00 00 00 00 04 04 60  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08   .......`........
00000050   73 64 6B 5F 76 65 72 73  69 6F 6E 00 00 00 00 00   sdk_version.....
00000060   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000070   00 00 00 00 00 04 04 80  00 00 00 00 00 01 E5 CC   .......€......åÌ
00000080   6C 76 31 6C 64 72 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   lv1ldr..........
00000090   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000A0   00 00 00 00 00 05 EA 80  00 00 00 00 00 01 6D A0   ......ê€......m 
000000B0   6C 76 32 6C 64 72 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   lv2ldr..........
000000C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000D0   00 00 00 00 00 07 58 80  00 00 00 00 00 01 2E 44   ......X€.......D
000000E0   69 73 6F 6C 64 72 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   isoldr..........
000000F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000100   00 00 00 00 00 08 87 00  00 00 00 00 00 01 DA E4   ......‡.......Úä
00000110   61 70 70 6C 64 72 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   appldr..........
00000120   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000130   00 00 00 00 00 0A 61 E4  00 00 00 00 00 00 FA CC   ......aä......úÌ
00000140   73 70 75 5F 70 6B 67 5F  72 76 6B 5F 76 65 72 69   spu_pkg_rvk_veri
00000150   66 69 65 72 2E 73 65 6C  66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   fier.self.......
00000160   00 00 00 00 00 0B 5C B0  00 00 00 00 00 00 5C 94   ......\°......\”
00000170   73 70 75 5F 74 6F 6B 65  6E 5F 70 72 6F 63 65 73   spu_token_proces
00000180   73 6F 72 2E 73 65 6C 66  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   sor.self........
00000190   00 00 00 00 00 0B B9 44  00 00 00 00 00 00 65 D0   ......¹D......eÐ
000001A0   73 70 75 5F 75 74 6F 6B  65 6E 5F 70 72 6F 63 65   spu_utoken_proce
000001B0   73 73 6F 72 2E 73 65 6C  66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ssor.self.......
000001C0   00 00 00 00 00 0C 1F 14  00 00 00 00 00 01 53 2C   ..............S,
000001D0   73 63 5F 69 73 6F 2E 73  65 6C 66 00 00 00 00 00   sc_iso.self.....
000001E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000001F0   00 00 00 00 00 0D 72 40  00 00 00 00 00 00 44 98   [email protected]˜
00000200   61 69 6D 5F 73 70 75 5F  6D 6F 64 75 6C 65 2E 73   aim_spu_module.s
00000210   65 6C 66 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   elf.............
00000220   00 00 00 00 00 0D B6 D8  00 00 00 00 00 00 D7 F0   ......¶Ø......×ð
00000230   73 70 70 5F 76 65 72 69  66 69 65 72 2E 73 65 6C   spp_verifier.sel
00000240   66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   f...............
00000250   00 00 00 00 00 0E 8E C8  00 00 00 00 00 00 80 8C   ......ŽÈ......€Œ
00000260   6D 63 5F 69 73 6F 5F 73  70 75 5F 6D 6F 64 75 6C   mc_iso_spu_modul
00000270   65 2E 73 65 6C 66 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   e.self..........
00000280   00 00 00 00 00 0F 0F 54  00 00 00 00 00 00 88 B8   .......T......ˆ¸
00000290   6D 65 5F 69 73 6F 5F 73  70 75 5F 6D 6F 64 75 6C   me_iso_spu_modul
000002A0   65 2E 73 65 6C 66 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   e.self..........
000002B0   00 00 00 00 00 0F 98 0C  00 00 00 00 00 00 C0 78   ......˜.......Àx
000002C0   73 76 5F 69 73 6F 5F 73  70 75 5F 6D 6F 64 75 6C   sv_iso_spu_modul
000002D0   65 2E 73 65 6C 66 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   e.self..........
000002E0   00 00 00 00 00 10 58 84  00 00 00 00 00 00 5D B0   ......X„......]°
000002F0   73 62 5F 69 73 6F 5F 73  70 75 5F 6D 6F 64 75 6C   sb_iso_spu_modul
00000300   65 2E 73 65 6C 66 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   e.self..........
00000310   00 00 00 00 00 10 B6 34  00 00 00 00 00 00 22 A0   ......¶4......" 
00000320   64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 2E  73 70 70 00 00 00 00 00   default.spp.....
00000330   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000340   00 00 00 00 00 10 D9 00  00 00 00 00 00 12 B1 70   ......Ù.......±p
00000350   6C 76 31 2E 73 65 6C 66  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   lv1.self........
00000360   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000370   00 00 00 00 00 23 8A 80  00 00 00 00 00 03 E8 28   .....#Š€......è(
00000380   6C 76 30 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   lv0.............
00000390   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000003A0   00 00 00 00 00 27 72 A8  00 00 00 00 00 16 EE B8   .....'r¨......î¸
000003B0   6C 76 32 5F 6B 65 72 6E  65 6C 2E 73 65 6C 66 00   lv2_kernel.self.
000003C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000003D0   00 00 00 00 00 3E 61 60  00 00 00 00 00 07 0F 94   .....>a`.......”
000003E0   65 75 72 75 73 5F 66 77  2E 62 69 6E 00 00 00 00   eurus_fw.bin....
000003F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000400   00 00 00 00 00 45 70 F4  00 00 00 00 00 07 FC 48   .....Epô......üH
00000410   65 6D 65 72 5F 69 6E 69  74 2E 73 65 6C 66 00 00   emer_init.self..
00000420   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000430   00 00 00 00 00 4D 6D 3C  00 00 00 00 00 06 16 00   .....Mm<........
00000440   68 64 64 5F 63 6F 70 79  2E 73 65 6C 66 00 00 00   hdd_copy.self...
00000450   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................

00040460   33 31 35 2E 30 30 30 0A  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   315.000.........
00040470   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................

BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg 3.50

Here is a piece of data from decrypted package.

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000300   43 6F 70 79 72 69 67 68  74 28 43 29 20 32 30 30   Copyright(C) 200
00000310   35 2D 32 30 30 36 2C 20  53 6F 6E 79 20 43 6F 6D   5-2006, Sony Com
00000320   70 75 74 65 72 20 45 6E  74 65 72 74 61 69 6E 6D   puter Entertainm
00000330   65 6E 74 20 49 6E 63 2E  1A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ent Inc.........
00000340   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000350   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000360   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000370   41 96 18 D3 2D 8F 0F 68  11 4D A7 09 E4 1F A7 6F   A–.Ó-.h.M§.ä.§o
00000380   EF 29 48 A0 E9 F2 A8 F0  CC 4B F3 4D E0 4A B0 17   ï)H éò¨ðÌKóMàJ°.
00000390   C2 DA 07 5F 96 B3 C8 8D  E1 06 2E 3A 1D A7 FD 20   ÂÚ._–³Èá..:.§ý

BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_301R.pkg 3.50

Here is a piece of data from decrypted package.

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000300   43 6F 70 79 72 69 67 68  74 28 43 29 20 32 30 30   Copyright(C) 200
00000310   35 2D 32 30 30 39 2C 20  53 6F 6E 79 20 43 6F 6D   5-2009, Sony Com
00000320   70 75 74 65 72 20 45 6E  74 65 72 74 61 69 6E 6D   puter Entertainm
00000330   65 6E 74 20 49 6E 63 2E  1A 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ent Inc.........
00000340   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000350   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000360   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000370   80 18 D2 E4 22 AA 2B D7  85 47 F4 40 53 9A 04 0C   €.Òä"ª+×…Gô@Sš..
00000380   D0 B8 A5 04 20 51 9E 90  09 4F 2E 78 BA 32 C0 EA   Ð¸¥. Qž.O.xº2Àê
00000390   E9 61 96 ED D8 2A 70 C0  59 68 4E B2 47 25 9C 97   éa–íØ*pÀYhN²G%œ—

BLUETOOTH_FIRMWARE.pkg 3.41

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000000   52 43 32 39 5F 66 69 72  6D 77 61 72 65 5F 66 6F   RC29_firmware_fo
00000010   6F 74 65 72 2E 64 66 75  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   oter.dfu........
00000020   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000030   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000040   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000050   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000060   00 00 00 00 30 30 30 30  36 34 34 00 30 30 30 30   ....0000644.0000
00000070   30 30 30 00 30 30 30 30  30 30 30 00 30 30 30 30   000.0000000.0000
00000080   31 35 36 36 33 30 30 00  31 31 30 36 34 33 34 36   1566300.11064346
00000090   33 30 36 00 30 31 35 34  36 33 00 20 30 00 00 00   306.015463. 0...
000000A0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000B0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000C0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000D0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000E0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
000000F0   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000100   00 75 73 74 61 72 20 20  00 72 6F 6F 74 00 00 00   .ustar  .root...
00000110   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000120   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 72 6F 6F 74 00 00 00   .........root...
00000130   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   ................
00000140   00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 30 30 30 30 30 30 30   .........0000000
00000150   00 30 30 30 30 30 30 30  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00   .0000000........


