Editing User talk:Masterzorag

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00000400
00000400
</pre>
</pre>
Another test on a different, not hacked PS3, running GameOS 4.11
ST96812AS is a 117210240 sectors of 512 bytes each, original PS3 60Gb HDD: here I've limited to 1/10, but I can force every size.
[[File:Smaller hdd.jpg|200px|thumb|6Gb]] [[File:Smaller hdd 2.jpg|200px|thumb|60Gb]]
GameOS (must) accept it.<br />


=ps3vuart-tools=
=ps3vuart-tools=
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We got info0 + info1, 64bytes each
We got info0 + info1, 64bytes each
content is 2845bytes, total is data length 2973
content is 2845bytes, total is data lenght 2973
info0, info1 are not encrypted
info0, info1 are not encrypted
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</pre>
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=.spkg_hdr.1 decryption=
=.spkg_hdr.1 decryption=
Verifing decryption of signed pkg headers with openssl:
strip metadata info
 
*strip metadata info
  # dd if=CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 of=metainfo.crypt skip=32 count=64 bs=1  
  # dd if=CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 of=metainfo.crypt skip=32 count=64 bs=1  
  64+0 records in
  64+0 records in
Line 215: Line 207:
  00000020  9c 28 c7 fd 38 31 24 3b  1b 2b 9f 3f dc 72 4f c4  |.(..81$;.+.?.rO.|
  00000020  9c 28 c7 fd 38 31 24 3b  1b 2b 9f 3f dc 72 4f c4  |.(..81$;.+.?.rO.|
  00000030  95 34 b8 0a af 25 a1 05  b6 8f ce 2c 88 e9 2b 7b  |.4...%.....,..+{|
  00000030  95 34 b8 0a af 25 a1 05  b6 8f ce 2c 88 e9 2b 7b  |.4...%.....,..+{|
*verify metadata info decryption with standard tool
verify metadata info decryption with standard tool
  # openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -in metainfo.crypt -K erk -iv riv | hexdump -C
  # openssl enc -d -aes-256-cbc -in metainfo.crypt -K erk -iv riv | hexdump -C
  00000000  7c f2 9a 4b 96 de 5f 75  a1 32 87 c0 42 ec 8f cf  ||..K.._u.2..B...|  Key
  00000000  7c f2 9a 4b 96 de 5f 75  a1 32 87 c0 42 ec 8f cf  ||..K.._u.2..B...|  Key
Line 221: Line 213:
  00000020  6f 85 6a 60 2a 8d b4 3f  2a 81 1b 1a 9c a3 02 f6  |o.j`*..?*.......|  IV
  00000020  6f 85 6a 60 2a 8d b4 3f  2a 81 1b 1a 9c a3 02 f6  |o.j`*..?*.......|  IV
  00000030
  00000030
*strip rest of crypted metadata
strip rest of crypted metadata
  # dd if=CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 of=metarest.crypt skip=96 bs=1
  # dd if=CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 of=metarest.crypt skip=96 bs=1
  544+0 records in
  544+0 records in
  544+0 records out
  544+0 records out
  544 bytes (544 B) copied, 0.00626423 s, 86.8 kB/s
  544 bytes (544 B) copied, 0.00626423 s, 86.8 kB/s
*decrypt rest of metadata
decrypt rest of metadata
  # openssl enc -d -aes-128-ctr -in metarest.crypt -K Key -iv IV | hexdump -C
  # openssl enc -d -aes-128-ctr -in metarest.crypt -K Key -iv IV | hexdump -C
  00000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 <span style="background-color:#B5E61D;">02 50</span> 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 <span style="background-color:#fff200;">03</span> |.......P........| mh
  00000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 02 50  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 03  |.......P........|
  00000010  00 00 00 <span style="background-color:#808000;">14</span> 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
  00000010  00 00 00 14 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |................|
  00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 02 80  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  |...............@|
  00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 02 80  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  |...............@| m_sh<span style="background-color:#fff200;">0</span>
  00000030  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  |................|
  00000030  00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  |................|
  00000040  00 00 00 01 ff ff ff <span style="background-color:#000000; color:#ffffff;">ff</span> ff ff ff <span style="background-color:#000000; color:#ffffff;">ff</span> 00 00 00 01  |................|
  00000040  00 00 00 01 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 01  |................|
  00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 02 c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  |...............@|
  00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 02 c0  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  |...............@| m_sh<span style="background-color:#fff200;">1</span>
  00000060  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 02  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 06  |................|
  00000060  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 02  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 06  |................|
  00000070  00 00 00 01 ff ff ff <span style="background-color:#000000; color:#ffffff;">ff</span> ff ff ff <span style="background-color:#000000; color:#ffffff;">ff</span> 00 00 00 01  |................|
  00000070  00 00 00 01 ff ff ff ff  ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 01  |................|
  00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00  00 00 00 00 00 5a 01 74  |.............Z.t|
  00000080  00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00  00 00 00 00 00 5a 01 74  |.............Z.t| m_sh<span style="background-color:#fff200;">2</span>
  00000090  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 03  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 0c  |................|
  00000090  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 03  00 00 00 02 00 00 00 0c  |................|
  000000a0  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 <span style="background-color:#ff0000;">12</span> 00 00 00 <span style="background-color:#d52bd0;">13</span> 00 00 00 02  |................|
  000000a0  00 00 00 03 00 00 00 12  00 00 00 13 00 00 00 02  |................|
   
