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[[Category:Software]] | |||
== Boot Sequence == | == Boot Sequence == | ||
Power on: syscon boots from | Power on : syscon boots from it's internal (non-encrypted / dual banked) ROM *1 *2 | ||
+ syscon powers up various power subsystems | + syscon powers up various power subsystems | ||
+ syscon powers up cell and checks status | + syscon powers up cell and checks status | ||
+ syscon sends Cell configuration ring to Cell | + syscon sends Cell configuration ring to Cell | ||
+ syscon pulls the reset of Cell high -> Cell INIT | + syscon pulls the reset of Cell high -> Cell INIT | ||
Cell INIT: CELL boots from | Cell INIT: CELL boots from it's internal ROM *2 | ||
+ fetches encrypted bootldr off NAND (at address 0x000000) /NOR flash (at address 0xFC0000) | + Initialises I/O | ||
+ fetches encrypted bootldr off NAND (at address 0x000000) /NOR flash (at address 0xFC0000) | |||
+ | + Initialises RAM | ||
+ | + loads bootldr into Isolated SPU (SPE0) | ||
+ Runtime Secure Boot decrypts and verifies bootldr and executes | |||
+ bootldr decrypts lv0 which runs on PPU -> loaders INIT | + bootldr decrypts lv0 which runs on PPU -> loaders INIT | ||
loaders INIT: lv0 loads metldr (SPE2) | loaders INIT: lv0 loads metldr (SPE2) | ||
+ passes lv1ldr (which loads lv1) to metldr | + passes lv1ldr (which loads lv1) to metldr | ||
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*1) Read/Writeable with undocumented / should also be read/writeable through serial port and possible to switch it to the backup bank1 with backup_mode pulled high | *1) Read/Writeable with undocumented / should also be read/writeable through serial port and possible to switch it to the backup bank1 with backup_mode pulled high | ||
*2) | *2) CEX/Retail consoles go to standby with red light. SEX/SHOP/SECH will not standby, but instead boot through without waiting for powerbutton. Also check is done on all models if update is flagged to set it into firmware updating procedure | ||
*3) Partialy Read/Writeable | *3) Partialy Read/Writeable | ||
about the disabled SPE: syscon reads it’s internal (non-encrypted) eeprom @ 0x48C30 which is value 0×06 on all | about the disabled SPE: syscon reads it’s internal (non-encrypted) eeprom @ 0x48C30 which is value 0×06 on all CEX/Retail consoles and will set the cell config ring accordingly for 7 SPE’s. SPE0 and SPE2 are reserved for bootldr and metldr for isolation respectively. Setting the value to a nonworking state (e.g. 0×00, 0xFF, enabling a defective SPE or disabling a needed SPE for proper boot) might brick the console, locking you out from restoring the correct value to the syscon eeprom. | ||
=== References === | === References === | ||
* [http://ip.com/patapp/US20090055637 Secure power-on reset engine] | * [http://ip.com/patapp/US20090055637 Secure power-on reset engine] | ||
** [ | ** [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/US7895426.pdf US7895426.pdf] | ||
** [ | ** [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/US20090055637.pdf US20090055637.pdf] | ||
* [ | * [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/-%20Cell%20BE/CellBE_Handbook_v1.12_3Apr09_pub.pdf CellBE_Handbook_v1.12_3Apr09_pub.pdf] | ||
* [ | * [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/-%20Cell%20BE/Cell_Broadband_Engine_processor_vault_security_architecture.pdf Cell_Broadband_Engine_processor_vault_security_architecture.pdf] | ||
* [http://www.multiupload.com/7STWIQ8PBF CellBEBootprocess.pdf (177.69 KB) | * [http://www.multiupload.com/7STWIQ8PBF CellBEBootprocess.pdf (177.69 KB)]) // | ||
* [ | * [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/-%20CELL%20SDK%20Documentation/lib/CBE_Secure_SDK_Guide_v3.0.pdf CBE_Secure_SDK_Guide_v3.0.pdf] | ||
* [ | * [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/-%20Cell%20BE/CellBE_HIG_65nm_v1.01_8Jun2007.pdf CellBE_HIG_65nm_v1.01_8Jun2007.pdf)] | ||
* [ | * [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/-%20Cell%20BE/CellBE_HIG_90nm_v1.5_30Nov2007_pub.pdf CellBE_HIG_90nm_v1.5_30Nov2007_pub.pdf]) | ||
* [ | * [http://www.ps3devwiki.com/files/documents/BE_Hardwar_Init_Guide_v1.3_31March2006.pdf BE_Hardwar_Init_Guide_v1.3_31March2006.pdf] | ||
== Chain of Trust == | == Chain of Trust == | ||
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| SPE(0) | | SPE(0) | ||
| Per Console Encrypted at factory | | Per Console Encrypted at factory | ||
| No <span style="color:red | | No <span style="color:red;">*</span> | ||
| No | |||
| Setup Primairy Hardware + load lv0 | |||
| No | | No | ||
|- | |- | ||
| lv0 (Level 0) | | lv0 (Level 0) | ||
| Line 75: | Line 74: | ||
| No | | No | ||
| Setup Hardware | | Setup Hardware | ||
| | | No | ||
|- | |- | ||
| metldr (asecure_loader) | | metldr (asecure_loader) | ||
| Line 81: | Line 80: | ||
| SPE(2) | | SPE(2) | ||
| Per Console Encrypted at factory | | Per Console Encrypted at factory | ||
| No <span style="color:red | | No <span style="color:red;">*</span> | ||
| No | | No | ||
| | | load loaders (Meta Loader) | ||
| Yes | | Yes | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 92: | Line 91: | ||
| Yes | | Yes | ||
| No | | No | ||
| Decrypt lv1 (Hypervisor) | | Decrypt lv1 (Hypervisor) | ||
| Yes | | Yes | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Line 131: | Line 130: | ||
| Yes | | Yes | ||
|} | |} | ||
<span style="color:red | <span style="color:red;">*</span> : ofcourse with new hardware revisions, it is updated in factory. See [[Flash#new_metldr.2]] | ||
== Chain of trust Diagram == | == Chain of trust Diagram == | ||
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* http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/power/library/pa-cellsecurity/ | * http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/power/library/pa-cellsecurity/ | ||
== Changes in firmware 3.60 == | == Changes in firmware 3.60 == | ||
Lv0 has now been changed, LV0 now appears to encapsulate all of the [[Loaders]] (appldr, isoldr, lv1ldr, lv2ldr). Now in order to break the chain of trust we need to be able to decrypt/exploit LV0 (or bootldr which loads LV0) | Lv0 has now been changed, LV0 now appears to encapsulate all of the [[Loaders]] (appldr, isoldr, lv1ldr, lv2ldr). Now in order to break the chain of trust we need to be able to decrypt/exploit LV0 (or bootldr which loads LV0) -> done! see http://www.ps3devwiki.com/wiki/Keys#lv0 | ||
=== Chain of trust Diagram 3.60++ === | === Chain of trust Diagram 3.60++ === | ||
<table width="100%" align="left"><tr><td align="left">[[File:Ps3-cryptochain-360.png|800px|thumb|left|LV0 with encapsulated loaders (appldr, isoldr, lv1ldr, lv2ldr).)]]</tr></table> | <table width="100%" align="left"><tr><td align="left">[[File:Ps3-cryptochain-360.png|800px|thumb|left|LV0 with encapsulated loaders (appldr, isoldr, lv1ldr, lv2ldr).)]]</tr></tr></table> | ||
not in this diagram: the added .2 metadata<br /> | not in this diagram: the added .2 metadata<br /> | ||