000A5950   84 1B 00 C0 94 04 00 00  74 06 00 00 45 75 72 75   „..À”...t...Euru
000A5960   73 5F 50 72 69 6D 61 72  79 5F 50 68 79 00 00 00   s_Primary_Phy...
000A5970   4D 61 72 76 65 6C 6C 5F  41 50 00 00 94 BB 01 C0   Marvell_AP..”».À


000B7CC0   00 00 00 00 01 10 60 23  4D 61 72 76 65 6C 6C 20   ......`#Marvell 
000B7CD0   46 69 72 6D 77 61 72 65  20 53 44 4B 20 56 65 72   Firmware SDK Ver
000B7CE0   73 69 6F 6E 20 32 2E 33  2E 30 54 74 5D 04 02 2B   sion 2.3.0Tt]..+
000B7CF0   0F 14 E1 36 04 32 0A 1A  FD 08 32 1A 1A C1 08 02   ..á6.2..ý.2..Á..


000F42B0   44 6F 53 68 61 72 65 64  4B 65 79 53 65 71 31 3A   DoSharedKeySeq1:
000F42C0   20 45 6E 74 65 72 65 64  20 2D 2D 2D 20 72 73 70    Entered --- rsp
000F42D0   4D 61 63 20 3D 20 25 30  32 78 3A 25 30 32 78 3A   Mac = %02x:%02x:
000F42E0   25 30 32 78 3A 25 30 32  78 3A 25 30 32 78 3A 25   %02x:%02x:%02x:%
000F42F0   30 32 78 0A 00 00 00 00  6D 6C 6D 65 41 75 74 68   02x.....mlmeAuth
000F4300   44 6F 53 68 61 72 65 64  4B 65 79 53 65 71 31 3A   DoSharedKeySeq1:
000F4310   20 56 61 6C 69 64 61 74  69 6F 6E 20 66 61 69 6C    Validation fail
000F4320   65 64 20 2D 2D 2D 20 72  73 70 4D 61 63 20 3D 20   ed --- rspMac = 
000F4330   25 30 32 78 3A 25 30 32  78 3A 25 30 32 78 0A 00   %02x:%02x:%02x..
000F4340   6D 6C 6D 65 41 75 74 68  44 6F 53 68 61 72 65 64   mlmeAuthDoShared
000F4350   4B 65 79 53 65 71 33 3A  20 76 61 6C 69 64 61 74   KeySeq3: validat
000F4360   69 6F 6E 20 66 61 69 6C  65 64 21 20 2D 2D 2D 20   ion failed! --- 
000F4370   72 73 70 4D 61 63 20 3D  20 25 30 32 78 3A 25 30   rspMac = %02x:%0
000F4380   32 78 3A 25 30 32 78 0A  00 65 65 70 72 6F 6D 00   2x:%02x..eeprom.
000F4390   62 74 5F 68 63 69 00 62  74 5F 75 61 72 74 00 75   bt_hci.bt_uart.u
000F43A0   73 62 30 00 75 73 62 31  00 4F 53 41 00 77 6C 61   sb0.usb1.OSA.wla
000F43B0   F3 B8 E9 70 01 00 00 00  1C 6B 03 00 00 02 00 00   ó¸ép.....k......

SYS_CON_FIRMWARE_01050101.pkg 3.41

Offset      0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7   8  9  A  B  C  D  E  F

00000300   1B 2D 70 0F AB 5E B3 99  68 20 FE 3D E1 80 6A 1D   .-p.«^³™h þ=á€j.
00000310   B8 FD 37 CF CD 45 85 AB  51 F7 05 E3 EA 32 A5 EA   ¸ý7ÏÍE…«Q÷.ãê2¥ê
00000320   67 45 F9 48 00 00 00 00  00 10 00 00 C0 0F 00 00   gEùH........À...
00000330   8B 04 07 F9 9B A2 90 3A  75 89 F1 42 12 59 DA 0D   ‹..ù›¢:u‰ñB.YÚ.
00000340   21 7C A2 C3 5A E4 78 00  10 8D 4B F7 A2 73 9C 63   !|¢ÃZäx..K÷¢sœc
00000350   5D 8D 5D 49 16 C7 6F 2C  AD 33 FE 1F D3 6C A1 CA   ]]I.Ço,3þ.Ól¡Ê
00000360   BA AD 2B FE 8F 33 71 D7  C5 E6 5C FF BF 77 6C 80   º+þ3q×Åæ\ÿ¿wl€
00000370   F2 BE 11 BB 3C 52 52 DC  A9 68 E5 24 AD 4F F3 48   ò¾.»<RRÜ©hå$OóH

0x6005 - Extract Package Tophalf

The result of the request can be checked by reading the value of repository node ss.extract.request.<Request ID> periodically

0x600B - Read EEPROM

I have got read access to EEPROM of Update Manager through DM and tested it with PSGroove
I read PRODUCT_MODE from it successfully, PRODUCT_MODE = 0x000000FF
The service expects one additional parameter: offset (4 bytes)
The service accepts only some predefined offsets
The service returns the specified offset and the value at this offset

EEPROM Offset Table

Here is the table of EEPROM offsets that can be accessed through Update Manager (3.15):

Offset	Size	Description
0x48C06	1	FSELF Control Flag
0x48C07	1	Product Mode (UM allows to read this offset, it can be also written but only when already in product mode)
0x48C0A	1	QA Flag
0x48C13	1	Device Type
0x48C42	1	HDD Copy Mode
0x48C50	0x10	Debug Support Flag
0x48C60	1	Update Status
0x48C61	1	Recover Mode Flag
0x48D3E	0x50	QA Token (UM doesn't allow access to this offset but SC Manager can read/write it)

0x600C - Write EEPROM

Writting to EEPROM of Update Manager is also possible through DM
Tested this service successfully with QA flag

0x6010 - Check Integrity

This service checks integrity of important files stored on /dev/rflash1, e.g. lv0 or lv1
The service is used e.g. by System Manager
When product mode is NOT 0xFF then check is skipped !!!

0x6011 - Get Applicable Version

I have got access to this service through DM and PSGroove and tested it
The service expects one additional unknown parameter of size 4 bytes, it has to be 0x00000001 or else the service fails

Here is the return value:

00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01

BD Firmware Update

Update Manager in HV Process 6 updates BD firmware through ATAPI Interface of /dev/rbd0 device.
BD firmware is sent to BD drive by using ATAPI Write Buffer (0x3B) command with Mode 0x07 (Download microcode with offsets and save) and Buffer ID 0x00.
The current BD drive firmware version and hash is also stored by and retrieved from SYSCON by using SC Manager Get/Set Region Data (0x9006/0x9007) service. After successfull BD firmware update, Update Manager sends the new firmware version and hash to SYSCON.
BD firmware package is decrypted, SCE header size + 0x80 bytes are skipped and data beginning with copyright message is sent to BD drive.
BD firmware is sent packet wise, one packet is at most 0x8000 bytes.
After each sent packet, Update Manager checks the result by using ATAPI Request Sense (0x3) command.
Theoretically, BD firmware update can be done also from GameOS by using ATAPI interface of the BD drive.