  000000b0 fd 5e fe 3f a0 42 fe 31  d6 61 83 26 98 07 ce e8  |.^.?.B.1.a.&....| Key file
<span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00000b0 fd 5e fe 3f a0 42 fe 31  d6 61 83 26 98 07 ce e8  |.^.?.B.1.a.&....| h0 0x20, HMAC-SHA1
  000000c0 09 a7 65 7a 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |..ez............|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00000c0 09 a7 65 7a 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |..ez............|
  000000d0 6a 49 08 b2 87 ee 02 65  8c 73 5a 4c 54 f8 bf 5d  |jI.....e.sZLT..]|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00000d0 6a 49 08 b2 87 ee 02 65  8c 73 5a 4c 54 f8 bf 5d  |jI.....e.sZLT..]| k0 0x40, HMAC key
  000000e0 b6 3a d4 ef d3 94 74 f5  f3 a3 f2 ad af 1c 45 4e  |.:....t.......EN|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00000e0 b6 3a d4 ef d3 94 74 f5  f3 a3 f2 ad af 1c 45 4e  |.:....t.......EN|
  000000f0 08 aa 2b 61 fb 91 52 9d  69 a8 44 b0 a0 dd 39 1c  |..+a..R.i.D...9.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00000f0 08 aa 2b 61 fb 91 52 9d  69 a8 44 b0 a0 dd 39 1c  |..+a..R.i.D...9.|
  00000100 bc 4d a0 51 ed f5 30 16  d1 35 8c b1 d1 09 54 d0  |.M.Q..0..5....T.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000100 bc 4d a0 51 ed f5 30 16  d1 35 8c b1 d1 09 54 d0  |.M.Q..0..5....T.|
  00000110 60 32 ff 1c 3d 1a 9d 03  61 28 d8 ad 1f dc 34 57  |`2..=...a(....4W|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000110 60 32 ff 1c 3d 1a 9d 03  61 28 d8 ad 1f dc 34 57  |`2..=...a(....4W| h1 0x20, HMAC-SHA1
  00000120 05 2a 1e f6 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.*..............|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000120 05 2a 1e f6 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |.*..............|
  00000130 6a 49 08 b2 87 ee 02 65  8c 73 5a 4c 54 f8 bf 5d  |jI.....e.sZLT..]|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000130 6a 49 08 b2 87 ee 02 65  8c 73 5a 4c 54 f8 bf 5d  |jI.....e.sZLT..]| k1 0x40, HMAC key
  00000140 b6 3a d4 ef d3 94 74 f5  f3 a3 f2 ad af 1c 45 4e  |.:....t.......EN|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000140 b6 3a d4 ef d3 94 74 f5  f3 a3 f2 ad af 1c 45 4e  |.:....t.......EN|
  00000150 08 aa 2b 61 fb 91 52 9d  69 a8 44 b0 a0 dd 39 1c  |..+a..R.i.D...9.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000150 08 aa 2b 61 fb 91 52 9d  69 a8 44 b0 a0 dd 39 1c  |..+a..R.i.D...9.|
  00000160 bc 4d a0 51 ed f5 30 16  d1 35 8c b1 d1 09 54 d0  |.M.Q..0..5....T.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000160 bc 4d a0 51 ed f5 30 16  d1 35 8c b1 d1 09 54 d0  |.M.Q..0..5....T.|
  00000170 3c 37 73 07 73 d5 69 69  52 67 97 3b e9 20 70 a9  |<7s.s.iiRg.;. p.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000170 3c 37 73 07 73 d5 69 69  52 67 97 3b e9 20 70 a9  |<7s.s.iiRg.;. p.| h2 0x20, HMAC-SHA1
  00000180 53 a7 11 6d 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |S..m............|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000180 53 a7 11 6d 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  |S..m............|
  00000190 6a 49 08 b2 87 ee 02 65  8c 73 5a 4c 54 f8 bf 5d  |jI.....e.sZLT..]|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>0000190 6a 49 08 b2 87 ee 02 65  8c 73 5a 4c 54 f8 bf 5d  |jI.....e.sZLT..]| k2 0x40, HMAC key
  000001a0 b6 3a d4 ef d3 94 74 f5  f3 a3 f2 ad af 1c 45 4e  |.:....t.......EN|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00001a0 b6 3a d4 ef d3 94 74 f5  f3 a3 f2 ad af 1c 45 4e  |.:....t.......EN|
  000001b0 08 aa 2b 61 fb 91 52 9d  69 a8 44 b0 a0 dd 39 1c  |..+a..R.i.D...9.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00001b0 08 aa 2b 61 fb 91 52 9d  69 a8 44 b0 a0 dd 39 1c  |..+a..R.i.D...9.|
  000001c0 bc 4d a0 51 ed f5 30 16  d1 35 8c b1 d1 09 54 d0  |.M.Q..0..5....T.|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00001c0 bc 4d a0 51 ed f5 30 16  d1 35 8c b1 d1 09 54 d0  |.M.Q..0..5....T.|
  000001d0 35 53 b4 b5 44 28 fe 09  5a 04 e5 38 e8 38 f4 a6  |5S..D(..Z..8.8..|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00001d0 <span style="background-color:#ff0000;">35 53 b4 b5 44 28 fe 09  5a 04 e5 38 e8 38 f4 a6</span> |5S..D(..Z..8.8..| Key
  000001e0 5d 24 fa b1 e0 55 f4 58  15 22 c2 73 00 00 00 00  |]$...U.X.".s....|
  <span style="background-color:#808000;">0</span>00001e0 <span style="background-color:#d52bd0;">5d 24 fa b1 e0 55 f4 58  15 22 c2 73 00 00 00 00</span> |]$...U.X.".s....| IV
  000001f0 00 c9 57 08 f1 6f e6 75  39 6f 2a 12 51 48 5f 8c  |..W..o.u9o*.QH_.| Signature r,s
  <span style="background-color:#B5E61D;">0</span>00001f0 00 c9 57 08 f1 6f e6 75  39 6f 2a 12 51 48 5f 8c  |..W..o.u9o*.QH_.| r, s
  00000200  97 53 e3 e2 a7 00 b7 47  fa c2 0b 01 2b df 5a 34  |.S.....G....+.Z4|
  00000200  97 53 e3 e2 a7 00 b7 47  fa c2 0b 01 2b df 5a 34  |.S.....G....+.Z4|
  00000210  f7 a8 d0 21 d2 f8 94 4b  6e 30 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...!...Kn0......|
  00000210  f7 a8 d0 21 d2 f8 94 4b  6e 30 00 00 00 00 00 00  |...!...Kn0......|
get signature


