Editing SC Communication

=Introduction=

* The following information was reverse engineered from [[lv0ldr]], [[lv0]], [[Hypervisor_Reverse_Engineering#System_Controller_.28SC_or_SYSCON.29|lv1]].[[SC_Manager|self]], and [[Iso module]] sc_iso.self.
* Big thanks to graf_chokolo for a large part of the basis of this page, and to Jestero for Syscon Authentication info!

=Overview of Syscon Communication=

*Syscon lives at the mmio space of 0x24000080000.
*Communication occurs through mmio read/writes.

List of known offsets in Syscon:

{| class="wikitable FCK__ShowTableBorders"
|-
! Offset (from start of address space) !! Size !! Description
|-
|0xC000 || 0xFF0 || Syscon packet send area (Cell reads from here)
|-
|0xCFF0 || 0x4   || Syscon packet TX counter
|-
|0xCFF4 || 0x4   || Syscon packet RX counter
|-
|0xD000 || 0xFF0 || Cell packet send area
|-
|0xDFF0 || 0x4   || Cell packet TX counter
|-
|0xDFF4 || 0x4   || Cell packet RX counter
|-
|0xE100 || 0x4   || Tells syscon there is a packet to be received
|}

Quick explanation of the packet counters:
* There are two counters that are incremented by each side (Cell / Syscon).
* 0xCFF0 and 0xDFF0 are incremented by the sending side (Syscon for 0xCFF0, Cell for 0xDFF0)
* 0xCFF4 and 0xDFF4 are incremented by the receiving side (Cell for 0xCFF4, Syscon for 0xDFF4)

=Syscon Services=
* To be completed... (see {{talk}} page for examples)

<pre>
03 SERV_SDA         (not available on Sherwood)
10 SERV_DEVPM
11 SERV_THERM
12 SERV_SETCFG
13 SERV_SYSPM
14 SERV_NVS
15 SERV_SIRCS       (not available on Sherwood)
16 SERV_NOTIF
17 SERV_INTR_NOTIF  (not available on Sherwood)
18 SERV_VERS
1B SERV_LIVELOCK
1C SERV_OSWDT
1E SERV_DIAG        (not available on Sherwood)
1F SERV_SECU
20 SERV_CONSOLE
2D SERV_PATCH
30 SERV_HDMI
40 SERV_LS
50 SERV_STORAGE     (not available on Sherwood)

F1 CC_CGMS_191F8
F2 SERV_LS_DATA_23EBC
</pre>

{| class="wikitable FCK__ShowTableBorders"
|-
! Service ID !! Description
|-
| 0x03 || Device Access Service - Used for eeprom read/write.
|-
| 0x10 || Device Power Service (PS2 PCI Bus Power On/Off)
|-
| 0x11 || Time Zone Presence, Temperature, Thermal Alert Mode, 
|-
| 0x12 || Config Info Service (BE Count, Error Log....)
|-
| 0x13 || Power Service - Controls system power and related info. (Power Up/Power Button Mode, Wake Source, RTC too.)
|-
| 0x14 || NVS Service - Used for eeprom read/write. See: [[SC Manager#0x900B - SC Read EPROM]]
|-
| 0x15 || Serial Infrared Remote Control System
|-
| 0x16 || Notification / (LED / Buzzer) Service - Controls the lights on the console and the ring buzzer.
|-
| 0x17 || Interrupt Notification Service
|-
| 0x18 || Version Service - Versioning related (SC Type/Major-,Minor Version)
|-
| 0x1B || Livelock(?) Service - Checks for permission to use other services. 
|-
| 0x1C || Operating System Watch Dog Timer
|-
| 0x1E || Diag Service
|-
| 0x20 || Syscon Console Output - Used to send a string to syscon.
|-
| 0x2D || Syscon Patch Service
|-
| 0x30 || A/V Service / HDMI Service
|-
| 0x40 || LabStation (Fun Stuff)
|-
| 0x50 || Storage Service
|-
| 0x1F || Secure Services. (sc_secure_service)
|-
| 0xF1 || Copy Generation Management System Configuration 
|-
| 0xF2 || LabStation Data (More FunStuff)
|-
| 0xFF || Syscon Init (Seen in lv0ldr init sequence to syscon: [[User_talk:JuanNadie]])
|}