Detecting BD Drive Type, Generation and Revision

To detect BD drive type, Update Manager uses ATAPI Inquiry command.
To detect BD drive generation, Update Manager uses ATAPI Mode Sense 10 command.

BD Drive Type Table

Here is the BD Drive Type Table extracted from HV Process 6 (3.15):


"SONY    EmerFlashROM"
"SONY    PS-EMBOOT   300R"
"SONY    BDRW AQUAM(BDIT)"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   300R"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   V300"
"SCEI    EMER-FLASH-8"
"SONY    PS-EMBOOT   301R"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   301R"
"SONY    PS-EMBOOT   302R"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   302R"
"SONY    PS-EMBOOT   303R"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   303R"
"SONY    PS-EMBOOT   304R"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   304R"
"SONY    PS-EMBOOT   306R"
"SONY    PS-SYSTEM   306R"

Methods (HV Process 6)

update_manager_update_bd_firmware - 0x800064BC (3.15)

bd_updater_prepare_drive - 0x80011A88 (3.15)

bd_updater_send_firmware - 0x80011544 (3.15)

bd_updater_disable_reqsense - 0x80010410 (3.15)

bd_updater_enable_reqsense - 0x800104D8 (3.15)

send_atp_command - 0x80023B10 (3.15)

0x9000 - SC Manager

SC Manager cannot be accessed directly by using DM unfortunately (DM discards all requests) but it's used by other services that are accessable through DM
E.g. Update Manager services "Read EEPROM" and "Write EEPROM" send requests to SC Manager services "Read EEPROM" and "Write EEPROM"
SC Manager runs sc_iso.self
With full HV rights you could patch Dispatcher Manager and enable access to SC Manager from GameOS.

Packet ID	Description
0x9001	Get SRH
0x9002	Set SRH
0x9003	Encrypt
0x9004	Decrypt
0x9005	Init For VTRM
0x9006	Get Region Data
0x9007	Set Region Data
0x9008	Set RTC
0x9009	Get Time
0x900A	Set Time
0x900B	Read EPROM
0x900C	Write EPROM
0x900D	Init For Updater
0x900E	Get SC Status
0x9011	SC Binary Patch
0x9012	SC RTC Factory
0x9013	Correct RTC Factory
0x9014	Set SC Status
0x9015	Backup Root Info
0x9016	Restore Root Info

0x9001 - SC Get SRH

struct ss_sc_mgr_get_srh
{
    u8 field0[20];
    u8 res1[4];
    u8 field18[20];
    u8 res2[4];
};

0x9003 - SC Encrypt

There are 5 different types/kinds of encryption: 1 - 5.

struct ss_sc_mgr_encrypt
{
    u32 type;               /* 1 - 5 */
    u8 res[4];
    u8 field8[16];
    u8 field18[16];
    u64 field28;
};

0x9004 - SC Decrypt

There are 5 different types/kinds of decryption: 1 - 5.
Virtual TRM Decrypt Master (0x200E) service uses e.g. decryption type 4.

0x9006 - SC Get Region Data

This service expects an ID. The valid range of ID is 0 - 15.
E.g. Update Manager uses this service to retrieve hash and version of some SELFs and firmwares, e.g. lv0 and lv1.

struct ss_sc_mgr_get_region_data
{
    u64 id;
    u64 data_size;    /* max 0x30 bytes */
    u8 data[0];
};

Update Package Type - ID Mapping Table

Update Package Type	ID
1	0
2	2
3	4
4	6
5	7
6	8

0x9007 - SC Set Region Data

This service expects an ID. The valid range of ID is 0 - 15.
E.g. Update Manager uses this service to store hash and version of some SELFs and firmwares, e.g. lv0 and lv1.

struct ss_sc_mgr_set_region_data
{
    u64 id;
    u64 data_size;    /* max 0x30 bytes */
    u8 data[0];
};

0x900B - SC Read EPROM

There are 2 ways to access SC EPROM: NVS Service and Device Access Service.
NVS Service uses Block ID and Block Offset.
Not all EPROM offsets can be accessed through SC Manager.

struct ss_sc_mgr_read_eprom
{
    u32 offset;
    u8 res1[4];
    u32 nread;               /* max 0x100 bytes */
    u8 res2[4];
    u64 buf_size;
    u8 buf[0];
    /* here follows buf */
};

EPROM Offset - Block ID and Block Offset Mapping Table (NVS Service)

EPROM Offset	Block ID	Block Offset
0x48000 - 0x480FF	0x00	0x48000 - 0x480FF
0x48800 - 0x488FF	0x01	0x48800 - 0x488FF
0x48C00 - 0x48CFF	0x02	0x48C00 - 0x48CFF
0x48D00 - 0x48DFF	0x03	0x48D00 - 0x48DFF
0x2F00 - 0x2FFF	0x10	0x2F00 - 0x2FFF
0x3000 - 0x30FF	0x20	0x3000 - 0x30FF
All other offsets	Invalid	Invalid

0x900C - SC Write EPROM

struct ss_sc_mgr_write_eprom
{
    u32 offset;
    u8 res1[4];
    u32 nwrite;
    u8 res2[4];
    u64 buf_size;
    u8 buf[0];
    /* here follows buf */
};

0x900E - SC Get Status

Here is what the service returned on my fat PS3:

0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xC0 0x00 0x00 0xFF 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00

So, version is 0x00000003 and mode is 0xC00000FF.

struct ss_sc_mgr_get_sc_status
{
    u32 version;
    u8 res1[4];
    u32 mode;
    u8 res2[4];
};

0x9011 - SC Binary Patch

This service is used by Update Manager to send a new SC firmware version to SYSCON.

SC Isolation DMA Buffer Header

struct sc_iso_header
{
    u32 seqno;
    u32 mbmsg;
    u32 cmd;
    u32 cmd_size;
    u8 cmd_data[0];
};

0x11000 - SPM (Security Policy Manager)

Packet ID is mapped to SS id
SS id value range is 0x0 - 0x84

Packet ID	Description
0x11001	Request
0x11002	Load Additional Policy

0x14000 - SLL (Secure LPAR Loader)

SLL opens lv2_kernel.self, parses ELF header and determines the size of initial memory region for GameOS LPAR
SLL creates a memory region for GameOS LPAR by using syscall 0x10000.
SLL opens /proc/partitions/<LPAR id>/mem file and maps it with mmap syscall into it's address space.
Then it authenticates, decrypts and copies the SELF file of GameOS to LPAR's memory region by using SPE syscalls 0x10040 and 0x10042.
Linux is not loaded by SLL, it's loaded in Process 9 by Linux System Manager
GameOS file image lv2_kernel.self is stored on /dev/rflash1

Packet ID	Description
0x14004	Load GOS
0x14005	Unload GOS

0x15000 - SPL (Secure Profile Loader)

DEFAULT.SPP file is stored on /dev/rflash1

Packet ID	Description
0x15001	Get LPAR Parameter Size/Get LPAR Parameter
0x15003	Get Contents Size/Get Contents
0x15009	Get Component

SPP File

The file is encrypted but can be read by using 0x15003 service of SPL
SPL reads SPP file, parses SPP header and checks some fields
SPP file is verified and decrypted by SPU module spp_verifier.self that cab be executed with HV SPE calls
Even old default.spp from PS3 Firmware 1.10 can be decrypted with spp_verifier.self from PS3 Firmware 3.41
Header format version should be 5 or else the header check fails
If (SPP header size % 256 != 0) then header check fails
Finally i was able to decrypt profile file from 3.41 but by using SPE HV calls only !!! And Linux Manager is still there !!!
The decrypted file is a binary file

Here are the contents of DEFAULT.SPP from 3.41.

Here are the contents of DEFAULT.SPP 1.18 Debug from 1.18 Debug Firmware.

SPP Header

offset 0x2 - header format version (2 bytes)

offset 0x4 - header size (4 bytes)

offset 0x18 - number of segments (4 bytes)

Segments

Segments follow after the header
SPP file contains several segments.