=verify ecdsa signatures=
compute digest of the whole decrypted metadata until signature
*get signature
 
*join sceh + decrypted metadata info + decrypted rest of metadata until signature
# ls -l metadata.bin
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 592 Jul 11  metadata.bin
*compute digest of the whole decrypted metadata until signature
# sha1sum metadata.bin
70942107d35df85091bf4949d7fa46421e27d056  metadata.bin
 
*verify signature against computed digest
ecdsa_verify(digest, r, s) == 1
 
=collecting spkg_hdr.1 signatures=
I've started collecting into an SQLite database all publicily available ECDSA signatures from spkg.hdr.1 files, to research.<br />
Note that here I've named 3.57 the 3.56#2 one! I know, 3.57 doesn't exist.
*get spkg_hdr.tar file from PS3UPDAT.PUP, here I've just added an argument to pupunpack to extract only the needed section:
ps3tools # ./pupunpack ../PS3\ 3.56\ OFW/PS3UPDAT.PUP ../PS3\ 3.56\ OFW/unpacked 7
sections:    9
hdr size:    00000000_00000290
data size:  00000000_0b0f3d3d
header hmac: OK
extracting only section 7
section 7: unpacking spkg_hdr.tar      (00000000_00011800 bytes; hmac: OK)...
*untar spkg.hdr.1 files
# cd ../PS3\ 3.56\ OFW/unpacked/
unpacked # tar -xf spkg_hdr.tar
*strip signature data off spkg.hdr.1 files into spkg.hdr.1_sigdata files, here I've added a function to sceverify
unpacked # for file in *hdr.1; do ../../ps3tools/sceverify $file; done
...
hash:  c72f26e67e03b743a8c830a541e82bfb2e9f6c19
r:      0056af2dad5647288c75e76dc92ed875de86876d7e
s:      00d7de25130de0f6dc0602e590b42bc5f21ab2a3e6
Signature: ecdsa_verify(hash, r, s) : OK
Collecting digest + signature for file: UPL.xml.pkg.spkg_hdr.1
exported: UPL.xml.pkg.spkg_hdr.1_sigdata, recheck ecdsa signature: OK
 
