Editing QA Flagging
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As we know Sony has <strike>taken QA Flag away</strike> changed the Auth for QA-flag on 3.6x Firmwares. Until someone changes it to work with the new method (which doesnt work on the old), your QA Flag will not work on 3.6x. | As we know Sony has <strike>taken QA Flag away</strike> changed the Auth for QA-flag on 3.6x Firmwares. Until someone changes it to work with the new method (which doesnt work on the old), your QA Flag will not work on 3.6x. | ||
From 3.60 Sony added a new step in the authentication process in the | From 3.60 Sony added a new step in the authentication process in the module "spu_token_processor.self". | ||
This new step is a digital signature verification using ECDSA ("Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm"). | This new step is a digital signature verification using ECDSA ("Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm"). | ||
The old token, the IDPS taked from the machine, the version of the Token (1), the array of flags, and the HMAC hash of the previous parts, remains valid as such. | The old token, the IDPS taked from the machine, the version of the Token (1), the array of flags, and the HMAC hash of the previous parts, remains valid as such. | ||
No key (AES, HMAC) were changed in the new module. | No key (AES, HMAC) were changed in the new module. | ||
However, after the decryption of the token, | However, after the decryption of the token, IDPS and verification of the machine with which it has the token performs a digital signature verification of all encrypted token (0x50 bytes). | ||
This performs a SHA-1 hash of the entire token (like Sony performed at the time of the digital signature) and passes to check the signature, if it validates the token is considered authentic and returned both encrypted as decrypted (this with the hash hmac set to 0), as happened in 3.56 and lower. | This performs a SHA-1 hash of the entire token (like Sony performed at the time of the digital signature) and passes to check the signature, if it validates the token is considered authentic and returned both encrypted as decrypted (this with the hash hmac set to 0), as happened in 3.56 and lower. | ||
In the event that the digital signature fails, consider that the token is not valid, as would happen if the token decryption fails, or any of your previous checks (HMAC computed with token bearing the token, the | In the event that the digital signature fails, consider that the token is not valid, as would happen if the token decryption fails, or any of your previous checks (HMAC computed with token bearing the token, the IDPs , ...). | ||
In this case it will return an empty buffer (instead of the decrypted token) and one with a token prepared but without any active flag, or indeed with any digital signature, as happened in 3.56 and lower. | In this case it will return an empty buffer (instead of the decrypted token) and one with a token prepared but without any active flag, or indeed with any digital signature, as happened in 3.56 and lower. | ||
In short it is not possible to put a machine QA in firmware 3.60 and higher unless you are patching the module (thus only work in that customized firmware), or getting a whole token and a valid digital signature for. | In short it is not possible to put a machine QA in firmware 3.60 and higher unless you are patching the module (thus only work in that customized firmware), or getting a whole token and a valid digital signature for. | ||
Given that the token varies by the | Given that the token varies by the IDPS to prevent universal token exists, only the IDPS should know that token, and change the IDPS of section one of EID0 (which is what the module checks), but this could have unintended consequences in some cases. | ||
= QA Downgrading = | = QA Downgrading = | ||