Here is the list of profile segments from 3.41:

SCE_CELLOS_PME
PS3_LPAR
PS2_LPAR
PS2_GX_LPAR
LINUX_LPAR
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_LINUX
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2_SW
SCE_CELLOS_SYSTEM_MGR_PS2_GX
SCE_CELLOS_SS_SECURE_RTC
SCE_CELLOS_SS_INDI_INFO_EID
SCE_CELLOS_SS_INIT_LV1_ACL

0x15003 - Get Contents Size/Get Contents

This service provides the contents of a segment specified by a service requester
I have got access to this service through DM but couldn't get through access policy yet, the service returns error code 0x00000005 that means Access Violation
But i still could test with this service which segment names are valid
I need valid laid and paid to get through it

0x17000 - Indi Info Manager

Packet ID	Description
0x17001	Read EID Data Size By Index/Read metldr Size
0x17002	Read EID Data By Index/Read metldr
0x17004	Read System Data
0x17007	Read System Data From EEPROM
0x17013	Read eEID Size
0x17014	Write eEID/Write metldr
0x17015	Read cISD Size
0x17016	Read cISD
0x17017	Write cISD

Indi Info Manager is accessed e.g. in syscall 868 on GameOS

0x17001 - Read EID Data Size By Index

I have got access to this service through DM and tested it
This service is used e.g. by Update Manager, User Token Manager or Storage Manager
The service expects 2 additional parameters, each parameter is 8 bytes
I tested it with values: 0x0, 0x4 and 0x1000 for the 1st parameter. I extracted this values from HV Processes which use this service
The 2nd parameter is not used in a request but in a response. It contains EID size.

Index	Size Of Data	Description
0	0x860	Used e.g. by Update Manager to decrypt update packages
4	0x30	Used e.g. by Storage Manager
0x1000	0xe960	metldr

0x17002 - Read EID Data By Index

I have got access to this service through DM and tested it
This service is used e.g. by Update Manager, User Token Manager or Storage Manager
The service expects 2 additional parameters, each parameter is 8 bytes
The 1st parameter is same as the 1st parameter of service Read EID Data Size By Index
The 2nd parameter is EID Data Size that is returned by the service Read EID Data Size By Index
The returned data is some binary data.
The data returned by the service with 1st parameter set to 0x0 or 0x4 is from file eEID stored on FLASH storage device region 0.
The data returned by the service with 1st parameter set to 0x1000 contains string metldr.
E.g. EID0 data is passed by Update Manager to SPU module spu_token_processor.self when Update Manager loads and executes it with syscall 0x10043.
E.g. EID4 data is passed by Storage Manager to SPU module sb_iso_spu_module.self.

0x17004 - Read System Data

Reads data from cISD or cCSD files stored on /dev/rflash1.
E.g. Gelic MAC address is stored in file cISD.

0x17007 - Read System Data From EEPROM

Reads data from SC EEPROM
An index is passed to the service. The index is mapped to a specific SC EEPROM offset.

Here is the list of possible EEPROM offsets from HV 3.15:

Index	SC EEPROM Offset	Size Of Data
0	0x48D20	6
1	0x48D28	6
2	0x48D30	6
3	0x48D38	6
4	0x48D00	4
5	0x48D04	4
6	0x48D08	4

0x17014 - Write eEID/Write metldr

Holy crap, it writes passed data to the region of FLASH memory where eEID or metldr data is stored !!!
And GameOS is allowed to use this service !!!
Do not experiment with this service if you don't know what it does or else your PS3 will not work anymore !!!

0x17015 - Read cISD Size

Returns size of data cISD that is stored on FLASH storage device region 0

0x17016 - Read cISD

Returns data cISD that is stored on FLASH storage device region 0

0x17017 - Write cISD

Writes passed data to the region of FLASH memory where cISD data is stored !!!

0x18000 - DM (Dispatcher Manager)

Dispatcher Manager runs in Process 3.
When SLL (Secure LPAR Loader) creates GamesOS LPAR and loads it, it also creates a VUART with port number 10 owned by GameOS using a service provided by Dispatcher Manager (0x18001 - Construct Service Port).
Dispatcher Manager communicates with GameOS through this VUART. It opens the file /proc/partitions/<LPAR id>/vuart/10. When the file /proc/partitions/<LPAR id>/vuart/10 is opened by Dispatcher Manager, the Hypervisor creates a peer VUART which is connected to the GameOS's VUART 10.
After that Dispatcher Manager reads requests from this VUART sent by GameOS and dispatches these requests to services (functions) provided by Hypervisor Processes through sockets. Through VUART and Dispatcher Manager, the GameOS LPAR has access to all services provided by Hypervisor Processes.
However, the services provided by Hypervisor Processes are protected by Security Policy Manager (SPM). Before Dispatcher Manager routes the requests from GameOS to these services, it consults SPM (by using 0x11001 service of SPM) and checks if the GameOS has access rights to the requested service. If not then the request is not routed.
DM overwrites the LAID sent in SS packet header with the LAID of the LPAR that sent the request. So, no matter what LAID you send in SS packet header, it will be always overwritten with the correct one by DM. That is the reason why e.g. USB Dongle Master Key cannot be decrypted by GameOS without patching DM. But with HV access rights, DM can be easily patched and access to SYSCON can be gained.
Linux LPAR doesn't have a VUART communication link to Dispatcher Manager.
I tested VUART 10 on GameOS with PSGroove and it's there.
On GamesOS, _ss_multiplexer accesses DM (VUART 10)

Packet ID	Description
0x18001	Construct Service Port
0x18002	Destruct Service Port

Dispatcher Manager Messages

Dispatcher Manager Header

Payload follows after header
Payload is a SS packet

struct dispmgr_header
{
    uint32_t request_id;
    uint32_t function_id;
    uint32_t request_size;         /* payload size of request */
    uint32_t response_size;        /* payload size of response */
}

Packet ID - SS ID Mapping

Before DM routes a received request to a service provider (HV Process) it consults SPM
DM sends a request to SPM
Request contains SS ID and Subject ID (laid and paid)
DM obtains SS ID by mapping Packet ID

Here is the mapping table i extracted from HV Process 3 where SPM and DM run:

Packet ID	SS ID
0x2001	0x34
0x2002	0x35
0x2003	0x36
0x2004	0x37
0x2005	0x38
0x2006	0x39
0x200A	0x3D
0x200B	0x3E
0x200C	0x3F
0x200D	0x40
0x200E	0x41
0x2012	0x7B
0x2013	0x7C
0x2014	0x7E
0x2015	0x7F
0x2016	0x7D
0x2017	0x80

0x19000 - AIM

Executes isolated SPU module aim_spu_module.self
EID0 data is passed to aim_spu_module.self

Packet ID	Description
0x19002	Get Device Type
0x19003	Get Device ID
0x19004	Get PS Code
0x19005	Get Open PS ID

0x19002 - Get Device Type

On my fat PS3 with HV 3.41 it returns:

0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x85

struct ss_aim_get_device_type
{
    u8 field0[16];
};

0x19003 - Get Device ID

struct ss_aim_get_device_id
{
    u8 field0[16];
};

0x19004 - Get PS Code

struct ss_aim_get_ps_code
{
    u8 field0[8];
};

0x19005 - Get Open PS ID

struct ss_aim_get_open_ps_id
{
    u8 field0[16];
};

0x24000 - USB Dongle Authenticator

Packet ID	Description
0x24001	Generate Challenge
0x24002	Verify Response

0x24001 - Generate Challenge

I have got access to this service through DM and tested it
The service expects no input parameters except those in SS packet header
It uses 0x5003 service (Generate Random Number) to generate random numbers that are used in challenge body
The length of a challnge body is always 23 bytes, first 3 bytes are always the same: 0x2E 0x02 0x01

Here are hexdumps of some challenge bodies i let 0x24001 service generate:

2E 02 01 72 3A 0A 76 BB 81 CB 29 BC E7 B5 D6 62 7C 0E EE 23 18 A9 1D

2E 02 01 F0 DA 78 D4 1D CB D7 C9 C7 F0 32 F4 2E 92 39 BD 3F 32 93 AA

2E 02 01 3B B2 9D FD A8 83 AF 9A C0 E9 13 BB AE D5 6C 8C 45 2E DE 13

0x24002 - Verify Response

I have got access to this service and tested it with PSGroove
The response body is 25 bytes large
The first 3 bytes have to be 0x2E 0x02 0x02 or else the check fails
The 16 bit at offset 3 is a dongle ID
The dongle ID is checked if it's revoked or not
When the verification succeedes then product mode is set to 1
The service calculates USB Dongle Key from USB Dongle ID and USB Dongle Master Key by using HMAC SHA-1
The service uses HMAC SHA-1 to calculate the correct response body from the challenge body and USB Dongle Key
After that the service compares the calculated response body with the given one that was sent to the service
It seems that laid and paid from SS packet header are used in decryption process

USB Dongle Master Key

USB Dongle Master Key is stored encrypted in Process 6
The encrypted key is 64 bytes large
The decrypted key is 20 bytes large
The USB Dongle Master Key is decrypted first time the service 0x24002 is used
The USB Dongle Master Key is decrypted by using the service 0x200E (Decrypt Master) of Vitual TRM Manager
The decrypted USB Dongle Master Key is stored in Process 6 in clear text (after first usage of this service)
When decryption of USB Dongle Master Key fails then a dummy key is used
Unfortunately, in the HV dump 3.15 the USB Dongle Master Key was not decrypted at the moment of dumping
The first 12 bytes of decrypted USB Dongle Master Key is a magic value: _USB_DONGLE_. After these 12 bytes follows the real USB Dongle Master Key of size 20 bytes. So, if after decryption of USB Dongle Master Key, you see this magic value then the decryption was successfull.

Here is the encrypted USB Dongle Master Key from HV 3.15:

0x22 0xD5 0xD1 0x8C 0xFF 0xE2 0x4F 0xAC 0xEC 0x72 0xA2 0x42 0xA7 0x18 0x98 0x10
0x25 0x33 0xE0 0x96 0xF2 0xC1 0x91 0x0D 0x15 0x23 0xD3 0x07 0x74 0xE7 0x2B 0x72
0xDF 0xA6 0xDD 0xE9 0x68 0x8B 0x76 0x2A 0x6A 0x87 0x51 0x7F 0x85 0x39 0x0B 0xD4
0x20 0x3F 0x46 0x89 0x04 0x82 0xB7 0x30 0x84 0x89 0x4B 0xCC 0x9D 0xB1 0x24 0x7C

This is the decrypted dongle master key:

0x46 0xDC 0xEA 0xD3 0x17 0xFE 0x45 0xD8 0x09 0x23
0xEB 0x97 0xE4 0x95 0x64 0x10 0xD4 0xCD 0xB2 0xC2

This is the decrypted dongle key for dongle ID 0xAAAA which works up to 3.55:

0x04 0x4E 0x61 0x1B 0xA6 0xA6 0xE3 0x9A 0x98 0xCF
0x35 0x81 0x2C 0x80 0x68 0xC7 0xFC 0x5F 0x7A 0xE8

Here is the USB Dongle Master Dummy Key from HV 3.15:

0xD1 0xFC 0x57 0x55 0xBF 0x20 0xFA 0xB2 0xD4 0xA5 0x4A 0x0A 0x0C 0x5D 0x52 0x8E
0xDF 0x66 0xCD 0x74

USB Dongle ID Revoke List

Process 6 contains a revoke list for USB Dongle IDs
The revoke list is 0x2000 bytes large. It's a bitmap.
Each bit represents a USB Dongle ID. If bit is 0 then USB Dongle ID is revoked.

The following USB Dongle IDs are revoked in HV 3.15:

0, 2, 13, 32, 34, 176, 241

0x25000 - User Token Manager

Packet ID	Description
0x25001	Encrypt User Token
0x25002	Decrypt User Token

User Token

Before User Token Manager encrypts a received user token it checks it's format.
User Tokens are processed by spu_utoken_processor.self
Before User Token is processed, User Token Manager reads IDPS by sending SS requests to Indi Info Manager (packet ids 0x17001 and 0x17002). Indi Info Manager runs in HV Process 5.

User Token Format

stuct user_token_attr
{
    uint32_t type;                                 /* 0x00000001, value != 0x00000001 means attribute list ends here */
    uint32_t size;                                 /* 8 + sizeof(data) */
    /* data follows here, size of data may be 0 */
}

struct user_token
{
    uint32_t magic;                                /* 0x73757400 = "sut\0" */
    uint32_t format_version;                       /* 0x00000001 */
    uint64_t size;
    uint8_t idps[16];
    uint64_t expire_date;
    uint64_t capability;
    union
    {
        stuct user_token_attr attrs[0];
        uint8_t dummy[3072];
    } attrs;
    /* 0xC30 */
    uint8_t digest[20];
}

LPAR Memory Management

Memory Region class

This class is the base class for different memory region types.

vtable

0x003578B0 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x40 - pointer to LPAR object that owns this memory region

offset 0x48 - type of memory region (8 bytes)

offset 0x50 - LPAR start address of memory region

offset 0x58 - size of memory region (8 bytes)

offset 0x60 - flags (8 bytes)

offset 0xA0 - log2 of page size

Generating New LPAR Memory Region Addresses

generate_new_lpar_mem_region_address(?, memory region size, log2(page size), ?, ?) - 002C82E8 (3.15)

generate_new_lpar_mem_region_address - 002C6570 (3.41)

The function returns a new LPAR memory region address.
This method is used e.g. in all HV calls which create any kind of memory regions, e.g. lv1_allocate_memory, lv1_map_htab, lv1_undocumented_function_114, lv1_construct_logical_spe, lv1_map_device_mmio_region or syscall 0x10040.

Encoding LPAR Memory Region Start Addresses and Sizes

Size of LPAR memory region is encoded in the LPAR memory region start address.
That is why e.g. the LPAR Memory Region Start Addresses of LPAR Memory Region of size 4096 byte begin with 0x300000000000, 0x300000000000 >> 42 = 0xC = log2(4096).
Each LPAR has a counter (8 bytes) which is incremented by 1 every time a new LPAR Memory Region is created.
Before incrementing, the counter is shifted left by log2(LPAR Memory Region Size) and ored with log2(LPAR Memory Region Size) << 42.

LPAR Memory Region Start Address >> 42 = log2(LPAR Memory Region Size)

LPAR Memory Region Start Address = (log2(LPAR Memory Region Size) << 42) |
   (counter << log2(LPAR Memory Region Size))

LPAR Memory Region Address Counter

LPAR Memory Region Address Counter is stored at address: 0x38(LPAR ptr) + 0x9E8
LPAR1's Memory Region Address Counter is at address 0x00677A48 in HV dump 3.15
LPAR2's Memory Region Address Counter is at address 0x007632D8 in HV dump 3.15
LPAR1's Memory Region Address Counter is at address 0x00677A48 in HV dump 3.41
LPAR2's Memory Region Address Counter is at address 0x00161E68 in HV dump 3.41

Physical Memory Region class

This type of memory region is created e.g. in lv1_allocate_memory HV call or in syscall 0x10000.

vtable

0x00357D08 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xB0 - pointer to object that stores a list of addresses of physical pages owned by this memory region

offset 0xB8 - pointer to LPAR object that owns this memory region

offset 0xC0 - reference counter (8 bytes)

Objects

Here is the list of physical memory region objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	LPAR Start Address	Size	Flags	log2(Page Size)	Physical Page Addresses
0x006B5510	1	0x300000001000	0x1000	0x0	0xC	0x672000
0x006B5E50	1	0x440000040000	0x20000	0x0	0x11	0x6C0000
0x006B6980	1	0x440000060000	0x20000	0x0	0x11	0x6E0000
0x006B7F00	1	0x400000040000	0x10000	0x0	0x10	0x100000
0x003A80F0	2	0x6C0058000000	0x7000000	0x4	0x18	0x1000000 - 0x7000000
0x003BE800	2	0x300000047000	0x1000	0x0	0xC	0x1FA000
0x006BDAA0	2	0x0	0x8000000	0x8	0x1B (single huge page)	0x8000000

So, Linux kernel should be located at physical address 0x8000000 and Linux syscall handler at 0x8000C00. Too bad that the HV dump is not large enough.