unpacked # for file in *1_sigdata; do ls -h $file; done
BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1_sigdata
BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_301R.pkg.spkg_hdr.1_sigdata
BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_302R.pkg.spkg_hdr.1_sigdata
...
*collect sigdata into an sqlite database, I've coded an app to do the job:
unpacked # for file in *1_sigdata; do ../../ps3tools/collector 1 $file 3.56; done
Connection successful
BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1_sigdata
BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 3.56
dig = 749e7ba6fba9ff4c8ad83d1fd62feec4ea9ad3f2
sig = 00574c57e9ceaac1285b3f6d7b06feaa7daa180edf002b0cc8548f42c523afa39c6984e4b67b9639afbc
...
BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_301R.pkg.spkg_hdr.1_sigdata
BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_301R.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 3.56
dig = cee76eb85bf899952acc8723ef3e35fdc9b0da23
sig = 0001bd4af80d5e8f190baea58e6613e5672d1c29a8000dcfad27f4edcef9f0b9f000759d89ebb050d871
...
*since collector can also export to STDOUT, we can already filter, sort...
# ./ps3tools/collector 2 | head -12
Connection successful
Export to STDOUT
BDIT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 3.57
dig = fcde1eaf97e24c9d0a5fe2af312e5b1ce1e6ab14
r = 003798ace6c2097c02e2f9214bfc2bbf5c7bd347ae
s = 002b1a77b56e0995f80761fa779db5b09e269ebf96
BDPT_FIRMWARE_PACKAGE_301R.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 3.57
dig = 0d953e1f78195b960a145a0c20753269a2352204
r = 00b2a103abbf09db35eb5a2580554446255fee4504
s = 0061292680dccc79e92373f002e669cf238c520a70
# ./ps3tools/collector 2 | grep "r =" | sort | head
r = 000119f11cc9076d039c1c0a625afe3dc5f9e38af9
r = 000171cfd17643b35e3f7a9fa1d64398413c35a949
r = 0001bd4af80d5e8f190baea58e6613e5672d1c29a8
r = 00023c6b278121e57ae6c836c0a188344dc676f9b7
r = 0003c42810e1b9f3cc4a93e71b101359116c06e68a
r = 000418380d9e2d2f4a11e88bcb42af8f17b042cd31
r = 00049a30c5e2d38ad19765e6c02e94377bf93444f9
r = 0004fa6eb1641706c20a14ede5dc0fe497b01f4dee
r = 00051b73b3eea4904f899ffc10f445ee080f2f3912
r = 0005639f0f3dd5585ed5e64df0421b274e842a2a2f
*check for the same r (they just failed in this, but watch how is simple!)
# ./ps3tools/collector 2 | grep "r =" | sort | wc -l
298 lines
# ./ps3tools/collector 2 | grep "r =" | sort | uniq | wc -l
298 lines (no same r!)
*database can be accessed via SQL query too, it contains binary blobs
# sqlite3 /tmp/collector_db.sqlite3
SQLite version 3.8.5 2014-06-04 14:06:34
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> SELECT HEX(dig) FROM spkg_hdr WHERE name = "SYS_CON_FIRMWARE_01010303.pkg.spkg_hdr.1 3.70";
7215D87859A31889F5FB931BDED988A95AF6A38E
*we can just use a browser plugin to deal with database
[[File:Collector.png|200px|thumb|spkg_hdr SQLite table]]
 
=questions=
'''z'''<br />
why you collect these hashes and signatures?<br />
Now if 2 digests are different then R signatures would be diffenet too. Pseudo Random number (that used to creating signature) now is F(digest);<br />
If digests are same then Pseudo Random numbers are same too ->> R sigs would be same and S sigs would be same.<br />
For every digest, we have 1 and only 1 signature (R,S). If you want obtain private key, you need to find an algorithm for generating pseudo random number from the digest.<br />
<br />
 
'''m'''<br />
ECDSA signature is the (r, s) keypair:<br />
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm#Signature_generation_algorithm
*first part, r
to compute r you have to (3) select a random integer, (4) calculate the curve point first, to finally (5) take the x coordinate mod n.
 