=Syscon Packet Headers=
* Some useful packet headers...
* If the header is shorter than 0x10, you must add your own size.
* If greater than 0x10, it's a full packet ;)

{| class="wikitable FCK__ShowTableBorders"
|-
! What? !! Description || Data || Notes
|-
| AUTH1 || AUTH1 Header || 0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,<br>0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30 || On AUTH1 UART SC Packets it's instead 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
|-
| AUTH2 || AUTH2 Header || 0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,<br>0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x30 || On AUTH2 UART SC Packets it's instead 0x10, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
|-
| Debug Output || Sends string to Syscon TTY || 0x20, 0x01, 0x00, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00<br>|| Start message with 0x00. Will print as much as packet length.
|-
| Triple Beep || || 0x16, 0x01, 0x16, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,<br>0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x08,<br>0x20, 0x29, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB6||
|-
| Shutdown || || 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,<br>0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04,<br>0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00|| Will not gracefully shut down HD.
|-
| Soft Restart || || 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,<br>0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04,<br>0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01|| Restarts, but doesn't kill power between boots.
|-
| Hard Restart || || 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,<br>0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04,<br>0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02|| Restarts, but kills power between boots.
|-
| Panic || || 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,<br>0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04,<br>0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03|| Shuts down, beeps, and kills power LED until power button pressed, or power removed.
|-
| Set Wake Up Source to Restart after Shutdown (Patch) || || 0x13, 0x01, 0x13, 0x12, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x39, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x08, 0x12, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x02, 0x74 || Sets Wake Up Source to Wake Up after Shutdown 
|-
| Shutdown Some Syscon Services Responsible for Patch  || || 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x14, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09 || Shutdown Some Syscon Services Responsible for Patch
|-
|}

=Syscon Authentication=
 - An IV of 0x00 is used for most AES steps.

== Step 1 - Generate Individual Seeds ==
Encrypt sc_iso metadata seeds w/ eid root key / iv.

<pre>aes256cbc_enc(eid_root_erk, eid_root_riv, sc_module_seeds, 0x40, sc_module_seeds);</pre>

== Step 2 - Generate SC_ISO encrypted keys ==
Encrypt the sc_key_seeds.

<pre>
indiv_key = sc_module_seeds + 0x20;
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; i += 0x10)
    aes256cbc_enc(indiv_key, zero_iv, key_seeds + i, 0x10, enc_key_seeds + i);
</pre>

== Step 3 - Authenticate with Syscon ==
Pick a session_id. Must be <= 7.

=== Step 3a - Secure Packet Header ===
<pre>
struct secure_payload_header {
    u8 session_id;
    u8 seq_service_id;  //service_ID (Unsecure uses 0xFF, AUTH1 = 0x02, AUTH2 = 0x03, READ_DATA = 0x04, WRITE_DATA = 0x05)
    u8 packet_type;     //0xFF for BE->SC, 0x00 for SC->BE (if success)
    u8 magic[0x2];      //0xAD1A
    u8 prng_random[0xB] //Random shit for padding
};
</pre>

=== Step 3b - AUTH 1 to SC ===
<pre>
u8 auth1_pkt_header[] = {0x1f,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x30};
uint8_t random_shit[0x10];
auth_key_1_0x01 = enc_key_seeds + (session_id * (0x10*2));
auth_key_2_0x01 = enc_key_seeds + (session_id * (0x10*2) + 0x10);

//generating random payload for auth1
rnd_gen(random_shit, 0x10);

//create auth1 random data
aes128cbc_enc(auth_key_1_0x01, zero_iv, random_shit, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10);

//length = 0x20
//Create secure header/footer
// create header: 5 bytes + random stuff (0xb)
payload_header->session_id = session_id;
payload_header->seq_service_id = seq_service_id++; // starts at 0
payload_header->packet_type = 0xFF;
payload_header->magic[0] = 0xAD;
payload_header->magic[1] = 0x1A;
rnd_gen((u8*) &payload_header->prng_random, 0x0B);
    
//encrypt payload
aes128cbc_enc(be2sc_key, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf, length, secure_payload_buf);