GameOS Physical Memory Regions

GameOS allocates nearly all physical memory of PS3 for itself !!! That is why new HV calls lv1_allocate_memory with large memory region sizes will fail.
So when someone wants a large piece of physical memory, he can borrow it from GameOS's LPAR memory region that starts at 0x700020000000. It can be used for example to send update packages to Update Manager which are very large.

Here is the list of physical memory regions of GameOS i found in HV 3.41:

Start Address	Size	Access Right	Max Page Size	Flags	Real Addresses
0x0	0x1000000	0x3	0x18	0x8	0x1000000 - 0x1FFF000
0x500000300000	0xA0000	0x3	0x10	0x8	0x380000 - 0x38F000, 0x3B0000 - 0x3BF000, 0x1E0000 - 0x1FF000, 0x3C0000 - 0x3FF000, 0xFF00000 - 0xFF1F000
0x700020000000	0xE900000 (huge memory region)	0x3	0x14	0x0	0x400000 - 0x5FF000, 0x800000 - 0xFFF000, 0x2000000 - 0xFEFF000

HTAB Memory Region class

This memory region is created when a HTAB is mapped into LPAR's address space. It's created in lv1_map_htab HV call.

vtable

0x00357C98 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xB0 - pointer to VAS object that owns the HTAB

Objects

Here is the list of HTAB memory region objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	VAS id	LPAR Start Address	Size	Flags	log2(Page Size)
0x001FE0F0	2	3	0x500000C00000	0x100000	0xC000000000000000	0x14
0x003BD850	2	3	0x500004300000	0x100000	0xC000000000000000	0x14
0x003BDEA0	2	3	0x500004500000	0x100000	0xC000000000000000	0x14

GameOS HTAB

HTAB of GameOS is already mapped into address space of GameOS so that is why HV call lv1_map_htab will fail until you unmap it with lv1_unmap_htab
Effective address of GameOS HTAB is 0x800000000F000000
Virtual address of GameOS HTAB is 0xF000000
Size of GameOS HTAB is 0x40000
GameOS HTAB supports large pages of size 64K and 1M
GameOS HTAB can be easily dumped by reading 0x40000 bytes at EA 0x800000000F000000

GameOS SLB

Here is the dump of SLB entries from GameOS 3.41:

0x8000000008000000  0x0000000000000500
0x8000000208000000  0x0000000000020500
0x8000000300000000  0x0000000000030510
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000080000000  0x0000000000038C00
0x00000000A0000000  0x000000000003AC00
0x00000000C0000000  0x000000000003CC00
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x8000000010057960  0x8000000000313E78
0x8000000010057940  0x0000000000000000
0x800000000001B698  0x0000000000000000
0x8000000010057930  0x8000000000490708
0x80000000002B6C68  0x80000000003DE928
0x8000000010057EC0  0x80000000003DE920
0x0000000000000000  0x8000000000309810
0x80000000004B3000  0x0000000000000000
0x8000000010057CC0  0x0000000000000000
0x80000000004AF000  0x80000000004E1F00
0x80000000100579C8  0x80000000100579C0
0x80000000100579E0  0x2400002200000000
0x80000000004CF5B0  0x8000000200012000
0x80000000100579F8  0x80000000100579F0
0x8000000010057A10  0x80000000004A3A00
0x80000000004CF5B0  0x80000000004C8D00
0x800000000001BF6C  0x80000000004CD400
0x800000000001B698  0x80000000004C8100
0x80000000100579D0  0x80000000004B48C0
0x0000000000001C08  0x0000000000000000
0x8000000010057A78  0x8000000010057A70
0x8000000010057A90  0x0000000000000000
0x80000000004CF90C  0x0000000000000000
0x0000000000000000  0x8000000010057A80
0x8000000010057A90  0x8000000000309810
0x80000000004CF62C  0x0000000000000000
0x8000000010057CC0  0x0000000000000000
0x80000000004AF000  0x80000000004B48C0
0x00004000001C0000  0x0000000000000001
0x00000000D0000000  0x0000A8E3EE7D10DA
0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x80000000004D8088  0x80000000004D9000

SPE MMIO Memory Region class

This type of memory region represents MMIO memory region of a SPE. It's created e.g. in lv1_construct_logical_spe or in syscall 0x10040.

vtable

0x003583F8 (3.15)

Member variables

Objects

Here is the list of SPE memory region objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	SPE	LPAR Start Address	Size	Physical Address	Flags	log2(Page Size)
0x003ABC20	2	1	0x4C0000880000	0x80000	0x20000080000	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003AAD70	2	2	0x4C0000980000	0x80000	0x20000100000	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003A8880	2	3	0x4C0000780000	0x80000	0x20000180000	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003B4F70	2	4	0x4C0000A80000	0x80000	0x20000200000	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003AB700	2	5	0x4C0000680000	0x80000	0x20000280000	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003B5BE0	2	6	0x4C0000B80000	0x80000	0x20000300000	0xA000000000000000	0xC

SPE Shadow Registers Memory Region class

This type of memory region represents shadow registers memory region of a SPE. It's created e.g. in lv1_construct_logical_spe or in syscall 0x10040.

vtable

0x00358448 (3.15)

Objects

Here is the list of SPE Shadow Registers memory region objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	SPE	LPAR Start Address	Size	Physical Address	Flags	log2(Page Size)
0x003ABDA0	2	1	0x300000012000	0x1000	-	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003B4290	2	2	0x300000014000	0x1000	-	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003A8A00	2	3	0x300000010000	0x1000	-	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003B50F0	2	4	0x300000016000	0x1000	-	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x001FFC90	2	5	0x30000000E000	0x1000	-	0xA000000000000000	0xC
0x003AE5B0	2	6	0x300000018000	0x1000	-	0xA000000000000000	0xC

Device MMIO Memory Region class

This type of memory region is created when a device MMIO region is mapped into LPAR address space, e.g. in lv1_map_device_mmio_region.

vtable

0x00352468 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xA8 - physical address where the device MMIO region is mapped to

Objects

Here is the list of Device MMIO memory region objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	LPAR Start Address	Size	Flags	log2(Page Size)	Physical Address	Device
0x001FDF00	2	0x4000001D0000	0x10000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x24003010000	USB controller
0x003B3850	2	0x400000200000	0x10000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x24003020000	USB controller
0x003B6E50	2	0x4000001E0000	0x10000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x24003810000	USB controller
0x003B9950	2	0x4000001F0000	0x10000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x24003820000	USB controller

GPU Device Memory Region class

This type of memory region is created e.g. in lv1_gpu_open, lv1_gpu_device_map and lv1_undocumented_function_114.

vtable

0x00357C48 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xA8 - physical address

Objects

Here is the list of Device GPU memory region objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	LPAR Start Address	Size	Flags	log2(Page Size)	Physical Address
0x003AF380	2	0x700190000000	0xFE00000	0x8000000000000000	0x14	0x28080000000
0x003AF500	2	0x4000001A0000	0xC000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x3C0000
0x003AF680	2	0x4800006C0000	0x40000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x2808FE00000
0x003AFC30	2	0x440000380000	0x20000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x28000C00000
0x003BB420	2	0x3C0000108000	0x8000	0x8000000000000000	0xC	0x28000080100

Direct Map Memory Region class

This type of memory region is created in HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114. lv1_undocumented_function_114 allows you to map any memory address into LPAR's memory address.

The HV call lv1_undocumented_function_115 destroys a memory region of this type.
HV allows GameOS to create objects of this type of size 0 only !!! But it can be exploited with a dangling HTAB entry.

vtable

0x00357C48 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0xA8 - physical address

Exploiting HV with memory glitching and HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114

Here is a short description of the method i used to exploit HV from GameOS 3.15 and 3.41.