*the random integer
that random integer in signature generation is equal to select the random integer in the priv/pub keypair generation.<br />
that number is the temporary or ephemeral key.<br />
for every signature the algorithm needs one random integer, that must be never reselected, else epic fail.<br />
 
*digest
hash function is SHA1, you know, collision resistant: we can "never" have two different messages that produces the same sha1sum, else a collision.<br />
they also uses metadata info to change the message to sign from .pkg to .spgk_hdr.1 files, else they signs the same digest with different curve. (who other noticed/know this?)
 
*second part, s
s is computed from the digest and the latter r.
 
*why
suppose that you are doing trial point multiplication (x) computing: p = k x G to guess for the correct k that had produced our public point p.<br />
instead of checking only for exactly p, the pub, now you can consider that you have some hundreds of correct/public x coordinate mod n to check/guess for.<br />
or, in other words: I can luckily select an integer that, even isn't the priv, is the ephemeral key that had produced a valid signature.<br />
what could happen if I get an ephemeral key?
 
*those two needs investigation
{|
| 1. "''For every digest, we have 1 and only 1 signature (R,S).''"<br />Sorry, but don't think so, because as you can have read, r comes from a random number.<br />2. "''Pseudo Random number (that used to creating signature) now is F(digest);''"<br />They can't be so idiots, since digest is ever known...<br /> || [[File:Signing with my keypair.png|100px|thumbnail]]
|}
*example of different signatures from custom keypair to test for dig: da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709<br />
pub: df4222f3bff899845d203cd9373358ff7a0752f501c7f378195c0ac7e157f61e14ff231d73a0137f<br />
sig0: 008e8eaee8452d2915ef2186358079ee82a7c90d410063de8d98f012778596c14eb0df17f7464da65a02<br />
sig1: 00fdb20299e37c4a23a6cdc07ee0e91539e58ae62b00fc8ec36e79d2de33b4569f7968ea2211a4a92bef<br />
sig2: 0067af6858bf5bc2eb239dfcb997bc0c21fbaf16dc002f1c4cd4dcc5d71037d65caf05bbbccfce4f7fc1<br />
 
=playing on the vsh curve=
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|'''z'''<br />
So I will show for you that R = Function(digest) and what this fail is not so critical.
I was interested for edat algorithm and figured out how edats (and sdat) files are signed.<br />
It contains 2 non-randomfailed ecdsa signatures. http://www.psdevwiki.com/ps3/EDAT_files#Structure_.28Encrypted_Format.29<br />
first one is metadata signature and the second one is header signature. There are some edat files created from data files with 0 byte length, that contains metadata with 0 byte length.<br />
There are examples: original pkg links: http://is.gd/naLaxh , http://is.gd/IFtWmq it contains destiny.edat and hdd_package_key.edat , both files have metadata with 0 byte length.<br />
Hex code of the edats: http://pastie.org/private/ejoloa5qjjy8wlkezadga , http://pastie.org/private/fbr9uphpjzm0xd4gqfuyg .<br />
So Both edats have metadata digiest = DA39A3EE5E6B4B0D3255BFEF95601890AFD80709 , R = A2732E0161E20C290108FDD0B567120C42AAB3D2 , S = B894E8775AFF90A3CBB6CC08BC918C14F759D439<br />
So if digests are same then pseudo_random_numbers are same and signatures are same.<br />
Please make your conclusions.<br />
|}
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|'''m'''<br />You have already seen differences between two files, but maybe some other not. Here a png.<br />Page is telling me that at 0xB0 there is an ECDSA signature, and you are pointing out that we have the same (ECDSA) signature on two different files !?!<br />1. I see your "same signature", but how do you get "metadata digest = DA39A3EE5E6B4B0D3255BFEF95601890AFD80709" from both?<br />2. Conclusion to me are that at 0xB0 there is not an ECDSA signature, so: have you checked? Have you validated? Have you proven that r, s is the valid signature for the digest?<br />3. There is also another aspect to not forget: alignment (%16 = 0), so there is an ECDSA signature in 40 bytes? does not sound good to me...<br />4. SHA-1 produces a fixed length of 20 bytes: at wiki page I read "''0x40 QA digest, size 0x10 (seems like to be a SHA-1 hash of the non-finalized file) ... Can be ... zeroed on forged file.''" !?!<br />5. There are two ECDSA signatures on an EDAT file and only one to protect CORE_OS_PACKAGE.pkg from alteration !?!?! || [[File:EDATs diff.png|thumbnail|100px]]
|}
<br />
 