// create footer: omac1 of the whole packet
aesOmac1Mode(secure_payload_buf + length, secure_payload_buf, length, be2sc_key, sizeof(be2sc_key)*8);

//Set regular header
memcpy(sc_packet, auth1_pkt_header, 0x10);

//Send packet. 0x40 Bytes
</pre>

=== Step 3c - Validate AUTH1 ===
First, check the header/footer.
* Calculate AES [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-key_MAC OMAC] over the packet length and compare to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-key_MAC OMAC] from syscon. Use sc2be key.
* Decrypt internal packet with sc2be key. Use AES128CBC
* Compare returned session_id and seq_service_id.
* Check secure_payload_buf[0x2] == 0.

Then check the AUTH1 response
<pre>
// decrypt secure_payload
for (i = 0x0; i < 0x20; i += 0x10)
    aes128cbc(auth_key_2_0x01, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf + 0x10 + i, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10 + i);
    
// check if challange returned from syscon is correct
res = memcmp(secure_payload_buf + 0x10, random_shit, 0x10);
if (res != 0)
    return -1;
    
// save the new challange needed for AUTH2
memcpy(auth_challenge, secure_payload_buf + 0x20, 0x10);
</pre>

=== Step 3d - AUTH2 to SC ===
<pre>
//AUTH2 Challenge Payload
aes128cbc_enc(auth_key_1_0x01, zero_iv, auth_challenge, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10);

//length = 0x20
//Create secure header/footer
// create header: 5 bytes + random stuff (0xb)
payload_header->session_id = session_id;
payload_header->seq_service_id = seq_service_id++; // starts at 0
payload_header->packet_type = 0xFF;
payload_header->magic[0] = 0xAD;
payload_header->magic[1] = 0x1A;
rnd_gen((u8*) &payload_header->prng_random, 0x0B);
    
//encrypt payload
aes128cbc_enc(be2sc_key, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf, length, secure_payload_buf);

// create footer: omac1 of the whole packet
aesOmac1Mode(secure_payload_buf + length, secure_payload_buf, length, be2sc_key, sizeof(be2sc_key)*8);

//Set regular header
memcpy(sc_packet, auth2_pkt_header, 0x10);

//Put packet - 0x40 packet length
</pre>

=== Step 3e - Validate AUTH2 ===
Again, check the header/footer.
* Calculate AES [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-key_MAC OMAC] over the packet length and compare to [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-key_MAC OMAC] from syscon. Use sc2be key.
* Decrypt internal packet with sc2be key. Use AES128-CBC
* Compare returned session_id and seq_service_id.
* Check secure_payload_buf[0x2] == 0.

<pre>
// encrypt random_shit using auth_challenge (returned from AUTH1 reply) as key and 0 IV
aes128cbc_enc(auth_challenge, zero_iv, random_shit, 0x10, session_key);

// encrypt result in place with session_key_create[0x10 * sess_id] and IV 0 (result will be the session_key)
aes128cbc_enc(session_key_create + (session_id * 0x10), zero_iv, session_key, 0x10, session_key);

// use the session_key to decrypt auth2_payload in place (0x10)
aes128cbc(session_key, zero_iv, secure_payload_buf + 0x10, 0x10, secure_payload_buf + 0x10);
    
// compare the result with a 0x10 zero string
res = memcmp(secure_payload_buf + 0x10, zero_iv, 0x10);

//res == 0x0 is good.
</pre>

== Step 4 - Profit? ==
You are now authenticated with syscon, and can use privileged commands. Just use the session_key calculated from the AUTH2 reply to encrypt/decrypt responses.


= Some Samples from DYN-001 Syscon SPI SC Comms =

* https://mega.nz/#!2w00VAjK!u10PD2b0G-MqwUZTBD4Nv_by36QNn8P-jVIUxq0pLDM (dead link)

<pre>
00 70 0B 93 FF DC CF 43 97 68 49 06 71 32 27 C1 
E8 9F D1 73 DA 4D FA A2 7C 6F 24 F7 BD 95 37 EC 
F9 17 5B BB DB 32 E8 82 55 3F 51 23 F1 71 E6 88
</pre>

{{Reverse engineering}}<noinclude>[[Category:Main]]</noinclude>