First i used the Geohot's method to create a dangling HTAB entry.
Making memory glitch work on GameOS was the largest of my obstacles but i solved it and i'm able to create a dangling HTAB entry from GameOS within 1-3 minutes.
Then i created many Direct Map Memory Region objects of size 0 with HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114 and checked if they are within the page to which the dangling HTAB entry points to.
When i found one such Direct Map Memory Region object i patched the size of this object to 0x1000. Then i pointed this memory region object to the code of HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114 and patched 4 bytes in this HV call which allows me to create any Direct Map Memory Region objects without any restrictions.
Function LPAR_construct_direct_mapping_mem_region which is used by HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114 has a parameter (register %r9) and when this parameter is not 0 then HV will allow you to create any Direct Map Memory Region objects without restrictions, but unfortunately the HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114 passes 0 in this parameter, so i just patched it.
Then i mapped whole HV memory range with the patched HV call lv1_undocumented_function_114 into the address space of GameOS.
And now you have read/write access to the whole HV.
$ONY could fix this exploit by disallowing creating of Direct Map Memory Region objects of size 0, but i know tons of other HV C++ classes which will allow me to exploit the HV in a similar way, so it wouldn't bring $ONY anything :-) And they have to change member variable offsets in those objects to make sure that i cannot patch them easily :-)

Methods

LPAR_get_memory_region_by_start_address - 0x002C7C40 (3.15)

LPAR_get_memory_region_by_address - 0x002C7DA8 (3.15)

LPAR_mem_addr_to_phys_addr(LPAR id, LPAR address, phys_addr) - 0x002FB8F0 (3.15)

LPAR_construct_direct_mapping_mem_region - 0x002D4D04 (3.15)

Network Devices

Ethernet Gelic Device

device id = 0

MAC Address: 00:1F:A7:C6:2A:C5

device memory base address = 0x24003004000 (size = 0x1000)

WLAN Gelic Device

device id = 0

MAC Address: 02:1F:A7:C6:2A:C5 (locally administered)

Net Manager

Net Manager runs in Process 9
It sends commands to /dev/sc1 to reset WLAN Gelic device
It opens /dev/net0, sets MAC address and writes device firmware eurus_fw.bin to WLAN device by using ioctl syscall

/dev/net0

The device supports 3 ioctl commands:

0 - 0x002AC10C (3.15)
1 - 0x002AC250 (3.15)
2 - EURUS_STAT 0x002AC320 (3.15)

Methods

net_control_cmd_GELIC_LV1_POST_WLAN_CMD - 0x0024A55C (3.15)

net_control_wlan_cmd_GELIC_EURUS_CMD_ASSOC - 0x00246C78 (3.15)

net_control_wlan_cmd_GELIC_EURUS_CMD_START_SCAN - 0x00248A14 (3.15)

net_control_wlan_cmd_GELIC_EURUS_CMD_SET_WEP_CFG - 0x00249F24 (3.15)

net_control_wlan_cmd_GELIC_EURUS_CMD_SET_WPA_CFG - 0x002497B8 (3.15)

Event Notification

Event Notfication is used e.g. to notify a LPAR about some event, e.g. device interrupt or notify a LPAR about destruction of another LPAR.
For example Process 9 is notified through Event Notification when LPAR 2 is destructed.
During LPAR construction, Process 9 creates an Outlet object with syscall 0x1001A and then passes the outlet ID to the syscall 0x10009 that constructs the LINUX LPAR. In this way Process 9 is notified when LINUX LPAR is destructed.

Outlet class

This is the base Outlet class. There are different types of Outlet and they derive from this base class.

vtable

0x00357DC0 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x30 - type (8 bytes)

offset 0x38 - pointer to LPAR that owns this Outlet object

offset 0x48 - outlet id (8 bytes)

offset 0x90 - VIRQ assigned to this Outlet object (4 bytes)

Event Receive Port class

This type of Outlet is created e.g. in lv1_construct_event_receive_port and in syscall 0x1001A.
HV calls lv1_connect_irq_plug and lv1_connect_irq_plug_ext assigns a VIRQ to Event Receive Port object.

vtable

0x00357E88

VUART Outlet

HV supports only one VUART Outlet per LPAR
lv1_configure_virtual_uart_irq constructs a VUART Outlet object and passes the address of LPAR's VUART IRQ Bitmap to HV

vtable

0x00357DC0

VUART IRQ Bitmap

At address 0x38(LPAR ptr) + 0x158 is the VUART IRQ Bitmap owned by HV for LPAR (4 * 8 bytes = 256 bits)
At address 0x38(LPAR ptr) + 0x150 is stored the physical address of LPAR's VUART IRQ Bitmap that was passed to lv1_configure_virtual_uart_irq
When a VUART interrupt is generated by HV then first the VUART IRQ Bitmap owned by HV is updated and then this bitmap is copied to LPAR's VUART IRQ Bitmap, so VUART IRQ Bitmap is stored twice, once in HV and once in LPAR, just like IRQ State Bitmap.
VUART IRQ Bitmap is not allowed to cross page boundary of LPAR memory region where it is stored. HV checks it and makes sure that it doesn't happen.
GameOS 3.41 VUART IRQ bitmap is at address 0x80000000003556E8 and of size 32 bytes (256 bits, each bit corresponds to a VUART port).
GameOS 3.15 VUART IRQ bitmap is at address 0x8000000000354768.

Logical PPE

Logical PPE is used for interrupt management of LPAR.
A Logical PPE object is created in syscall 0x10005. It' used e.g. in Process 9 during LPAR construction.
syscall 0x10007 activates a Logical PPE object
0x67F0(HSPRG0) - pointer to currently active Logical PPE object (in HV dump it points to Linux PPE object naturally because the dump was made on Linux, so Linux LPAR was active at that time)
E.g. lv1_get_logical_ppe_id, lv1_start_ppe_periodic_tracer and lv1_set_ppe_periodic_tracer_frequency grab the currently active Logical PPE object

vtable

0x00357DF0 (3.15)

Member variables

offset 0x90 - pointer to an object that contains VIRQ-Outlet mapping table for thread 0

offset 0x98 - pointer to an object that contains VIRQ-Outlet mapping table for thread 1

Objects

Here is the list of Logical PPE objects i found in HV 3.15.

Address in HV dump	LPAR id	PPE id
0x0069C7F0	1	1
0x007A8900	2	1

Virtual IRQ - Outlet Mapping

HV maintains 2 tables per PPE that map a VIRQ to an Outlet object.
The table has 256 entries and is indexed by VIRQ.
Each entry is a pointer to Outlet object.
Each Logical PPE object has 2 tables, one for each thread of Cell CPU.

LPAR 1 PPE 1 Thread 0

0x0069C990 (3.15) - address of VIRQ-Outlet table for LPAR 1 PPE 1 Thread 0 (not empty)

VIRQ	Address of Outlet object in HV dump	Description
58	0x00090D10	-
59	0x006BAC50	-
60	0x006B3ED0	FLASH storage device / Storage device notification for LPAR 1
61	0x00697E70	VUART interrupts
62	0x001C8F20	-

LPAR 1 PPE 1 Thread 1

0x0069D9B0 (3.15) - address of VIRQ-Outlet table for LPAR 1 PPE 1 Thread 1 (empty)

LPAR 2 PPE 1 Thread 0

0x000A06B0 (3.15) - address of VIRQ-Outlet table for LPAR 2 PPE 1 Thread 0 (not empty)

VIRQ	Address of Outlet object in HV dump	Description
20	0x003AA210	-
21	0x003AFEC0	-
22	0x001FC010	-
23	0x003A8E50	-
24	0x001FFED0	SPE 0 Class 0 Interrupt
25	0x003AE160	SPE 0 Class 1 Interrupt
26	0x003AE350	SPE 0 Class 2 Interrupt
27	0x003AB100	SPE 1 Class 0 Interrupt
28	0x003AB2F0	SPE 1 Class 1 Interrupt
29	0x003AB4E0	SPE 1 Class 2 Interrupt
30	0x003AA6A0	SPE 2 Class 0 Interrupt
31	0x003AA890	SPE 2 Class 1 Interrupt
32	0x003AAA80	SPE 2 Class 2 Interrupt
33	0x003B44A0	SPE 3 Class 0 Interrupt
34	0x003B4690	SPE 3 Class 1 Interrupt
35	0x003B4AD0	SPE 3 Class 2 Interrupt
36	0x003B5300	SPE 4 Class 0 Interrupt
37	0x003B54F0	SPE 4 Class 1 Interrupt
38	0x003B56E0	SPE 4 Class 2 Interrupt
39	0x003AE7C0	SPE 5 Class 0 Interrupt
40	0x003AE9B0	SPE 5 Class 1 Interrupt
41	0x003AEBA0	SPE 5 Class 2 Interrupt
42	0x003B2040	Storage device notification for LPAR 2
43	0x003AEE30	VUART interrupts
44	0x001FEAA0	-
45	0x001FEED0	HDD storage device
46	0x003B5E20	-
47	0x003B7040	-
48	0x003B9B40	-
49	0x003B3A40	-
50	0x003BACA0	Gelic device
51	0x003BAE10	UNKNOWN storage device
52	0x003B8350	-