{| class="wikitable"
|-
|'''z'''<br />
1. metadata length = 0 bytes for both files, so digest for empty message is DA39A3EE5E6B4B0D3255BFEF95601890AFD80709.<br />
2. r,s validated and valid of course. so you can use make_npdata the newest version for validate signatures into edats. there are no mistakes, it is realy ecdsa sig.<br />
3. Both signatures has 40 bytes, first 20 bytes is R , second 20 bytes is S.<br />
4. Sony used full 20 bytes length sha1 hash for validate ECDSA signatures.<br />
5. Correct info. SCE pkg file have only header signature. edat have metadata sig and header sig.<br />
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|'''m'''<br />You are right, I've verified all, as you can see in my shots.<br />I've also noticed one thing that explain something: with zeroed ECDSA signature every digest results in a valid signature!<br />Why?<br />Because the signature becomes the point at infinity!<br />That's because on signature generation when r = 0 you have to select another random integer, as 0 < rand < n! And the same applies for s.<br />But really cool stuff can happen exacly with this kind of crazyness!||[[File:EDAT signatures on vsh curve 1.png|thumbnail|100px]] || [[File:EDAT signatures on vsh curve 2.png|thumbnail|100px]]
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|'''z'''<br />Im verified metadata and header signatures for both edat files. Check my screenshotes please. || [[File:Hdd_package_key.edat_ECDSA_validation.jpg|thumbnail|100px]] || [[File:Destiny.edat_ECDSA_validation.jpg|thumbnail|100px]]
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|'''m'''<br />
Checked your data, validated the same:
r =    00a2732e0161e20c290108fdd0b567120c42aab3d2
s =    00b894e8775aff90a3cbb6cc08bc918c14f759d439
hash =  da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 < zerolength metadata digest
call to check_ecdsa return 1, signature is VALID!
r =    00ff83adbd03d9ba619f3a6d80efef6408561f08d2
s =    009c3102a2852cdda21648014c4d0a1471bd6512fc
hash =  c9210133558bedda8981e5e06d6189be0dee84f3
call to check_ecdsa return 1, signature is VALID!
r =    0011f2e3ded044e3ace8e4513306a81ee124356e7a
s =    00ac9e20528900839f7a577c4b84e026539b89425e
hash =  6db5d204d7f9fa19442209a27647c3973a7e7232
call to check_ecdsa return 1, signature is VALID!
||
I can confirm your two signatures EDATs, when metadata length is zero the signature is valid as you told me and verified.<br />
could you try to validate a zeroed signature on two random hash with your implementation?<br />
f0f's one (and derived make_npdata) does not check for 1 < (r, s) < N - 1 as stated in signature verification algorithm, so a zeroed sig is valid for us!!<br />
 
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|'''z'''<br />Im tryed to validate a zeroed signature on two random hashes. Check my screenshot please. My Conclusion. Signatures R would be same only when random numbers are same. -->> Random numbers are not random again! So you can find another examples with another same digests and same signatures(R,S) -->> Random number are depends of digest. If we find algorithm how the "Random" numbers depends of the digests , we can calculate the "Random" number itself and obtain the private key.|| [[File:Zeroed_signature_validation.jpg|thumbnail|100px]]
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*conclusion<br />
when you EDAT have your famous zero metadata length, so the same digest, they MUST use EVER the same signature, else they let us solve the math!<br />
that's the real reason that explain also your wrong think about "''there is only one signature''" for a digest.
 
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UbTT_2yxeM sample psl1ght app: ec_gmp]
[https://github.com/andoma/ps3toolchain ps3toolchain and psl1ght from andoma], [https://gmplib.org gmplib] port, [https://github.com/masterzorag/xbm_tools xbm font] in [https://scognito.wordpress.com/2010/11/07/sconsole-a-simple-function-for-printing-strings-on-ps3 sconsole]: compute P = kG to eternity
 
=Petitboot NAND/NOR precompiled images=


* Not sure what is happening with you right now, but do you have some petitboot precompiled images? That'd be nice contribution for the wiki. Thanks :)
verify digest / signature
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