LPAR 2 PPE 1 Thread 1

0x007A89E0 (3.15) - address of VIRQ-Outlet table for LPAR 2 PPE 1 Thread 1 (not empty)

VIRQ	Address of Outlet object in HV dump	Description
16	0x003B2480	-
17	0x003B2590	-
18	0x003B26A0	-
19	0x003B27B0	-

IRQ State Bitmap

There is one IRQ State Bitmap (256 bits = 32 bytes) per thread of Logical PPE
HSPRG0 value is per thread, so there are 2 HSPRG0 values in HV dump !!!
The IRQ State Bitmap of a thread is stored at -0x68E0(HSPRG0)
When an Event or Interrupt happens then the bitmap at 0x68E0(HSPRG0) is updated
The physical address of LPAR's IRQ State Bitmap of thread is stored at offset -0x68C0(HSPRG0)
The address of LPAR's IRQ State Bitmap is passed to Hypervisor through HV call lv1_configure_irq_state_bitmap
lv1_detect_pending_interrupts returns value of current IRQ State Bitmap.
The IRQ State Bitmap is updated if an Outlet object is assigned to VIRQ and when Outlet generates an event
After IRQ State Bitmap update, it's copied to LPAR's IRQ State Bitmap and a hardware interrupt is generated so that LPAR can read it's IRQ State Bitmap and handle interrupts.
So, IRQ State Bitmap is stored twice, once in HV and once in LPAR, just like VUART IRQ Bitmap.
GameOS IRQ state bitmap is stored at address SPRG0 + 0x1C0 and of size 64 bytes (256 bits state + 256 bits mask) per thread of Cell CPU. So there are 2 IRQ state bitmaps.

0x8941FC0 - physical address of LPAR's IRQ State Bitmap for Thread 0 of LINUX LPAR

0x8948FC0 - physical address of LPAR's IRQ State Bitmap for Thread 1 of LINUX LPAR

System Controller (SC or SYSCON)

Data received from SC is sent to a VUART
lv1_get_rtc and syscall 0x10036 communicate with SC VUART 4.

VUART Table

Address of SC VUART Table - 0x00610410 (3.15).
There are 5 VUARTs for SC in HV 3.15

Here is the SC VUART table from HV 3.15:

Index	Address of VUART object in HV dump	Description
0	0x0060FD20	This VUART is connected with the VUART 0 (/dev/sc0) of LPAR 1
1	0x0060FE20	This VUART is connected with the VUART 1 (/dev/sc1) of LPAR 1
2	0x0060FF20	This VUART is not connected to some peer VUART but i guess that it should be connected to VUART 2 (/dev/sc2) of LPAR1
3	0x006124E0	This VUART is connected with the VUART 3 (/dev/sc3) of LPAR 1
4	0x00612DF0	lv1_get_rtc and syscall 0x10036 communicate with this VUART.

Interrupt Handling

spider_sc_interrupt_handler - 0x0020A68C (3.15)

Methods

sc_vuart_4_get_peer_vuart - 0x002ED384 (3.15)

sc_send - 0x0020A908 (3.15)

sc_receive - 0x0020A354 (3.15)

sc_vuart_rx_trigger_callback - 0x002ED470 (3.15)

lv1_get_rtc

lv1_get_rtc communicates with SC VUART 4.
20 bytes are written to the peer VUART of SC VUART 4.
After a request is sent to SC VUART 4, lv1_get_rtc busy waits until SC VUART 4 receive data buffer is not empty.
When SC VUART 4 receive data buffer is not empty, lv1_get_rtc reads 24 bytes from the VUART.

SYSCON Protocol

I was able to enable SYSCON Manager debug messages in HV Process 5
Messages sent to SYSCON are at least 0x10 bytes of size. SC VUARTs check it before sending the messages to SYSCON.
The header size of the SYSCON messages is 0x10 bytes.

Packet Header

Packet header is of size 0x10 bytes.
At offset 0x6 of SYSCON packet is the header checksum which is of size 2 bytes.
The header checkum is just a sum of first 6 header bytes and 0x8000 constant
The 2nd byte in every SYSCON message has to be 1 or else the function sc_send fails.
The word at offset 0x8 is the SC VUART index.
The half-words at offset 0xC and 0xE have to be equal or the function sc_send fails.

struct sc_hdr
{
    uint8_t field0;
    uint8_t field1; /* always 1 */
    uint8_t field2[4];
    uint16_t cksum;
    uint32_t index;
    uint16_t size1;
    uint16_t size2;
};

Packet Body

Packet body follows packet header
Packet body size is stored at offset 0xC and 0xE in packet header and is of size 2 bytes

Reading SYSCON EPROM (NVS Service)

Here is a command which is sent to SYSCON to read 1 byte of EPROM at offset 0x48C07 (Product Mode):

0x14 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x80 0x15 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x04 0x00 0x04 0x20 0x02 0x07 0x01

And here is the response to the above request:

0x14 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x80 0x15 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 0x00 0x05 0x00 0x05 0x00 0x02 0x07 0x01 0xff

@@ Line 7,384: / Line 7,384: @@
 Here is a command which is sent to SYSCON to read 1 byte of EPROM at offset 0x48C07 (Product Mode):
-x14 <span style="background:#00FF00">0x01</span> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 <span style="background:#FF0000">0x80 0x15</span> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x04</span> <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x04</span> 0x20 0x02 0x07 0x01
+x14 <span style="background:#00FF00">0x01</span> <span style="background:#FFFF00">0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00</span> <span style="background:#FF0000">0x80 0x15</span> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x04</span> <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x04</span> 0x20 0x02 0x07 0x01
 And here is the response to the above request:
-x14 <span style="background:#00FF00">0x01</span> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 <span style="background:#FF0000">0x80 0x15</span> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x05</span> <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x05</span> 0x00 0x02 0x07 0x01 0xff
+x14 <span style="background:#00FF00">0x01</span> <span style="background:#FFFF00">0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00</span> <span style="background:#FF0000">0x80 0x15</span> 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x03 <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x05</span> <span style="background:#00FFFF">0x00 0x05</span> 0x00 0x02 0x07 0x01 0xff
 ----

Hypervisor Reverse Engineering: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 12:57, 21 March 2011

HSPRG

LPAR

vtable

Member variables

Interrupt handling

Interrupt vector tables

Interrupt vector table entry

Interrupt handlers

Spurious interrupt handler

RSX

SB bus

I/O address translation

Performance monitor

Token manager

HV call

HV call

Initializing HV Call Table

set_lv1_hvcall_table

set_lv1_hvcall_table_entry_invalid

Memory HV call

Memory HV call table

Memory HV calls

System call

System call handler

System call table 0 - 36

System call numbers

System call table 0x10000 - 0x100FF

System call numbers

Process

Process table

Process table entry

create_new_proc

Parameters

copy_user_data

Parameters

vtable

Member variables

Signals

Signal constants

File table

Process_EA_to_RA

Objects

PThread

vtable

Member variables

Signals

Methods

Thread

get_current_thread

vtable

Member variables

AddressSpace

vtable

Member variables

AddressSpace_EA_to_RA

AddressProtectionDomain

vtable

Member variables

ProtectionPage

vtable

Member variables

Mutex

vtable

Member variables

ConditionVariable

vtable

Member variables

File interface

vtable

StorageRegionFile

vtable

VUARTFile

vtable

STDLCFile

vtable

Member variables

SocketFile

vtable